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CHAPTER ONE 
PREFACE 
“We’re not children here. The law is – how should I put it? A convenience. Or a 
convenience for some people, and an inconvenience for other people. Like, take the law 
that says you can’t go into someone else’s house… I have a house, so, hey, I like that 
law. The guy without a house – what’s he think of it? Stay out in the rain, schnook.  
That’s what the law means to him…” 
Paul Castellano (1915-1985) 
1.1 Introduction 
Why study the informal economy? Informal economic activities increasingly capture the 
interest of scholars, policymakers, journalists, and the public alike. In broad terms, the 
informal economy covers a wide range of economic activities that are not taxed, 
regulated, or reported to authorities, i.e., these activities take place outside a society’s 
legal system and are thus not recorded in national (income) accounts. Although present 
in all types of economic systems in one way or another, it is generally agreed that the 
importance of the informal sector has varied in different periods and across different 
countries. For example, Schneider (2007a) estimates that the average size of the shadow 
economy – an important if not the most important part of the informal sector – amounted 
to 37% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of developing countries and 39% of the 
GDP of the transition countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 2005. 
While the shadow economies in developing and transition countries are relatively large, 
the shadow economies of developed countries are relatively small: on average, they 
amounted to “only” 15% of GDP in 2005 [Schneider (2007a)]. The informal economy 
has nevertheless reached a remarkable size in almost all countries around the world. 
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Three main aspects make the informal economy an interesting and relevant research 
topic for economists. First, according to the overwhelming majority of the empirical 
evidence available, the size of the informal economy has been growing in recent years 
[Gërxhani (2004); Schneider (2007a); Feige and Urban (2008)]. A second aspect is that 
effective policymaking requires accurate information about informal economic activities. 
Detailed information enables governments to effectively measure the extent of the 
informal economy, then to study its determinants, and finally to allocate resources to 
combat it. Third, tracking the development of informal economic activities over time 
also provides evidence as to how successful these efforts have been and may help 
governments to further improve their policies. 
The character of the informal economic activities undertaken differs depending on the 
level of a country’s development. In developed countries, informal economic activities 
often include tax evasion, the employment of undeclared labor such as illegal or 
undocumented immigrants, and the smuggling of illegal goods such as drugs and 
firearms. That is, the execution of these activities in the informal economy, which is in 
developed countries relatively small compared to the official economy, is primarily 
motivated by institutional restrictions or – in cases of neighborly help and do-it-yourself 
(DIY) activities – by individual market constraints. In developing countries, informal 
economic activities are often the source of employment for a significant portion of the 
labor force which is due to the weakness of the formal sector of the economy to create a 
sufficient number of (legal) jobs. That is, the informal economy, which is in developing 
countries relatively large compared to the official economy, often provides subsistence 
for families. Consequently, discussions about informal economic activities in developed 
countries focus on unemployment, problems of financing public expenditures, tax 
evasion, and antisocial behavior, while informal economic activities in developing 
countries are considered a central aspect of the economic as well as social life and 
strategies focus on policies needed to promote development and growth [Schneider and 
Enste (2002), pp. 30-32].  
The concept of the informal sector originates from a study in a Third World context 
[Hart (1970)]. Hart uses the term to describe a part of the labor force outside the formal 
labor market made up of (small) self-employed individuals. In addition to Hart’s 
influential work, the International Labour Organization’s report on employment in 
Kenya is considered a pioneering study on the informal economy [ILO (1972)]. In it, the 
12 
 
ILO focuses on employment in unregistered enterprises and finds that providing 
subsistence to families is the main reason for the existence of the informal economy. The 
report concludes that growth of the informal economy in Kenya is mainly due to its 
positive effects on employment and income distribution. The informal sector, or the 
informal economy, thereafter typically referred to ways of making a living outside the 
formal economy – either as an alternative to or as a means of supplementing income 
earned in the formal economy [Bromley and Gerry (1979), pp. 4-6]. These studies make 
clear that the notion of the informal economy in the 1970s had been limited to self-
employment and the provision of subsistence to families in developing countries. 
In the 1980s and 1990s however, the literature established many other criteria to 
determine what constitutes informal economic activities. These criteria are rather 
heterogeneous across most authors: determinants, consequences, and the character of the 
activity. For example, Feige (1981; 1990) and Tanzi (1986) distinguish informal from 
formal economic activities by the incentive to evade taxes while Harding and Jenkins 
(1989) distinguish them by the consequences of these activities for employees such as 
whether employment is associated with fewer social benefits or lower than minimum-
wages.1 In his study of Peru, De Soto uses the legal status – unregistered/unlicensed 
versus registered/licensed enterprises – to distinguish informal from formal economic 
activities [De Soto (1989), pp. 151-172]. He relates the emergence of the informal 
economy to economic policy and to transaction costs and argues that deregulation of the 
market, greater private property rights, and a reduction of state intervention will reduce 
informal economic activities. 
The terms these days found most often in the literature to classify informal economic 
activities include undeclared labor, tax evasion, unregulated or unlicensed enterprises, 
illegality, and criminality. Table 1.1 lists the most common characteristics used to define 
informal economic activities in alphabetical order together with a brief characterization 
and influential representatives who first used the respective criterion.2 
                                               
1
 See Gërxhani (2004). 
2
 Table 1.1 provides a brief overview of the literature’s definitions of informal economic 
activities. For comprehensive reviews, see Thomas (1992), Schneider and Enste (2000), and 
Gërxhani (2004). 
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Table 1.1 Characteristics Typical for Informal Economic Activities 
Category Characteristics of informal 
economic activities 
Author(s) 
Government 
regulation 
intension to avoid regulations ILO (1972), Feige (1981; 
1989), Harding and Jenkins 
(1989) 
Illegality generally illegal or unlawful Feige (1981; 1989), 
Harding and Jenkins 
(1989), Renooy (1990) 
Labor market undeclared labor, lack of 
social benefits, lower than 
minimum-wages 
ILO (1972), 
Harding and Jenkins 
(1989), Renooy (1990) 
National accounts 
statistics 
not included due to creative 
accounting or non- or under-
reporting 
Feige (1981), Tanzi (1982; 
1986), Renooy (1990) 
Professional status self-employment, family 
workers, domestic servants 
Hart (1970; 1973), ILO 
(1972), Swaminathan 
(1991) 
Registration unregistered or unlicensed 
enterprises 
De Soto (1989), 
Swaminathan (1991) 
Subsistence/survival widespread in developing 
countries, less important for 
developed countries 
Banerjee (1982), 
Swaminathan (1991) 
Taxes/income intension to evade/un- or 
underreported  
Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), Feige (1981; 1990), 
Tanzi (1982; 1986), Frey 
(1989), Alm (1991) 
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All of the activities that meet the criteria mentioned above have one thing in common: 
they all involve some kind of unlawfulness. For example, employing undeclared workers 
in order to save on labor costs and social security contributions is illegal. Tax evasion, 
non- or under-reporting of income, and the production, distribution, or consumption of 
illegal goods and services are also illegal. Another important characteristic of these 
activities is that they are not accounted in official national accounts statistics. For this 
reason, DIY activities – although perfectly legal – are also considered informal economic 
activities [Thomas (1992), p. 3]. 
Using a rigid list of criteria to distinguish between formal and informal economic 
activities has advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that it enables researchers 
to distinguish between very different activities within the informal economy. For 
example, one can consider simultaneously goods and services produced within the 
household, forms of illegal employment, tax evasion and social security fraud, and even 
criminal economic activities like drug smuggling. The disadvantage is that it becomes 
difficult to develop a single, overarching definition for all informal economic activities. 
For this reason, many researchers tailor the definition of informal economic activities to 
the subject under consideration. The literature nevertheless agrees that, in general, the 
informal economy comprises all goods and services which normally should be included 
in the calculation of the GDP but which are not because of businesses not being legally 
registered as businesses, employing workers informally, failing to comply with laws and 
regulations, or failing to disclose transactions to authorities because the goods and/or 
services are illegal [Thomas (1992), pp. 1-9]. Examples of businesses operating in the 
informal economy range from family businesses and large companies that employ 
informal workers, avoid social security contributions, evade taxes, or avoid compliance 
with labor market regulations such as minimum wage and safety regulations, to criminal 
organizations. 
One aspect of the informal economy on which much of the literature focuses is the 
shadow economy, i.e., the unlawful (illegal) production, sale, and/or consumption of 
otherwise legal goods and services.3 These activities are typically referred to as the legal 
                                               
3
 The following terms are used as mere synonyms in the literature: black, concealed, informal, 
non-observed, parallel, shadow, subterranean, underground, or unrecorded economy. 
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part of the shadow economy.4 The DIY economy, i.e. the production and consumption of 
goods and services within the household sector, and the illegal part of the shadow 
economy, i.e., the (illegal) production, sale, and/or consumption of illegal goods and/or 
services such as drugs, are typically excluded from analyses of informal economic 
activities. Smuggling, for example, i.e., the illegal trade of legal and/or illegal goods, is 
usually studied in a completely separate branch of the literature. By definition, however, 
smuggling – as well as DIY activities – are informal economic activities and thus part of 
the informal economy. 
For this reason, this dissertation takes a comprehensive approach to the study of the 
informal economy. It considers traditional shadow economic activities, household DIY 
activities, and the smuggling of illegal as well as legal goods as informal economic 
activities. The reason for this is because shadow economic activities, DIY activities, and 
smuggling, all meet one or another criterion presented in Table 1.1. DIY and shadow 
economic activities, for example, are part of the informal economy because they are not 
accounted for in official national accounts statistics, involve family or undocumented 
workers, or evade taxes. Legal goods smuggling is part of the informal economy because 
it is not accounted for in official international trade statistics and because it is motivated 
by tax and/or tariff evasion. Illegal goods smuggling is both an informal and illegal 
economic activity and is thus also part of the informal economy. 
The empirical analyses in this dissertation are based on structural equation models 
(SEMs). These models are particularly appropriate for the analysis of informal economic 
activities for two reasons. First, SEMs are able to consider informal economic activities 
as unobservable, rather than observable variables. Second, SEMs divide observable 
variables into causes and indicators of the unobservable variable. This enables 
researchers to take into account the multiple determinants (causes) and the multiple 
effects (indicators) of informal economic activities. The SEM methodology is often 
applied to the shadow economy, but I use it for DIY activities and smuggling as well. 
This approach contributes to the literature by applying SEMs consistently to the 
empirical analysis of all informal economic activities studied in this dissertation. 
                                               
4
 See, for example, Schneider and Enste (2002, pp. 10-13) for a detailed discussion on the 
classification of different types of shadow economic activities. 
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1.2 Outline and Main Findings 
This dissertation is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the main topic, the 
outline, and presents the main findings. The bulk of the analysis is contained in Chapters 
2, 3, and 4. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes. Chapter 6 lists the references. Chapter 
7 describes SEMs which have been used in the empirical analyses of Chapters 2, 3, and 
4. Chapters 8, 9, and 10 contain the appendices of Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
Chapter 2 studies shadow economic and DIY activities and presents a dual estimation 
for the development of both types of informal economic activities in Germany from 1970 
to 2005. DIY activities produce goods and services at home in one’s spare-time, and are 
often associated with self-realization of the individual.5 Shadow economic activities are 
carried out by small-scale producers who supply intermediate goods and services to other 
producers and by (large-scale) businesses which supply goods and services for final 
demand. While shadow economic goods and services are legal, the processes of 
production and distribution involve some kind of irregularity and unlawfulness such as 
tax evasion, social security fraud, or non-compliance with regulations such as minimum 
wages or safety standards. Although difficult to obtain (because individuals engaged in 
these activities wish not to disclose these activities), statistics on shadow economic 
activities are valuable for two reasons. First, without accurate statistics on the economy 
as a whole (whether formal and informal), such as unemployment, income, and 
consumption, the government’s economic policies are likely to be inappropriate, 
ineffective, or both. Second, statistics on shadow economic activities can help 
policymakers to find and prosecute those who have evaded taxes and enforce labor and 
safety regulations. Failure to do so weakens not only the economy but society as well.  
The calculations for Germany presented in Chapter 2 show that the informal 
economy, in particular shadow economic and DIY activities, in Germany accounted for a 
remarkable 22% of official GDP in 2005. German shadow economic activities are 
motivated primarily by institutional factors such as taxation and regulation while DIY 
                                               
5
 While DIY activities in developed countries are often seen as something positive and 
creative, the nature of DIY activities in developing countries is different. In developing countries, 
household production and exchange of goods and services is often necessary for survival and 
motivated by self-sufficiency of households. 
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activities are driven by unemployment and individual constraints. Deregulation as well 
as lower tax and social security contribution burdens are two efficient means of shifting 
shadow economic activities into the formal economy.  
Chapter 3 studies an informal economic activity that has attracted much attention 
recently: legal goods smuggling, or the illegal trade of otherwise legal goods. The main 
form of this informal economic activity is the falsification of trade documents. By 
reporting false amounts of exports and/or imports to authorities smugglers, or trade 
misinvoicers, seek to avoid paying taxes and/or tariffs. Both shadow economic activities 
and legal goods smuggling involve otherwise legal products and services. Unlike shadow 
economic activities, however, legal goods smuggling involves the distribution – rather 
than the production or consumption – of goods in order to evade taxes and tariffs. 
Smuggling also differs from shadow economic activities in that it is an international – 
rather than domestic – activity. It requires extra-legal resources, promotes corruption and 
bribery, puts a strain on international relations, and potentially diminishes the gains from 
international trade.  
Due to the illegal nature of smuggling, data is difficult to obtain and little is known 
about the magnitude and extent of smuggling in different countries around the world. 
Chapter 3 contributes to the empirical literature on legal goods smuggling by applying an 
SEM to estimate an index of smuggling in 54 countries. The empirical analysis reveals 
that legal goods smuggling, or informal international trade, takes place when tariffs are 
high and/or when there are non-tariff barriers to trade. Thus, lowering tariffs and 
removing trade barriers may help shift the illegal smuggling of otherwise legal goods 
trade to the legal sector of international trade. Smuggling could also be reduced through 
more effective law enforcement because it would increase the expected cost of 
smuggling. Corruption, however, decreases the risk of illegal trade and makes it more 
profitable. The ranking of countries shows that illegal trade is less common in Western 
Europe – a region with relatively low corruption – and more common in Latin America, 
Asia, and Africa – regions with relatively high corruption. 
Chapter 4 argues that the analysis of smuggling has been incomplete in the literature 
so far. To improve the understanding of illegal trade, I distinguish between the 
smuggling of illegal goods and the smuggling of legal goods. In particular, I study the 
smuggling of illegal and legal goods across the U.S.-Mexico border. Official estimates 
suggest that illegal cross-border transactions are on the rise in many parts of the world: 
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the trafficking of illegal immigrants into developed countries and the smuggling of 
illegal drugs have developed into multi-billion-dollar businesses [LeMay (2007), 33-35; 
United Nations (2009), pp. 9-19]. The U.S.-Mexican case is particularly interesting since 
most illegal drugs and immigrants in the United States arrive via the Mexican border. For 
example, 90 percent of the cocaine in the United States – between 300 and 460 metric 
tons – came from Mexico [Ford (2008), p. 25]. In addition, more than 400,000 Mexicans 
per year over the last decade entered the United States illegally via the southern border 
[Passel (2007)]. While Mexico’s efforts focus mostly on the violent, well-armed and 
well-financed drug cartels, the focus in the United States is – according to the 2008 
National Drug Threat Assessment Report – on enforcing the border and reducing the 
demand for illegal drugs [Department of Justice (2008), pp. 4-7].  
The smuggling of legal goods differs from the smuggling of illegal goods. Legal 
goods smuggling is motivated by tariff and tax evasion and is commonly considered a 
peccadillo (petty offense). Illegal goods smuggling, on the other hand, often involves 
dangerous criminals committing serious offenses who, if caught, face severe punishment. 
The two types of smuggling are thus associated with different types of agents, incentives, 
and intensity of law enforcement. 
Chapter 4 also provides the empirical analyses of illegal and legal goods smuggling. 
The first analysis shows that the smuggling of illegal goods from Mexico to the United 
States decreases when Mexican labor market conditions improve and U.S. border 
enforcement is intensified. Conversely, illegal goods smuggling increases when the 
Mexican economy suffers as during the Mexican recessions in 1982-83 and 1995 which 
led to large temporary increases in illegal goods smuggling. From 1984 to 2004, the 
smuggling of illegal goods decreased from $116 billion to $27 billion. This can be 
attributed to stricter border enforcement in the United States and better job prospects in 
Mexico. The second analysis shows that legal goods smuggling is motivated by tariff and 
tax evasion and decreases with tariff reductions. The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1987 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1994, for example, had a significant impact on the smuggling of legal goods across the 
U.S.-Mexico border.  
Chapter 5 presents the most important findings of the dissertation and places them in 
the overall context of informal economic activities. It also explores avenues for future 
research. 
  
CHAPTER TWO 
SHADOW ECONOMIC AND DO-IT-YOURSELF ACTIVITIES:  
THE GERMAN CASE∗ 
”Taxes grow without rain.” 
Jewish Proverb 
This chapter presents a dual estimation of shadow economic and do-it-yourself (DIY) 
activities and tracks their development in Germany from 1970 to 2005. It shows that DIY 
activities in Germany are sizable and should be taken into account when formulating 
economic policy. It also considers the impact of German reunification on shadow 
economic and DIY activities and employs a proper estimate of domestic currency in 
circulation (M0) within Germany as an indicator variable for the shadow economy. 
DIY activities – home repair, maintenance, and improvements – are, in developed 
country like Germany, often considered positive and creative spare time activities. 
Shadow economic activities, such as legal work for which income is not reported, on the 
other hand, are often considered negative and harmful. Most societies therefore attempt 
to control the shadow economy through punishment in order to spur growth in the 
official economy. While much is know about the size of the shadow economies in 
different parts of the world, its determinants, and impacts, the literature has paid less 
attention to DIY activities. One reason is that in developed countries DIY activities are 
less sizable and important compared to shadow economic activities.6 
                                               
∗
 This chapter follows Buehn et al. (2009). Copyright © 2009 Mohr Siebeck. 
6
 In developing countries, however, DIY activities are an important part of life. As a way of 
making a living outside the formal economy, either as an alternative to it, or as means of 
supplementing the formally earned income, they often provide subsistence to families (see 
Chapter 1). 
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From a household perspective, shadow economic and DIY activities may be 
substitutes. If it is too risky to demand shadow economic activities – for fear of being 
caught and incurring fines and/or punishment – individuals may undertake DIY 
activities. The two could, however, be viewed as complements. Individuals may demand 
shadow economic activities, for example, to supplement the production of DIY goods 
and services for quality assurance and/or efficiency. For example, an individual may 
choose to renovate her home herself but may hire a handyman informally for tasks she 
does not know how to do or cannot do well. In this way, she is supplementing (or 
complementing) her own DIY activities with shadow economic ones.  
Unfortunately, gathering accurate information on the shadow economy is difficult 
because individuals working in this sector do not readily volunteer details about their 
informal activities. Although literature on particular aspects of the shadow economy 
exists,7 including one comprehensive survey on the shadow economy as a whole 
[Schneider and Enste (2000)], the subject still remains controversial. Measuring DIY 
activities, an even more neglected subject of the literature, is no less challenging. 
Previous investigations into the informal economy usually excluded DIY activities, 
claiming that they are less important and do not constitute a sizable portion of the 
economy. To the author’s knowledge, only two early studies estimate both shadow 
economic and DIY activities [Karmann (1988; 1990a)]. My calculations show that 
German shadow economic activities increased from 1-2% of official GDP in 1970 to 
17% of official GDP in 2005. Over the same period, DIY activities increased from 4% to 
around 5% of official GDP. Together, both types of activities accounted for 
approximately 22% of Germany’s official GDP in 2005. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 defines the shadow economy and 
DIY activities and provides a short review of existing estimates of the shadow economy 
in Germany. Section 2.2 describes the empirical methodology. Section 2.3 provides 
theoretical considerations as to why individuals turn to shadow economic and DIY 
activities. Section 2.4 presents the results of the estimations and calibrations of the size 
and development of shadow economic and DIY activities in Germany. Section 2.5 
                                               
7
 See Frey and Pommerehne (1984), Schneider (1994; 1997; 2005), Loayza (1996), Lippert 
and Walker (1997), Johnson et al. (1997), Johnson et al. (1998), Pedersen (2003), and Gërxhani 
(2004). 
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concludes. 
2.1 Definitions and Brief Literature Review 
2.1.1 Shadow Economic and Do-it-Yourself Activities 
Most authors attempting to measure the shadow economy face the difficulty to develop 
an appropriate working definition. One commonly used definition is all currently 
unregistered economic activities that would contribute to the officially calculated 
(observed) GDP. This definition is used, for example, by Frey and Pommerehne (1984) 
and Feige (1989, p.19; 1994). Smith (1994, p. 18) defines the shadow economy as 
“market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal that escapes 
detection in the official estimates of GNP.” One of the broadest definitions interprets the 
shadow economy as those economic activities and the income derived from them that 
circumvent government regulation, taxation, or observation.8 In this chapter, the 
following, more narrow definition of the shadow economy is used: The shadow economy 
includes all market-based, legal goods and services that are deliberately concealed from 
public authorities to avoid payment of income, value-added, or other taxes and social 
security contributions; to get around certain labor market standards, such as minimum 
wages, maximum working hours, and safety standards; or to avoid administrative 
procedures, such as filling in forms and statistical questionnaires. 
DIY activities include all goods and services that are produced by the household in 
order to avoid gross wage payments, including taxes and social security contributions, in 
the official economy or to avoid any net wage payments in the shadow economy. That is, 
DIY activities are primarily undertaken to avoid labor costs either in the official or in the 
unofficial (shadow) economy. The treatment of the value added from these activities to 
GDP depends on whether the production is for capital formation or consumption. The 
broadest rule is that capital formation undertaken by family businesses should be 
included in GDP while production for consumption should not [Thomas (1992), pp. 16-
                                               
8
 Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003) use this definition. See also Thomas (1999) and Fleming et 
al. (2000). For an excellent discussion of the definition of the shadow economy, see Pedersen 
(2003). 
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17]. I follow this rule and focus on DIY activities for capital formation only and not on 
activities such as cleaning.9  
It is important to note that the main difference between DIY and shadow economic 
activities is that the former are entirely lawful while the latter involve some kind of 
unlawfulness such as tax evasion or the violation of labor market regulations. This 
chapter does not deal with illegal/criminal (shadow economic) activities, such as 
burglary, robbery, and drug dealing. Rather, it considers the production of legal goods 
through shadow economic and DIY activities, which together form the hidden economy. 
Table 2.1 provides an overview of these different types of economic activities. 
 
                                               
9
 This differentiation is due to the choice of the indicator variable for DIY activities in the 
empirical analysis, turnovers in DIY stores, which largely reflects the demand for inputs of DIY 
activities for capital formation. 
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Table 2.1 Types of Hidden Economic Activities 
Type of 
activity 
Monetary transactions Non-monetary transactions 
Illegal 
activities 
Trade in stolen goods, drug dealing 
and manufacturing, prostitution, 
gambling, smuggling, fraud, etc.  
Barter of drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling, etc., production 
or growing of drugs for own 
use, theft for own use 
 Tax evasion Tax avoidance Tax evasion Tax 
avoidance 
Legal activities Unreported 
income from self-
employment, 
wages, salaries 
and assets from 
unreported work 
related to 
official/lawful 
goods and 
services 
Employee 
discounts, 
fringe benefits 
Barter of 
official / 
lawful goods 
and services 
All do-it-
yourself 
work and 
neighborly 
help 
Note: The structure of the table is taken from Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5), with additional 
remarks. 
2.1.2 Brief Literature Review 
This section briefly reviews important studies that estimate the size and development of 
shadow economic and DIY activities in Germany. It discusses neither the various 
methodologies used in the literature nor the advantages or disadvantages of any one 
methodology. For such a discussion, see Karmann (1986) or Schneider and Enste (2000). 
The oldest estimate of the German shadow economy uses the survey method of the 
Institute for Demoscopy (IfD) in Allensbach, Germany and determines that the shadow 
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economy was 3.6% of official GDP in 1974 [IfD (1975)].10 Pedersen (2003) and Feld 
and Larsen (2005) undertook extensive research projects using the survey method to 
estimate shadow economic activities in the years 2001 and 2004. Using the official wage 
rate, Feld and Larsen (2005, p. 22) conclude that these activities reached 4.1% and 3.1% 
of official GDP in 2001 and 2004. Using the (much lower) shadow economy wage rate, 
however, these estimates shrink to 1.3% and 1.0% of official GDP, respectively, 
confirming Pedersen’s estimate of 1.3% of the official GDP [Pedersen (2003), p. 136]. 
Using the discrepancy method, the German shadow economy is much larger: using the 
discrepancy between expenditure and income, it amounts to approximately 11% of 
official GDP for the 1970s [Lippert and Walker (1997)] and using the discrepancy 
between official and actual employment, it amounts to roughly 30% of official GDP 
[Langfeldt (1983)].11  
The physical input method produces values of around 15% of official GDP for the 
second half of the 1980s [Feld and Larsen (2005), p. 32]. The (monetary) transaction 
approach developed by Feige (1996) places the shadow economy at 30% of official GDP 
between 1980 and 1985. Yet another monetary approach – the currency demand 
approach, first used for Germany by Kirchgässner (1983) – yields values of 3.1% (1970) 
and 10.3% (1980) of official GDP. His estimates are quite similar to those obtained by 
Schneider and Enste (2000), who also use the currency demand approach and estimate 
the size of the shadow economy to be 4.5% and 14.7% of official GDP in 1970 and 
2000. Karmann (1990a) however, using the same approach, estimates three alternative 
specifications and yields lower estimates. The specification that uses the marginal tax 
rate to measure the burden of taxation estimates that the shadow economy in Germany 
increased from 1.5% of official GDP in 1970 to 9.2% in 1987.12 
Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model13 and Dynamic Multiple 
                                               
10
 See Schneider and Enste (2000). 
11
 See Schneider and Enste (2000). 
12
 The other two specifications – applying the gross hourly earnings of male workers in the 
small business sector and gross hourly earnings of male workers plus additional labor costs such 
as social security contributions – produce similar results. 
13
 Weck-Hannemann (1983) and Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) pioneered this approach, 
applying it to cross-sectional data of 24 OECD countries for various years. Before turning to this 
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Indicator Multiple Causes (DYMIMIC) model estimations produce results similar to 
those of the currency demand approach. Karmann (1990a) – estimating two alternative 
model specifications – presents the smallest figures for the size of the shadow economy 
in Germany.14 Schneider (2005) and others [e.g. Pickhardt and Sardà Pons (2006)] arrive 
at higher estimates.  
In general, figures placing the size of the shadow economy at almost one-third of 
official GDP in the mid-1980s are most likely overestimates. The similarity of the much 
lower figures obtained using the currency demand and MIMIC approaches is not 
surprising given the fact that the MIMIC model determines only the development of the 
shadow economy over time. To calibrate “real world” estimates of the shadow economy, 
e.g. as a percentage of official GDP, point estimates from the currency demand approach 
are typically used. Table 2.2 presents an overview of estimates of the shadow economy 
for Germany. 
                                                                                                                                           
approach, they developed the concept of “soft modeling” [see Frey et al. (1982); Frey and Weck 
(1983a; 1983b)], an approach which has been used to provide a ranking of the relative size of the 
shadow economy in different countries. 
14
 The estimates of the two specifications are similar. I thus present the estimates of the “S-D-
Model” only in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 The Size of the Shadow Economy (% of Official GDP) in Germany According to Different Methods 
Shadow economy (% of official GDP) in: Method 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Source 
- 3.6 1) - - - - - - IfD (1975) 
- - - - - - 1.3 2) - Pedersen (2003) 
- - - - - - 4.1 3) 3.1 3) 
Survey 
- - - - - - 1.3 4) 1.0 4) 
Feld and Larsen (2005) 
Discrepancy between 
expenditure and income 
11.0 10.2 13.4 - - - - - Lippert and Walker  
(1997) 
Discrepancy between 
official and actual 
employment 
23.0 38.5 34.0 - - - - - Langfeldt (1983) 
Physical input method - - - 14.5 14.6 - - - Feld and Larsen (2005) 
Transactions approach 17.2 22.3 29.3 31.4 - - - - Feld and Larsen (2005) 
3.1 6.0 10.3 - - - - - Kirchgässner (1983) 
12.1 11.8 12.6 - - - - - Langfeldt (1983; 1984) 
1.5 4.9 7.5 8.5 5) 9.2 6)    Karmann (1990a) 
Currency demand approach 
4.5 7.8 9.2 11.3 11.8 12.5 14.7 - Schneider and Enste 
(2000) 
(continued on next page)          
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Table 2.2 (cont.)          
5.8 6.1 8.2 - - - - - Frey and Weck-
Hannemann (1984) 
1.1 7.4 4.4 8.5 6) 7.0 7)    Karmann (1990a) 5) 
- - 9.4 10.1 11.4 15.1 16.3 - Pickhardt and Sardà 
Pons (2006) 
Latent ((DY)MIMIC) 
approach 
4.2 5.8 10.8 11.2 12.2 13.9 16.0 15.4 Schneider (2005; 2007b) 
Soft modeling - 8.3 8) - - - - - - Weck-Hannemann 
(1983) 
1) 1974. 
2) Estimate for 2001 calculated using actual “black” hourly wages. 
3) Estimates for 2001 and 2004 calculated using wages in the official economy. 
4) Estimates for 2001 and 2004 calculated using actual “black” hourly wages. 
5) Size of the shadow economy according to the “S-D-Model” specification. 
6) Estimate for 1983. 
7) Estimate for 1987. 
8) Average of 1974 and 1975. 
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Compared to the literature on shadow economic activities in Germany, the literature on 
DIY activities in Germany is rather limited. Brodersen (2003) provides a questionnaire-
based survey of DIY activities in northwestern Europe.15 For Germany, he finds that the 
likelihood of carrying out DIY activities depends positively on home ownership and 
negatively on age. Married or cohabitating respondents are also more likely to carry out 
DIY activities than unmarried or single respondents. Brodersen (2003, pp. 34-37) finds a 
negative significant correlation between income and DIY activities and strong regional 
influences – there is a greater likelihood to carry out DIY activities in the new federal 
states (Neue Bundesländer) of Germany than in the old federal states (Alte 
Bundesländer). Calculating the total value of DIY activities in the form of home repair, 
maintenance, and improvements, Brodersen (2003, p. 68) concludes that these activities 
correspond to approximately 1% of Germany’s GDP in 2001. 
Karmann (1990a) pioneered joint macroeconomic measurements of shadow economic 
and DIY activities.16 Using the MIMIC approach, he finds that financial constraints of 
households encourage DIY activities. Since 1970, the total value of these activities has 
increased steadily. In 1983, they accounted for 4.3% of official GDP. Between 1983 and 
1987 however, DIY activities decreased by almost 1%, to 3.4% of official GDP. The 
analysis in this chapter expands on his work in two ways. First, it models the demand for 
domestic currency in circulation in Germany explicitly and takes into account the 
distortion in currency in circulation due to the introduction of the euro. Second, it 
accounts for different behavioral patterns in Eastern and Western Germany and structural 
changes to the German economy due to German reunification in 1990. 
2.2 Empirical Methodology 
To estimate the size and development of shadow economic and DIY activities in 
                                               
15
 Merz and Wolff (1993) present a microeconomic analysis of the influence of regional long-
term unemployment figures, social contacts, and family characteristics such as marital status, 
number of earners in the household, and occupational characteristics on household production. A 
recent contribution to the theoretical literature is Ngai and Pissarides (2008) who study the 
substitution between home and market production. 
16
 See also Karmann (1988). 
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Germany, I employ two alternative structural equation model (SEM) specifications, one 
of them composed of two separate MIMIC models.17 Formally, MIMIC models consist 
of two parts: the structural equation model and the measurement model. The structural 
equation model can be represented by: 
t t tη ς′= +γ x ,                                                                                                             (2.1) 
where ( ), , ,t 1t 2t qtx x x ′′ =x …  is a q  vector and each  ,  1, ,itx i q= …  is a possible manifest 
cause of the latent variable tη .18 Here, ( )1 2, , , qγ γ γ ′′ =γ …  is a q  vector of coefficients 
describing the relationships between the latent variable and its causes. Thus, the latent 
variable tη  is determined by a set of exogenous causes. Since they only partially explain 
tη , the error term tς  represents the unexplained component. The variance of tς  is 
denoted by ψ , and ( )E ′= t tΦ x x  is the ( )q q×  covariance matrix of the causes.  
The measurement model represents the link between the latent variable and its 
indicators, i.e., the latent variable determines its indicators. The measurement model is 
specified by: 
t t tη= +y λ ε ,                                                                                                             (2.2) 
where ( ), , ,t 1t 2t py y y ′′ =y …  is a p  vector of several indicator variables, λ  is a p  vector 
of regression coefficients, and tε  is a p  vector of white noise disturbances. Their 
)( pp ×  covariance matrix is denoted by ( )E ′=ε t tΘ ε ε . 
Substituting equation (2.1) into equation (2.2) yields a reduced form regression model 
where the indicators ty  of the latent variable tη  are the endogenous variables and the 
causes tx  the exogenous variables. This model can be written as: 
,t t t= +y Πx z                                                                                                             (2.3) 
                                               
17
 Jöreskog (1970) and Goldberger (1972) first introduced SEMs into economics. Thereafter, 
very general SEMs were developed [see, for example, Keesling (1972); Jöreskog and Goldberger 
(1972); Jöreskog (1973)] and applied (see, for example, Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975)]. For a 
more comprehensive description of SEMs, see Appendix A or Bollen (1989). 
18
 The subscript t indicates the time series dimension of the variables. 
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where γλΠ ′=  is a ( )p q×  matrix and t t tς= +z λ ε . The error term tz  in equation (2.3) 
is a p  vector of a linear transformation of the white noise error terms tς  and tε  resulting 
from the structural equation and measurement models, i.e., ~ ( )tz 0,Ω . The covariance 
matrix Ω  is given as Cov E[( )( ) ]t t t t( ) ς ς ψ′ ′= = + + = +t εΩ z λ ε λ ε λ λ Θ . 
Since the latent variable is not observable, its size is unknown, and the parameters of 
the model must be estimated using the observed variables’ variances and covariances. 
The goal of the estimation procedure is thus to estimate an SEM’s covariance matrix 
)(θΣ , )ˆ(ˆ θΣΣ = , that is as close as possible to the sample covariance matrix of the 
observed causes and indicators.19 Identification and estimation of the model is however 
not possible without placing restrictions on certain model parameters. Among others, a 
restriction often imposed on the model is that one element of the vector λ , i.e., one 
indicator, is set to an a priori value (often 1 or -1). In this way the researcher also 
establishes an interpretable scale for the latent variable [Bollen (1989), pp. 91, 183].20 
The first step in the estimation is to select those causes and indicators that are 
appropriate to define the latent variable and which address the hypothesized theoretical 
relationships. After model identification and determination of the latent variable’s scale, 
the coefficients and model parameters are estimated and the hypothesized relationships 
between the latent variable and its causes and indicators tested. The second step is to use 
the estimated coefficients of the causes to calculate the latent variable score for each 
point in time. Finally, a benchmarking procedure is applied to estimate “real world” 
figures of the underlying latent variable. The next section presents the theoretical 
reasoning for the selection of causes and indicators. 
                                               
19
 θ  is a vector that contains the parameters of the model and ( )Σ θ  is the covariance matrix 
as a function of θ  implying that each element of the covariance matrix is a function of one or 
more model parameters. 
20
 An alternative is to set the variance of the unobservable variable tη  to one. However, 
setting one element of λ to an a priori value is often more convenient for economic interpretation 
and thus typically done [Dell’Anno and Schneider (2009)]. 
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2.3 Theoretical Considerations for the Choice of Variables 
It is clear from the previous section that the meaning of the latent variable depends on 
the causes and indicators chosen to represent it. This makes the selection of appropriate 
causes and indicators the most demanding part of the SEM approach. The following 
explains the reasoning for the causes and indicators employed in this chapter of the 
dissertation based on theoretical and empirical evidence from the literature. 
2.3.1 Causes of Shadow Economic and Do-it-Yourself Activities 
2.3.1.1 Tax and Social Security Contribution Burdens 
Studies point to tax and social security contribution burdens as one of the main reasons 
for the existence of the shadow economy because taxes affect labor-leisure choices and 
stimulate informal labor supply.21 The greater the difference between the total cost of 
labor in the official economy and the after-tax earnings from work, the greater the 
incentive to reduce or avoid this difference by working in the shadow economy. 
Schneider (1986; 1994) demonstrates the strong influence of indirect and direct taxation 
on the shadow economies of Austria and the Scandinavian countries. Johnson et al. 
(1998) provide further empirical evidence to support this view. Higher taxes may also 
create an incentive to carry out DIY activities rather than buy the equivalent – but more 
expensive – products and services in the official economy. An alternative view is that 
higher taxation may drive up the prices of DIY goods, thereby making DIY activities 
more costly. 
For the approximation of tax and social security contribution burdens, I use public 
revenues data (in % of GDP) provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) which comprises total revenue of central and local 
                                               
21
 See Schneider (1994; 1997), Lippert and Walker (1997), Johnson et al. (1998), Tanzi 
(1999), Mummert and Schneider (2002), and Giles et al. (2002). Loayza (1996) provides a 
theoretical macroeconomic analysis of the relationship between excessive taxation/regulation and 
the shadow economy. Neck et al. (1989) show that households’ determinants to work in the 
shadow economy are similar to those of tax evasion. 
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governments. Its main components are income tax, value added and sales taxes, social 
security contributions as well as payroll taxes. 
2.3.1.2 Intensity of Regulation 
The intensity of regulation is another important reason for the existence of the shadow 
economy. Regulations not only increase labor costs in the official economy, but – since 
most of these costs can be shifted onto employees – also provide an incentive to work in 
the shadow economy – where these costs can be avoided. The intensity of regulation is 
often measured by the number of laws and regulations, such as license requirements, or 
the size of staff at regulatory agencies. Examples of labor market regulations include 
minimum wages, security standards, and restrictions on foreigners. Johnson et al. (1998) 
provide empirical evidence of the influence of (labor) market regulations on the shadow 
economy. The influence of labor market regulations on shadow economic activities is 
also clearly described and theoretically derived in other studies, for example in the 
findings of the German Deregulation Commission 1990/91 [Deregulation Commission 
(1991)] and in Pelzmann (2006, pp. 94-99) who applies the psychological foundations of 
the reactance theory to the shadow economy. 
2.3.1.3 Other Influential Factors 
Real disposable income is included as a control variable. Here, a positive relationship is 
assumed. Since real disposable income is positively correlated with the demand for 
goods and services in general, I hypothesize that the higher the real disposable income, 
the greater the demand not only in the official but also in the unofficial economy and, 
hence, the larger the shadow and DIY economies. 
A zero one time dummy variable (Dummy) is included to control for structural 
changes of the German economy as a result of the reunification in 1990. Because 
German reunification offered remarkable opportunities not only in the formal but also in 
the informal economy, I expect a positive correlation between the dummy variable and 
shadow economic as well as DIY activities. 
With respect to DIY activities, I focus on the labor market – which numerous studies 
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identify as a driving force for informal economic activities.22 It is generally agreed, for 
example, that high labor costs are the cause of unemployment in the OECD countries. 
The higher the unemployment is, the greater the incentive to engage in DIY activities 
because unemployed individuals have less money to purchase goods and services, either 
in the official or unofficial economy, and also more time to perform DIY activities. DIY 
activities may also boost individuals’ self-esteem, thereby further stimulating DIY 
activities. It is also apparent that the higher the average gross hourly earnings in the 
official small business sector, the higher the costs for those individuals who demand such 
services. Given that they are able to do these activities themselves, they may replace 
demand both in the official small business sector and in the shadow economy – which 
runs the risk of punishment and fines – with DIY activities. I therefore postulate that 
higher average gross hourly earnings for craftsmen lead to an increase in the volume of 
DIY activities, ceteris paribus. 
2.3.1.4 Summarizing the Hypotheses 
Because it is not clear whether shadow economic and DIY activities can be treated as 
complements or substitutes, I do not formulate any hypotheses about the interaction 
between these activities. Instead, I undertake the attempt to estimate simultaneously the 
shadow economy and DIY activities according to the following hypotheses: 
(1) An increase in tax and social security burdens increases shadow economic and 
DIY activities, ceteris paribus. 
(2) The more the German economy is regulated, the greater the incentive to work in 
the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
(3) The higher unemployment and wages in the official economy, the more 
individuals engage in DIY activities, ceteris paribus. 
                                               
22
 Schneider and Enste (2000) and Gërxhani (2004) provide comprehensive overviews of the 
literature. 
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2.3.2 Indicator Variables of Shadow Economic and Do-it-Yourself Activities 
In addition to the causal variables described above, I use four indicator variables to 
estimate shadow economic and DIY activities in Germany. The first indicator variable is 
domestic M0, i.e., currency in circulation outside the banking system. Cash is the most 
common form of payment in the shadow economy because it protects both principal and 
agent by eliminating the “paper trail.” I thus argue that cash holdings are a sign of 
shadow economic activities. I therefore expect a positive relationship between the 
shadow economy and domestic M0, i.e., the more currency in circulation, the larger the 
shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
An increase of the shadow economy can lead to reduced state revenues which in turn 
reduce the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services. Ultimately, this 
can lead to an increase in the tax rates for firms and individuals in the official sector, 
quite often combined with a deterioration in the quality of the public goods (such as the 
public infrastructure) and of the administration, with the consequence of even stronger 
incentives to participate in the shadow economy. Johnson et al. (1998) present a 
theoretical model of this relationship. Because the quantity and quality of the public 
infrastructure are key elements for economic growth, an increasing shadow economy – 
ceteris paribus – results in lower growth rates of the official economy. This negative 
view of the shadow economy is also held by e.g. Loayza (1996). 
An alternative view – held by some authors [e.g. Asea (1996); Tanzi (1999)] – is that 
shadow economic activities are something positive and creative responding to the 
demand for services and small-scale manufacturing. Thus, the shadow economy adds a 
dynamic component to an economy promoting the creation of new markets and 
enhancing entrepreneurship. This, in turn, can spur competition and higher efficiency, 
which stimulates economic growth. 
The average number of hours worked per week in the official economy can be another 
useful indicator of shadow economic activities. If individual increase labor supply in the 
shadow economy, the number of hours worked in the official economy will reduce, 
ceteris paribus. Recent empirical studies [e.g. Bosch and Lehndorf (1998); DIW (1998)] 
support this view identifying a negative relationship between shadow economic activities 
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and working hours in the official economy.23 Following these empirical findings, I 
expect a negative correlation between the shadow economy and the average number of 
hours worked per week in the official economy. 
Inputs for DIY activities are typically bought in DIY stores. Hence, turnovers at DIY 
stores are an indication of DIY activity. Thus, I expect a positive correlation between 
DIY activity and turnovers in DIY stores, i.e., the more common DIY activities, the 
higher turnovers in DIY stores, ceteris paribus. 
2.4 Empirical Analyses 
2.4.1 Data 
The data covers the period 1970 to 2005 on an annual basis. Data on turnovers in DIY 
stores is available from A.C. Nielsen Company GmbH starting in 1978, when they 
conducted the first annual survey on turnovers in DIY stores in Germany. To complete 
the time series for the entire period 1970-2005 I regress its annual growth rates on a 
constant term and on a linear time component and calculate estimates from 1970 to 1977. 
The estimation results are then used to predict the level of turnovers in DIY stores for the 
years 1971 to 1978. Table 2.3 presents the regression results.24 Figure 2.1 provides a 
graphical representation of turnovers in DIY stores from 1970 to 2005. Turnovers in DIY 
stores increased until the mid 1990s followed by a short period of stagnation. Between 
2002 and 2005 they decreased as a result of a recession in the Germany economy in 
2002/2003, which followed the dot-com bubble crash in 2001. 
 
                                               
23
 See Schneider and Enste (2000) for a detailed discussion. 
24
 For a discussion on unit root tests, see Section 2.4.2. 
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Table 2.3 Regression of Turnovers on a Constant and Time 
Variable Growth rate of turnovers 
Parameter estimates 
Constant 
0.212*** 
(12.548) 
Time 
-0.008*** 
(7.946) 
Test statistics 
Standard error of regression 0.039 
Adjusted R-squared 0.713 
DW-statistic 2.57 
Unit root tests (growth rate of turnovers) 
ADF test -6.391*** 
PP test -6.367*** 
KPSS test 0.083 
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. 
* Significance at the 10% level. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. The 
order of the autoregressive correction for the unit root tests was chosen 
using the Schwarz information criterion (ADF test) and the Bartlett 
kernel estimator and the Newey-West (1994) data-based automatic 
bandwidth parameter method (PP and KPSS test). The MacKinnon 
(1996) critical values for the ADF and PP tests are: -4.13, -3.49, and -
3.17 for the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The LM 
statistics critical values of the KPSS test – taken from Kwiatkowski et 
al. (1992) – are: 0.216, 0.146, and 0.119 for the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels. 
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Figure 2.1 Turnovers in DIY Stores 1970-2005 (Billions of Euros) 
 
M0 in Germany greatly increased until 2001. This cannot be explained on the basis of 
domestic transactions in the official and unofficial economies alone. One possible 
explanation is the rise in foreign – especially Eastern and Southeast European – demand 
for the deutsche mark after the breakdown of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) in the 1990s [Seitz (1995)]. The unstable political situation in 
those countries in the early 1990s, the war in Kosovo, and the Bulgarian financial crisis 
of 1996-1997 increased foreign demand for the deutsche mark further. 
Given that I am interested in shadow economic and DIY activities in Germany, it is 
essential to focus on domestic M0 as an indicator variable for the shadow economy. To 
estimate the level of domestic M0 in Germany from 1970 to 2005, I apply a vector error 
correction model using the methodology proposed by Seitz (1995). This enables me not 
only to adjust the total amount of M0 by foreign demand for the deutsche mark but also 
to take into account distortions caused by German reunification in 1990 and preparation 
for the 2002 introduction of the euro in the second half of 2001.25  
                                               
25
 At that time, individuals substituted cash with demand deposits in order to avoid personally 
exchanging their deutsche mark for euros [Deutsche Bundesbank (2002)]. This triggered an 
enormous decrease in domestic M0, which cannot be attributed to changes in shadow economic 
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In equilibrium, real money demand is assumed to depend positively on real income 
and negatively on short-term interest rates (the Goldfeld equation). In countries with 
weak national currencies, however, often two or more sound currencies – typically the 
U.S. dollar and the euro/deutsche mark – are used as a means of payment and/or store of 
values. For example, during the war in Kosovo in the early 1990s the deutsche mark and 
the U.S. dollar were both used in the Balkan region but the actual amount of either 
currency individuals held depended on the USD/EUR exchange rate.26 I take this fact 
into account and include the USD/EUR exchange rate to reflect both the strength of the 
euro relative to the U.S. dollar and the fact that the two currencies are close substitutes in 
such countries. The expected sign for the USD/EUR exchange rate is positive.27 Dummy 
variables for the first and second quarters of 1991 are used to control for German 
reunification. 
Data is on a quarterly basis from Q1 1970 to Q4 2005. Data for M0 – expressed in 
logs – and the short-term interest rate is taken from the Deutsche Bundesbank. Data for 
the German quarterly GDP (also expressed in logs) and the USD/EUR exchange rate is 
taken from the German Federal Statistical Office and Thomson Financial Datastream, 
respectively. All variables are found to be I(1). Using the Johansen methodology 
[Johansen (1991; 1995)], I find one cointegration equation at the 5% significance level. 
In order to achieve stationarity for the short-run estimation, I then difference all variables 
once. The results of the unit root and cointegration tests are shown in Table 2.4.28 Table 
2.5 presents the estimation results for domestic currency in circulation. The estimated 
coefficients for GDP, the short-term interest rate, and the USD/EUR exchange rate have 
the theoretically motivated signs and the model has a satisfactory fit. 
Figure 2.2 displays the pattern of the predicted time series in comparison with the 
original one. It clearly shows the distortions in the original time series of currency in 
                                                                                                                                           
activities. 
26
 The USD/EUR exchange rate is defined as the amount of U.S. dollars one must pay for one 
euro. 
27
 A stronger euro increases the USD/EUR exchange rate and should lead to more euro 
holdings compared to the U.S. dollar while a weaker euro should lead to less euro holdings. In 
portfolio theory, this effect is called return-chasing. 
28
 For a discussion on unit root tests, see Section 2.4.2. 
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circulation which, on the one hand, are due to Eastern and Southeast European demand 
for the deutsche mark in the mid 1990s. The political situation in those countries, the war 
in Kosovo, and the Bulgarian financial crisis of 1996-1997 increased demand for 
deutsche mark above the level that can be explained by domestic transactions in the 
official and unofficial economies. On the other hand, the preparation for the introduction 
of the euro in 2002 – individuals substituted cash with demand deposits in order to avoid 
personally exchanging their deutsche mark for euros – triggered an enormous decrease in 
domestic M0 that cannot be attributed to changes in shadow economic activities. It is 
thus important to correct for these distortions and to use the estimated time series of 
domestic currency in circulation as indicator variable for shadow economic activities in 
Germany. Table B.1 in Appendix B presents a description of causes as well as indicators 
ultimately used in the SEM/MIMIC estimations and provides a complete list of sources. 
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Table 2.4 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests  
Variable ADF (PP) unit root test 
 Levels First difference 
M0 -2.233 
(-1.951) 
-7.813*** 
(-11.850)*** 
GDP -0.993 
(-1.422) 
-11.794*** 
(-11.905)*** 
Short-term interest rate -3.0510 
(-3.051) 
-5.590*** 
(-9.291)*** 
USD/EUR exchange rate -1.269 
(-1.389) 
-9.649*** 
(-9.740)*** 
 Cointegration tests 
Trace test 54.361** 
(0.011) 
 
Maximum eigenvalue test 30.097** 
(0.023) 
 
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. 
* Significance at the 10% level. Autoregressive correction is chosen using the 
Bartlett Kernel estimator and Newey and West’s (1994) data-based automatic 
bandwidth parameter method (PP test). I use the Schwarz information criterion for 
the ADF test. All regressions in levels (first differences) include an intercept and a 
time trend (intercept). The ADF and PP test’s MacKinnon (1996) critical values for 
a test equation with intercept and time trend (intercept) are: -4.13  
(-3.55), -3.49 (-2.91), and -3.17 (-2.59) for the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels, respectively. The 5% critical value for the trace and maximum eigenvalue 
tests – taken from MacKinnon et al. (1999) – are 47.86 and 27.58, respectively. For 
these two tests p-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2.5 Estimation of Domestic Currency in Circulation 
Variable Coefficient Absolute 
t-statistic 
Long-run equilibrium estimation   
M0 (dependent variable)   
Constant -1.780*** 7.150 
GDP 1.337*** 18.382 
Short-term interest rate -0.007* 1.945 
USD/EUR exchange rate 1.049*** 13.571 
Dummy Q1 1991 -0.168 1.610 
Dummy Q2 1991 -0.137 1.316 
Adjusted R-squared 0.973  
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000  
Short-run dynamic estimation   
∆ M0 (dependent variable)   
Constant 0.013*** 3.645 
∆ GDP 0.461* 1.669 
∆ short-term interest rate 0.003 0.666 
Residuum(-1) long-run estimation -0.108*** 3.325 
Dummy Q1 1991 -0.064 1.169 
Dummy Q2 1991 -0.008 0.210 
Adjusted R-squared 0.056  
Probability (F-statistic) 0.024  
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
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Figure 2.2 Currency in Circulation 1970-2005 (Billions of Euros) 
 
2.4.2 Unit Root Tests 
I begin the empirical analysis of shadow economic and DIY activities in Germany by 
pre-testing the data. Applying SEMs with nonstationary time series may result in 
misleading estimates – as is common in standard time series econometrics.29 I therefore 
use three conventional unit root tests to figure out the time series’ properties: the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Phillips Peron (PP) test, and the Kwiatkowski 
et al. (1992) (KPSS) test. While the ADF and PP tests test the null hypothesis of a unit 
root against the alternative of stationarity, the KPSS test tests the null hypothesis of 
stationarity against the alternative of existence of a unit root. Because of the reversed 
null hypothesis, the KPSS test is often used as a confirmatory analysis to cross-check the 
ADF and PP tests’ results.30 
                                               
29
 In a seminal paper, Granger and Newbold (1974) conclude that in regressions using levels 
of integrated data, standard significance tests are usually misleading and suggest a significant 
relationship of one time series on another, even if the two are independent. This is the well-
known phenomenon of spurious or nonsense regressions. 
30
 This approach is taken by Choi (1994). For a discussion of unit root tests, their properties, 
and power, see, for example, Maddala and Kim (1998, pp. 47-97) or Greene (2008, pp.739-756). 
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In some cases, e.g. for the inflation rate (Inflation), unemployment (Unemployment), 
the average hours worked per week (Working hours), and domestic M0, the tests show 
ambiguous results. In general, however, I find that the variables are not stationary.31 As a 
result – and to enable consistent estimation of the SEM/MIMIC models in first 
differences – I difference all time series, except for the indicator variable growth rate of 
real GDP (Growth rate GDP), once. Employing the same unit root tests, the first 
differences do not exhibit a unit root. The KPSS test largely confirms this result. As the 
time series for the turnovers in DIY stores (Turnovers) remains nonstationary – even 
after taking first differences – I employ the approach suggested by Schwert (1987) to 
detrend this series. Because of the limited sample size, the lag order used is set to 2. 
Table 2.6 summarizes the findings of the unit root tests. 
 
                                               
31
 Conflicting results in unit root testing is a recognized problem in time series econometrics 
[see, for example, Maddala and Kim (1998), pp.126-128]. 
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Table 2.6 Unit Root Tests 
Variable Levels First differences  
 ADF test PP test KPSS test ADF test PP test KPSS test 
Causes       
Regulation -0.930 -0.660 0.205 -4.775*** -4.775*** 0.602 
Income -1.701 -1.701 0.186 -4.562*** -4.561*** 0.515 
Inflation -3.365* -2.878 0.058 -4.570*** -5.218*** 0.056 
Tax burden -0.741 -1.023 0.143 -3.690*** -3.690*** 0.446 
Unemployment -3.630*** -2.586 0.056 -3.334** -3.550*** 0.398 
Wages -4.988*** -4.852*** 0.142 -4.064*** -4.101*** 0.452 
Indicators       
Growth rate GDP -3.959*** -4.010*** 0.187    
Working hours -4.524*** -1.397 0.104 -3.044** -3.073** 0.136 
M0 -2.440 -1.661 0.093 -4.135*** -3.512** 0.384 
Turnovers -2.675 -1.055 0.111 0.020 -1.412 0.446 
Turnovers 
(detrended) -5.334
***
 -5.330*** 0.069    
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. * Significance at the 
10% level. Autoregressive correction is chosen using the Bartlett Kernel estimator and Newey 
and West’s (1994) data-based automatic bandwidth parameter method (PP and KPSS test). I use 
the Schwarz information criterion for the ADF test. All regressions in levels (first differences) 
include an intercept and a time trend (intercept). The ADF and PP test’s MacKinnon (1996) 
critical values for a test equation with intercept and time trend (intercept) are -4.13 (-3.55), -3.49 
(-2.91), and -3.17 (-2.59) for the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The LM 
statistics critical values of the KPSS test [Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)] are 0.216 (0.739), 0.146 
(0.463), and 0.119 (0.347) for the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
2.4.3 Empirical Models 
Following Karmann (1990a), the estimation of the shadow economy and of DIY 
activities is based on two alternative SEM specifications. The first model (S-DIY) 
considers shadow economic and DIY activities as two distinct latent variables estimated 
in a MIMIC approach. The second model (H-DIY) estimates the hidden economy (H) 
first as a whole. It then uses the estimate for the hidden economy to derive individual 
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estimates of shadow economic and DIY activities. Following the earlier hypotheses, I 
use tax and social security contribution burdens as well as the intensity of regulation as 
the main causes of shadow economic activities. I use unemployment, tax and social 
security contribution burdens, and average gross hourly earnings as causes of DIY 
activities. Despite the ambiguous theoretical effect of inflation on the shadow economy 
and on DIY activities, I consider inflation as a causal variable in the models. 
Furthermore, I use a dummy variable (Dummy) to control for different behavioral 
patterns in Eastern and Western Germany and structural changes to the German economy 
as a result of German reunification in 1990. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 display the conceptual 
diagrams of the S-DIY and H-DIY models, respectively. Since the shadow economy (S) 
is a significant part of the hidden economy (H) in the H-DIY SEM, I consider all 
variables that cause S to cause H as well. Hence, the same set of indicator variables is 
used in both model specifications.32 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Conceptual Diagram of the S-DIY Model 
                                               
32
 See Section 2.3.2 for the theoretical justification regarding the selection of indicators. 
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income (Income) 
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Figure 2.4 Conceptual Diagram of the H-DIY Model 
 
Table 2.7 displays the results of both SEM estimations applying the maximum likelihood 
estimator for the S-DIY model as well as for the H-DIY model. For each model 
specification, the first column shows the parameter estimates for both causal and 
indicator variables for S and H. The parameter estimates relating to DIY activities are 
always displayed in the second column. The two rows above goodness-of-fit refer to the 
causal link between H and DIY in the H-DIY model. 
 
Hidden 
economy (H) 
Regulation 
Inflation 
Tax and social 
security burden 
(Tax burden) 
Real domestic 
currency in 
circulation (M0) 
Average hours 
worked per week 
(Working hours) 
Growth rate of 
real GDP 
(Growth rate 
GDP) 
Real turnovers in 
DIY stores 
(Turnovers) 
Do-it-yourself 
economy (DIY) 
Real disposable 
income  
(Income) 
Dummy of 
reunification 
(Dummy) 
  
47 
Table 2.7 Estimation Results 
 S-DIY model H-DIY model 
 S DIY H DIY 
Causes     
Regulation 11.98*** 
(2.54)  
11.24*** 
(2.51) 
 
Income 1.38*** 
(3.34)  
1.43*** 
(3.54) 
 
Inflation -0.32 
(0.50) 
-0.53*** 
(2.44) 
-0.93 
(1.44) 
 
Dummy 0.10*** 
(2.50) 
0.05*** 
(4.18) 
0.13*** 
(3.29) 
 
Tax burden 0.11** 
(2.37) 
-0.01 
(0.37) 
0.09** 
(2.07) 
 
Unemployment 
 
0.03** 
(2.14)  
 
Wages 
 
0.15 
(0.85)  
 
Indicators      
M0 (fixed) 1.00  1.00  
Growth rate GDP 0.25*** 
(3.32) 
 0.22*** 
(3.22) 
 
Working hours -0.02 
(1.32) 
 -0.01 
(1.10) 
 
Turnovers (fixed)  2.00  2.00 
(continued on next page)   
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Table 2.7 (cont.)   
Latent variables     
H → DIY 
   
0.13** 
(2.05) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics S-DIY model H-DIY model 
Number of observations 36 36 
Degrees of freedom 50 33 
Chi-square 
(p-value) 
34.87 
(0.95) 
30.19 
(0.61) 
RMSEA 0.00 0.00 
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5 % level. * Significance at 
the 10% level. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. The degrees of freedom are 
determined by 0.5 (p + q) (p + q + 1) – t, where p = the number of indicators, q = the 
number of causes, and t = the number of free parameters. If the model fits the data 
perfectly and the parameter values are known, the sample covariance matrix equals the 
covariance matrix implied by the model. The null hypothesis of perfect fit corresponds to 
a p-value of 1. The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) measures the 
model’s fit based on the difference between the covariance estimated and the actual 
covariance matrix. RMSEA values smaller than 0.05 indicate a good fit [Browne and 
Cudeck (1993)]. 
 
All variables except Working hours and Tax burden are significant at the 5% level for 
both the shadow (S) and hidden (H) economy. For DIY activities (DIY) only the Tax 
burden variable is not statistically significant. The goodness-of-fit statistics of the two 
model specifications show satisfactory statistical properties.33 I also estimate both model 
specifications excluding the insignificant variables (parsimonious models) and test for 
robustness by varying the observation period, for which the parameter estimates remain 
stable.34 For the S-DIY model, the statistics of the full model indicate a slightly closer fit 
                                               
33
 Further goodness-of-fit statistics are presented in Table B.2 in Appendix B. For a 
description of the goodness-of-fit statistics, see Section A.3 in Appendix A. 
34
 In these estimations I consider the following time periods: 1970-2002, 1970-2003, 1970-
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than those of the parsimonious model. For the H-DIY model, the reverse is true: the 
statistics of the parsimonious model indicate a slightly closer fit than those of the full 
model. To assure comparability between the estimates of both the S-DIY and the H-DIY 
models, I always use the full model to predict the size of shadow economic and DIY 
activities in Germany from 1970 to 2005.  
Identification and estimation of SEMs requires the normalization of one indicator for 
each latent variable. A well-established way to normalize one of the indicators is to set 
its coefficient to a nonzero value.35 For the shadow economy, I choose the variable M0 
and set it to one. Because I am dealing with two latent variables simultaneously, it is also 
necessary to fix the scale for the other latent variable, DIY, as explained below.  
According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, capital productivity in the 
construction business was 1.89 in 1991 (the approximate midpoint of the observation 
period).36 The use of capital productivity as a scaling parameter is appropriate since 
capital productivity is the ratio of output to capital input and the measurement model for 
DIY activities employs a general input-output measure, i.e., the capital input of DIY 
activities (i.e., turnovers in DIY stores) is used as an indicator for the unobservable 
variable DIY (i.e., the output). Assuming that capital productivity in the construction 
business is nearly equal to that of DIY activities, I set the coefficient of the indicator 
variable turnovers in DIY stores (Turnovers) to this level, with the numerical value two. 
The following summarizes the findings from the estimations of the models presented and 
addresses the proposed hypotheses: 
                                                                                                                                           
2004, 1971-2005, 1972-2005, and 1973-2005. The results of these estimations are presented in 
Tables B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B. Tables B.3 and B.4 present the main goodness-of-fit statistics 
only. The additional goodness-of-fit statistics, as shown in Table B.2, are not presented for the 
robustness estimations with variations in the observation period (Tables B.3 and B.4), because 
these statistics do not differ much from those of the full models. Further goodness-of-fit statistics 
for the parsimonious model specifications are presented in Table B.5. 
35
 The choice of the indicator which establishes the scale of the latent variable does not affect 
the estimated coefficients because the maximum likelihood estimator is scale invariant 
[Swaminathan and Algina (1978)]. Typically, one selects the indicator that loads most on the 
unobservable variable, i.e., M0 in the S-DIY and H-DIY MIMIC models.  
36
 For similar arguments, see also Karmann (1990a). 
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(1) The intensity of regulation (Regulation) and tax and social security contribution 
burdens (Tax burden) are always statistically significant and positively related to 
S and H, having the expected sign. I cannot confirm that the tax burden is a 
driving factor for individuals to engage in DIY activities. 
(2) In both model specifications, the real disposable income (Income) – which 
measures per capita real disposable income – is highly statistically significant and 
positively related to S and H. One explanation for this is that the higher the 
disposable income of households, the higher the demand for goods and services. 
Demand rises not only in the official economy but also, in part, in the shadow 
economy, leading to a higher observed level of shadow economic activity.  
(3) The inflation rate (Inflation) is significant for DIY activities only; that is, the 
higher the inflation rate – which increases the cost of materials for DIY activities 
– the fewer activities individuals perform, leading to a lower level of the latent 
variable DIY. The negative, though insignificant, influence of inflation on the 
shadow economy may be seen as a contribution to a reduction in real tax burdens, 
thereby reducing incentives to avoid taxation. Another important factor 
explaining DIY activities is unemployment (Unemployment): it is positively 
related to the latent variable DIY activities with the expected sign. 
(4) The zero one dummy variable (Dummy) is, as expected, significantly positively 
related to all of the latent variables. This result reflects the catching up of East to 
West Germany after reunification in 1990 triggering a steep rise in the shadow 
economy due to the reconstruction period that followed. 
(5) Average hourly earnings in the small business sector (Wages) do not influence 
DIY activities. Still, the parameter estimate – though not statistically significant –
has the expected sign. This shows that higher wages lower the demand for small 
business services and hence raise the incentives for individuals to engage in DIY 
activities. 
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(6) The coefficient for the unemployment rate is statistically significant and has the 
expected positive sign. This confirms the hypothesis that unemployed individuals 
are more likely to perform DIY activities because they have, on the one hand, 
more time for these activities and, on the other hand, have less money to purchase 
goods and services in the official or unofficial economy. 
(7) The estimated coefficient on the growth rate of real GDP (Growth rate GDP) is 
statistically different from zero and hence suggests a positive relationship 
between the shadow economy and the growth rate of real GDP. I cannot confirm 
that the size of the shadow economy affects the average hours worked per week 
(Working hours). This is in line with observations that unemployed individuals 
typically cannot compensate loss of income through work in the shadow economy 
unless they have already been engaged in the shadow economy. 
2.4.4 Size of Shadow Economic and Do-it-Yourself Activities 
As a result of data transformation, the model is estimated in first differences and thus 
provides estimates of the latent variables under the same transformation. I must therefore 
integrate the resulting time series to obtain index series for shadow economic and DIY 
activities as well as for the hidden economy. Another difficulty of SEM estimations is 
that one obtains an index describing the development of the latent variable only which 
needs to be converted into estimates of “real world” figures (% of official GDP). In the 
literature, this is usually done by calibration using a firm figure for the latent variable at 
some point in time within the observation period.  
In this chapter, I refer to an assessment for the size of DIY activities using primary 
data by Niessen and Ollmann (1987, p. 151). According to them, households spent an 
average of 125 hours on DIY activities in 1983. Karmann (1990a) – using a currency 
demand approach – estimates that the value added (the size) of these activities 
corresponds to 4.4% of official GDP. For consistency, I also take Karmann’s (1990a) 
currency demand approach estimate for the size of the shadow economy. Thus, I use the 
estimates of 8.5% of official GDP for shadow economic activities and 4.4% for DIY 
activities and calibrate the estimated MIMIC/SEM indices into series measuring the size 
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of these activities in % of official GDP.37 In order to calibrate each estimated 
MIMIC/SEM index into an index in % of official GDP, I follow the benchmarking 
procedure proposed by Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003). According to this procedure, 
the time series 'ˆ ˆt txη γ∆ = ∆ , resulting from the estimated structural equation, are first 
integrated to an index tηɶ  – the base year of which is 1983 – indicating the development 
of the latent variables. The indices are then applied to the firm figure estimates, i.e., to 
8.5% and 4.4% of official GDP for shadow economic and DIY activities, respectively, 
which finally yields the indices shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6.  
Figure 2.5 plots the size and development of shadow economic activities according to 
the S-DIY model. It shows a remarkable increase in these activities over the past 25 
years, reaching 17.40% of official GDP in 2005. German reunification in 1990 triggered 
a steep rise in the shadow economy during the reconstruction period that followed. After 
East Germany caught up to West Germany’s behavior patterns, growth in the shadow 
economy leveled out to the level of around 17% in 2005. 
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Figure 2.5 Shadow Economy in Germany 1970-2005 (% of Official GDP) 
 
                                               
37 Both firm figure (or benchmark point) estimates refer to 1983. 
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Figure 2.6 plots the size and development of DIY activities according to the S-DIY 
model. DIY activities increased from 4.05% of official GDP in 1970 to 4.94% in 1995 
and remained more or less stable through 2005. Like shadow economic activities, DIY 
activities also experienced a big push following German reunification – though the 
dynamics were not as pronounced: between 1970 and 2005, DIY activities grew more 
slowly than did shadow economic activities. Altogether, the catch-up process in East 
Germany after reunification offered remarkable opportunities in the hidden economy.  
When calculating the size and development of shadow economic and DIY activities in 
Germany according to the H-DIY model, I obtain similar results.38 As illustrated in 
Figure 2.4, DIY activities are determined by the link between the latent variables and are 
measured as a portion of the hidden economy. Table 2.8 shows the estimates of all the 
different index series according to the S-DIY and H-DIY models. 
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Figure 2.6 DIY Activities in Germany 1970-2005 (% of Official GDP)  
                                               
38 In this case, the benchmark value for the H-index is derived simply by summing up the firm 
figure values for shadow economic and DIY activities. As a result, the benchmark point estimate 
for the hidden economy in 1983 is 12.9% of official German GDP. 
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2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have used SEM and MIMIC models to provide consistent estimates of 
the size and development of shadow economic and DIY activities in Germany. I found 
positive, highly statistically significant influences of regulation and tax and social 
security contribution burdens on the shadow economy. For DIY activities, I found a 
positive, highly statistically significant influence of unemployment. In general, the 
models show satisfactory statistical properties. According to my calculations, German 
shadow economic activities increased from 1-2% of official GDP in 1970 to around 17% 
in 2005. DIY activities amounted to 4% of official GDP in 1970, increased to 4.94% in 
1995, and remained relatively constant through 2005. Taking both sectors together, the 
hidden economy in Germany reached a remarkable size of around 22% of official GDP 
in 2005. While shadow economic activities are driven by institutional factors such as 
taxation and regulation, DIY activities respond to unemployment.  
The results suggest that shadow economic activities are contingent upon 
governmental policies while DIY activities are determined by individual constraints. It 
might also be that these constraints motivate individuals to engage into self-help and 
mutual aid. With respect to DIY activities, the results can also be interpreted by 
following the analysis of the household presented in Becker (1993). He shows that 
members of a household should allocate the various activities according to their 
comparative advantages, which implies not only the division of labor but also concerns 
investment in human capital. According to his theory, the household runs most 
efficiently when some members invest in human capital by working in paid employment 
while others work at home and maximize their individual utility through, for example, 
rearing children [Becker (1993), pp. 30-53].39 The relatively stable index of DIY 
activities might be an indication of the relevance of this theory and the strong separation 
of responsibilities within a household. Because of their significant amount and specific 
dynamics, a comprehensive analysis of the hidden economy must take account of DIY 
activities. 
                                               
39
 This argument is in line with Brodersen (2003, p. 34) who finds that married or 
cohabitating respondents are more likely to carry out DIY activities. 
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The analyses presented in this chapter imply the following policy conclusions. A 
reduction in regulations and/or taxes and social security contribution burdens seem to be 
efficient means of reducing the shadow economy by shifting shadow economic activities 
to the official economy. Either policy may also reduce labor costs in the official 
economy and thus decrease unemployment. Lower unemployment in turn reduces the 
incentive to engage in DIY activities. Though these results should be regarded as first 
steps in measuring the size of the hidden economy, I have demonstrated that – at least for 
Germany – both shadow economic and DIY activities are important and should be taken 
into account when seeking to stimulate the official economy through policy measures. 
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Table 2.8 The Hidden, Shadow, and DIY Economy in Germany (% of Official GDP) 
Year Hidden economy Shadow economy DIY activities 
 
H-DIY 
model 
S-DIY 
model 
H-DIY 
model 
S-DIY 
model 
H-DIY 
model 
S-DIY 
model 
1970 5.50 4.02 1.63 0.04 3.87 4.05 
1971 6.16 4.92 2.24 0.86 3.92 4.07 
1972 7.08 5.95 3.10 1.88 3.98 4.07 
1973 7.57 6.71 3.55 2.60 4.02 4.11 
1974 8.17 7.48 4.11 3.28 4.06 4.20 
1975 8.97 8.34 4.85 4.09 4.12 4.25 
1976 9.76 9.16 5.59 4.88 4.17 4.28 
1977 10.37 9.84 6.15 5.56 4.22 4.28 
1978 11.17 10.65 6.90 6.35 4.28 4.30 
1979 11.88 11.52 7.55 7.27 4.33 4.25 
1980 12.28 12.11 7.93 7.85 4.36 4.25 
1981 12.45 12.43 8.09 8.14 4.37 4.29 
1982 12.54 12.58 8.17 8.23 4.37 4.35 
1983 12.90 12.90 8.50 8.50 4.40 4.40 
1984 13.60 13.66 9.15 9.24 4.45 4.42 
1985 14.10 14.23 9.61 9.80 4.49 4.43 
1986 14.92 15.01 10.38 10.54 4.55 4.47 
1987 15.44 15.61 10.86 11.14 4.58 4.47 
1988 15.77 16.03 11.16 11.59 4.61 4.44 
1989 16.03 16.47 11.41 12.08 4.62 4.39 
1990 16.78 17.31 12.10 12.90 4.68 4.42 
1991 18.24 19.03 13.45 14.42 4.78 4.61 
1992 19.50 20.44 14.63 15.60 4.87 4.84 
1993 19.56 20.56 14.68 15.68 4.88 4.87 
1994 20.05 21.05 15.13 16.15 4.91 4.91 
1995 20.25 21.26 15.32 16.32 4.93 4.94 
1996 20.40 21.46 15.46 16.51 4.94 4.96 
(continued on next page)     
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Table 2.8 (cont.)      
1997 20.33 21.44 15.40 16.48 4.93 4.96 
1998 20.65 21.76 15.69 16.79 4.96 4.97 
1999 21.12 22.29 16.13 17.31 4.99 4.97 
2000 21.30 22.56 16.29 17.61 5.00 4.94 
2001 21.23 22.48 16.23 17.54 5.00 4.94 
2002 21.23 22.46 16.23 17.50 5.00 4.96 
2003 21.39 22.63 16.38 17.66 5.01 4.97 
2004 21.23 22.48 16.23 17.51 5.00 4.96 
2005 21.10 22.35 16.11 17.40 4.99 4.96 
 
 
  
CHAPTER THREE 
SMUGGLING AROUND THE WORLD∗ 
“Honesty is for the most part less profitable than dishonesty.” 
Plato (~428 BC~348 BC) 
The preceding chapter has studied informal shadow economic and do-it-yourself 
activities in a national context. I now turn to the analysis of smuggling, an international 
informal economic activity. Smuggling is motivated by a desire to make or save money 
by avoiding taxes/tariffs and/or to make money by selling goods prohibited by the state. 
Smuggling often involves other crimes, such as fraud, fraudulent conversion, bribery, 
extortion, or violence. Although smuggling has attracted much attention in policy 
debates, the empirical literature is rather limited.40 This chapter provides an empirical 
contribution to the literature by applying a structural equation model (SEM) to estimate 
an index of smuggling for 54 countries. 
The hidden and illegal nature of smuggling makes it difficult to analyze this economic 
activity. Often, estimates of the extent of smuggling rely on narrow proxies or anecdotal 
evidence. This chapter presents an alternative for the economic analysis of smuggling 
and contributes to the empirical literature on smuggling in the following two ways: 
firstly, using a specific form of an SEM with latent variables (that is, a Multiple 
Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model) it captures the unobservable nature of 
smuggling and accounts for the manifold potential causal and indicator variables of 
                                               
∗
 This chapter follows Buehn and Farzanegan (2008). 
40
 The literature deals mostly with theoretical aspects of the effects of smuggling on social 
welfare and the economy [see, for example, Bhagwati and Hansen (1973); Pitt (1981); Martin 
and Panagariya (1984); Norton (1988); Thursby et al. (1991)]. 
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smuggling.41 Secondly, the MIMIC estimation results are used to rank the countries 
according to the extent of smuggling in the economy and to compute an index of 
smuggling for 54 countries over the period 1991-1999. This is, to my knowledge, the 
first comparable estimate of smuggling across countries. 
In general, smuggling includes illegal trade of both illegal and legal goods.42 This 
chapter follows Pitt’s definition of smuggling: “Traded goods are misweighted, 
misgraded, misinvoiced or not invoiced at all with or without the cooperation of customs 
authorities” [Pitt (1981), p. 449].  Hence, it does not deal with the illegal trafficking of 
human beings, such as prostitutes or illegal immigrants, or with the illegal trade of 
generally forbidden goods such as drugs. Rather, chapter 3 considers the illegal trade of 
legal goods, often referred to as trade misinvoicing. Given this working definition, the 
main channel of smuggling is that traders report false amounts of their actual exports or 
imports to authorities circumventing high taxes and/or tariffs.43 
The incentive to smuggle seems not to be exclusively linked to the level of taxes. For 
example, in countries with high taxes, such as in the Scandinavian countries in Europe, 
there is little evidence of smuggling. Contrary, in many Eastern European countries, 
where taxes are much lower, illegal trade is more common. This might be due to the fact 
that countries with a low level of taxes often have less effective systems of border 
control, tax collection, and less transparent administrative rules [Merriman et al. (2000)]. 
The MIMIC model enables me to analyze whether ineffective administrations and 
institutions or high tariffs and trade restrictions determine the level of smuggling. 
The analysis reveals that tariffs and trade restrictions are important push factors of 
smuggling while a higher black market premium discourages smugglers. Better law 
enforcement reduces smuggling by increasing the expected costs of illegal trade. A more 
                                               
41
 MIMIC approaches were previously applied to estimate the development of the shadow 
economy [see, for example, Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003); Schneider (2005); Buehn et al. 
(2009)] and to corruption [Dreher et al. (2007)]. Interesting, recent applications of this 
methodology to smuggling are presented in Farzanegan (2009) and Buehn and Eichler (2009). 
42
 Chapter 4 distinguishes between the smuggling of illegal and legal goods in the context of 
the U.S.-Mexican border. 
43
 Although this working definition of smuggling considers legal goods, it is an informal 
economic activity as trade documents are falsified in order to circumvent taxes and/or tariffs. 
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corrupt society makes it easier, however, for traders to increase profits by turning to 
illegal means of trade. The impact that smuggling has on the official economy is 
substantial: it reduces GDP per capita and tax revenues. The estimated smuggling index 
shows that smuggling is less common in Western European countries but seems to be 
widespread in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents a short theoretical 
motivation, a literature review, and the main hypotheses for the empirical analysis. 
Section 3.2 briefly introduces the empirical methodology. Section 3.3 discusses the 
causes of smuggling and how this activity is reflected in observable indicator variables. 
Section 3.4 presents the estimation results and the smuggling index. Section 3.5 
concludes. 
3.1 Theoretical Motivation 
In most countries, tariffs (taxes on imported goods) or quotas (restrictions on the quantity 
of goods that can be imported) limit the ability of consumers to choose between foreign 
or domestic goods. Although financial and capital markets are becoming more 
integrated, a lot of countries have had foreign exchange market restrictions until recently 
which limited the ability of traders to exchange domestic into foreign currency units. 
These two types of restrictions in international markets make smuggling more attractive. 
On the one hand, tariffs and trade restrictions create incentives for traders to resort to 
illegal means of trade such as the smuggling of products or the misinvoicing of exports 
and imports. The reason is obvious: evading tariffs or circumventing state controls 
increases their profits. On the other hand, capital controls and foreign exchange market 
restrictions create parallel or black foreign exchange markets and a premium of the 
parallel over the official exchange rate. This so called black market premium (BMP) is a 
very attractive incentive for traders: underinvoicing exports, they can realize additional 
profits by supplying the unrecorded revenues on the black foreign exchange market. 
However, the existence of a BMP might also cause a disincentive for illegal trade. Illegal 
importers, when underinvoicing imports, have to acquire foreign exchange in the black 
market for the amount of imports not reported to authorities. In this case, an increasing 
BMP means increasing costs for illegal importers and thus reduces the incentive to 
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smuggle [see, for example, De Macedo (1987)]. The next section briefly reviews the 
literature presenting further theoretical and empirical evidence on the determinants of 
smuggling. 
3.1.1 Literature Review 
The existing literature on smuggling consists of two strands. One strand demonstrates 
that tariffs and trade restrictions lead to smuggling and misinvoicing in international 
transactions. The other strand analyzes the welfare effects of smuggling. In their seminal 
paper, Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) refute the common argument that smuggling, by 
evading taxes on trade which are always sub-optimal, improves social welfare. Instead, 
they find a welfare reducing effect of smuggling when it coexists with legal trade. 
Introducing a third non-traded good, Sheikh (1974) shows that this coexistence could, 
however, be welfare improving. Pitt (1981), in an alternative model of smuggling, 
demonstrates that the welfare consequences of smuggling are ambiguous. In his model 
legal and illegal trade do coexist, although, in addition, firms trading illegally use legal 
trade to camouflage the smuggling. This model explains the coexistence of legal trade, 
illegal trade, and a price disparity defined as the difference between the domestic market 
price and the tax-inclusive world price of a commodity. 
The theoretical literature focusing on the determinants of smuggling confirms the 
obvious incentives for smuggling, i.e., the existence of trade taxes and restrictions. 
Several influential contributions prove [see, for example, Bhagwati (1964); Bhagwati 
and Hansen (1973); Sheik (1974)] that traders, facing high trade taxes or trade 
restrictions, resort to illegal means of trade such as smuggling and the misinvoicing of 
exports and imports, i.e., the false declaration of trade documents. Pitt (1981) shows that 
tariffs cause a price disparity which in turn provides an incentive for illegal imports. Pitt 
(1984) analyzes the BMP as a determinant for smuggling. He shows that the black 
market equilibrates the supply of foreign exchange from illegal exports and its demand 
for illegal imports. Biswas and Marjit (2007) find that import (export) underinvoicing is 
negatively (positively) correlated with the BMP, since the foreign exchange from 
unreported transactions is acquired (sold) on the black market. 
Martin and Panagariya (1984) and Norton (1988) focus on the cost of smuggling and 
examine the effect of law enforcement. They show that increasing the probability or cost 
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of confiscation by intensifying law enforcement is a deterrent to smuggling and enables 
authorities to reduce the extent of smuggling. The reason for this is that smugglers try to 
maximize their net gain from smuggling, i.e., the difference between expected revenues 
and expected costs. The expected costs of smuggling arise from the risk of being caught 
and punished by authorities. Better enforcement increases the costs of smuggling making 
it less attractive for illegal traders. Thursby et al. (1991) investigate the consequences of 
law enforcement on smuggling for welfare. Because the market price in the presence of 
smuggling is below the price when all sales are legal, smuggling can improve welfare if 
the price effect outweighs its cost. Hence, reducing smuggling by increasing law 
enforcement might come at the cost of lower welfare for consumers. 
Most empirical studies use the trade discrepancy which is calculated using balance of 
payments data as a proxy for smuggling. For example, if import figures reported by the 
importing country (adjusted for shipping and insurance costs) significantly exceed (fall 
short of) export figures reported by the exporting country, these studies conclude that 
import overinvoicing (underinvoicing) will take place in the importing country. 
Bhagwati (1964) analyzes trade between Turkey and its major trading partners and 
observes import underinvoicing for machinery and transport equipment. McDonald 
(1985) analyzes trade in 10 developing countries and finds that export underinvoicing is 
positively correlated with export taxes and the BMP. Pohit and Taneja (2003) analyze 
informal trade between India and Bangladesh and find that the potential reduction of 
transaction costs is a strong motive for smuggling. Fisman and Wei (2004) present strong 
empirical evidence that higher tax rates cause tax evasion in the form of trade 
misinvoicing between China and Hong Kong. Fisman and Wei (2007) study illicit trade 
in cultural properties in the United States. They provide empirical evidence that 
misinvoicing is highly correlated with the extent of corruption in the exporting country. 
Berger and Nitsch (2008) confirm this finding in an extended analysis. Beja (2008) 
estimates that China’s unrecorded trade amounted to $1.4 trillion between 2000 and 
2005. While Farzanegan (2009) uses the MIMIC approach to estimate the size of 
smuggling in Iran, Chapter 4 studies the illegal trade of illegal and legal goods across the 
U.S.-Mexico border. Table 3.1 summarizes the most important findings of the empirical 
smuggling literature. 
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Table 3.1 Review of the Empirical Literature on Trade Misinvoicing 1) 
Study Subject of 
investigation 
Approach Main findings 
Bhagwati 
(1964) 
import underinvoicing 
in Turkey 
descriptive analysis of trade from Turkey to 
its major trading partners France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, and the United States 
import underinvoicing of transport 
equipment and machinery  
McDonald 
(1985) 
incentives for export 
misinvoicing 
OLS regressions for 10 developing countries; 
dependent variable: trade discrepancies; 
independent variables: BMP and export taxes 
weak statistical evidence that the BMP and 
export taxes explain variations in trade 
discrepancies 
Pohit and 
Taneja (2003) 
informal trade between 
India and Bangladesh 
direct survey approach encompassing 100 
traders in each country 
anonymous trading transactions 
characterize informal trade; motivations are 
the quick realization of payments as well as 
less paper work and procedural delay 
Fisman and 
Wei (2004) 
tax evasion in Chinese 
imports from Hong 
Kong 
analysis of 2,043 product categories at the 
six-digit classification level; 
dependent variable: trade discrepancies 
(evasion gap); 
independent variables: tax rate (sum of 
tariffs and the VAT), tax on similar products, 
tariff exemptions, interaction terms 
one percent increase in the tax rate 
increases evasion by three percent; evasion 
takes place in two ways: firstly, trough the 
reclassification of high-taxed product 
categories to lower-taxed categories and 
secondly, through the underinvoicing of 
imports 
(continued on next page)   
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Table 3.1 (cont.) 
Fisman and 
Wei (2007) 2) 
illegal trade in cultural 
properties in the 
United States 
worldwide unbalanced panel for 1996-2005; 
dependent variable: trade discrepancies in 
cultural objects and antiques; 
independent variables: corruption, GDP per 
capita 
highly positive correlation between trade 
discrepancies and corruption, i.e., more 
corrupt countries are more likely to 
misreport data 
Beja (2008) trade misinvoicing in 
China 
descriptive analysis of trade discrepancies  trade misinvoicing occurs mainly between 
Hong Kong and the United States 
Berger and 
Nitsch (2008) 
bilateral trade 
discrepancies at the 4-
digit product level 
OLS regressions for misinvoicing in bilateral 
trade in the United States, Germany, China, 
the United Kingdom, and Japan; 
dependent variable: trade discrepancies; 
independent variables: corruption, GDP per 
capita, distance measure 
trade discrepancies differ widely across 
importers; export underinvoicing is 
prevalent in antiques and bulky products; 
strong positive correlation to corruption in 
the source country 
Farzanegan 
(2009) 
illegal trade in Iran  MIMIC approach and trade misinvoicing; 
causes: penalties, BMP, tariffs, GDP per 
capita, unemployment rate, openness, 
education, institutional quality; 
indicators: government revenues, import 
price index, petroleum consumption 
illegal trade is related positively to tariffs 
and negatively to fines and the 
unemployment rate; trade openness and a 
higher BMP encourage illegal trade while 
better institutional quality reduces it; 
adverse effects on government revenues 
and the import price index; smuggling is 
about 13% of total trade in Iran 
(continued on next page)   
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Table 3.1 (cont.)   
Chapter 4 determinants and long-
term trends of 
smuggling across the 
U.S.-Mexico border 3) 
MIMIC approach for export and import 
misinvoicing; 
causes: BMP, real exchange rate, taxes on 
income/profits, taxes on international trade; 
indicators: errors and omissions, export 
misinvoicing, import misinvoicing 
export misinvoicing is positively correlated 
to a real peso depreciation and to Mexican 
taxes on income/profits; 
import misinvoicing is negatively 
correlated to a real peso depreciation and 
Mexican taxes on income/profits, 
positively to Mexican import tariffs; 
Mexico’s accession to GATT (1987) and 
NAFTA (1994) had a major impact on the 
smuggling of legal goods 
1) The structure of Table 3.1 is taken from Buehn and Eichler (2009, p. 331) with additional remarks. 
2) A shorter version of this working paper has also been published in the series Applied Economics of the American Economic Journal [Fisman and 
Wei (2009)]. 
3) Chapter 4 also deals with the case of illegal goods smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border. However, Table 3.1 just presents the results for the 
case of legal goods smuggling, i.e., trade misinvoicing, because only these are relevant for the cross-sectional analysis of (legal goods) smuggling 
presented in this chapter. 
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3.1.2 Main Hypotheses 
Following the theoretical motivation at the beginning of Section 3.1 as well as the 
theoretical and empirical literature on smuggling, Section 3.1.2 now summarizes and 
formulates the hypotheses on the determinants of smuggling. Section 3.3.2 will discuss 
the indicators and presents the hypotheses regarding the effects of smuggling on these 
variables. 
Facing high tariff rates and trade restrictions, traders often resort to illegal methods of 
trade, such as the smuggling of products or the misinvoicing of exports and imports. 
Liberalizing foreign trade and eliminating non-tariff barriers and similar red tapes reduce 
traders’ incentives to smuggle. Also, stronger law enforcement makes smuggling less 
profitable, and therefore, less attractive. Of course, if smugglers are apprehended and 
their operations exposed, they can facilitate their activities by bribing officials to turn a 
blind eye [Brodie et al. (2000), p. 16]. More corrupt bureaucrats, in exchange for a 
“small” fee, make it thus relatively easy for smugglers to get around certain export 
restrictions and to avoid punishment when caught. To summarize, my main hypotheses 
are as follows: 
(1) The higher the number of trade restrictions, the higher the level of smuggling, 
ceteris paribus. 
(2) The higher the tariffs, the higher the level of smuggling, ceteris paribus. 
(3) The stronger the law enforcement is in a society, the lower the level of smuggling, 
ceteris paribus. 
(4) The more corrupt a society is, the easier it is to smuggle, ceteris paribus. 
Because of the two contrasting types of evidence in the literature regarding the effect of 
the BMP on smuggling, I do not formulate a specific hypothesis about the relationship 
between the BMP and smuggling. Depending on what kind of smuggling dominates in 
the countries included in the sample, i.e., import or export smuggling, I expect to observe 
a negative or positive effect of an increasing BMP on smuggling. 
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3.2 Empirical Methodology 
I use a MIMIC model to analyze the relationships between the informal economic 
activity of smuggling and its determinants. Formally, the MIMIC model consists of two 
parts: the structural equation model and the measurement model.44 The structural 
equation model is given by: 
η ς′= +γ x ,                                                                                                               (3.1) 
where η  is a latent variable, i.e., smuggling in this case, ( ), , ,1 2 qx x x ′′ =x …  is a q  
vector; each 
  1, ,ix , i q= …  is a potential cause of η . The vector ( ), , ,1 2 qγ γ γ ′′ =γ …  is a 
q  vector of coefficients in the structural model describing the “causal” relationships 
between smuggling and its causes. Thus, η  is linearly determined by a set of exogenous 
causes. Since they only partially explain η , the error term ς  represents the unexplained 
component. The variance of ς  is abbreviated by ψ  and ( )E ′=Φ xx  is the ( )q q×  
covariance matrix of the causes. 
The measurement model links smuggling to its indicators, i.e., smuggling is expressed 
in terms of observable variables assuming that the indicators chosen are sound measures 
of the latent variables. Formally, the measurement model is specified as: 
η= +y λ ε ,                                                                                                                (3.2) 
where ( ), , ,1 2 py y y ′′ =y …  is a p  vector of several indicator variables of smuggling and 
( , , )'1, 2 pε ε ε='ε …  is a p  vector of disturbances. Every  ,  1, ,j j pε = …  is a white noise 
error term. The ( )p p×  covariance matrix of the error terms is given by ( )E ′=εΘ εε . 
The single 
 ,  1, ,j j pλ = …  in the p  vector of regression coefficients λ  represents the 
magnitude of the expected change of the respective indicator for a unit change of 
smuggling. 
Substituting equation (3.1) into (3.2) yields a reduced form regression model where 
the indicators of smuggling y  are the endogenous variables and the causes x  the 
exogenous variables. This model can be written as: 
                                               
44
 Section 3.2 briefly explains the MIMIC model. See Appendix A for details. 
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= +y Πx z ,                                                                                                               (3.3) 
where ′=Π λγ  is a ( )p q×  matrix and ς= +z λ ε . The error term z  in equation (3.3) is 
a p  vector of a linear transformation of the white noise error terms ς  and ε  resulting 
from the structural and the measurement model, i.e., ~ ( )z 0,Ω . The ( )p p×  covariance 
matrix Ω  is given as Cov E[( )( ) ]( ) ς ς ψ′ ′= = + + = + εΩ z λ ε λ ε λ λ Θ . 
The model is estimated using the observed variables’ variances and covariances to 
produce an estimate of the SEM’s covariance matrix )(θΣ , )ˆ(ˆ θΣΣ = , that is as close as 
possible to the sample covariance matrix of the observed causes and indicators.45 
Identification and estimation of the model is however not possible without placing 
restrictions on certain model parameters. Among others, a restriction often imposed on 
the model is that one element of the vector λ , i.e., one indicator, is set to an a priori 
value (often 1 or -1). In this way the researcher also establishes an interpretable scale for 
the latent variable [Bollen (1989), pp. 91, 183].46 
The coefficients are estimated under the assumption that smuggling generates the 
pattern of the variances and covariances among the causes and indicators of smuggling. 
The first step in the MIMIC model estimation is to confirm the hypothesized 
relationships between smuggling and its causes and indicators. Once these relationships 
are identified and the parameters estimated, the estimation results are used to calculate 
scores kη  for each country 1, ,and 54k = …  in the sample. These scores make up an 
index that finally provides the ranking of countries with respect to the level of 
smuggling. 
                                               
45
 θ  is a vector that contains the parameters of the model and ( )Σ θ  is the covariance matrix 
as a function of θ  implying that each element of the covariance matrix is a function of one or 
more model parameters. 
46
 The alternative of setting the variance of the unobservable variable η  to one is often less 
convenient for economic interpretation and thus typically not used [Dell’Anno and Schneider 
(2009)]. 
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3.3 Causes and Indicators of Smuggling 
3.3.1 Causes of Smuggling 
3.3.1.1 Tariff Rates and Trade Restrictions 
The theoretical and empirical literature (see Section 3.1.1) shows that tariffs and trade 
restrictions encourage traders to resort to illegal ways of trade, such as the smuggling of 
products or the misinvoicing of exports and imports. To test hypotheses (1) and (2), that 
more trade restrictions and higher tariffs encourage smuggling, I use a (trade) restriction 
index and the tariff rate provided by Waczirag and Welch (2003). For the tariff rate a 
positive correlation to smuggling is expected. The trade restriction index is part of the 
KOF Index of Globalization [Dreher (2006)] and comprises hidden barriers, mean tariff 
rates, taxes on international trade (% of current revenues), and capital account 
restrictions. The trade restriction index ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values of it 
indicating a better situation for free trade in a country. In the following, I thus refer to 
this index as a lack of trade restrictions index and expect a negative correlation to 
smuggling, i.e., by liberalizing foreign trade and eliminating non-tariff barriers and 
similar red tapes, the incentives to smuggle should decrease. Another alternative testing 
hypothesis (1) is to use the Openness Index of Penn World Table 6.1 [PWT (2002)] 
(Openness). Some estimated MIMIC model specifications employ this index, instead of 
the lack of trade restriction index, as a robustness check. The expected correlation 
between Openness and smuggling is negative. 
3.3.1.2 Rule of Law 
The literature also shows that law enforcement is a deterrent to smuggling because 
smugglers maximize their net gain of smuggling, i.e., the difference between their 
expected revenues and costs, including fines and punishment costs. The higher the 
expected costs and the lower the expected net gain, the less profitable smuggling is. The 
expected costs of smuggling depend on the probability of being caught and punished by 
law enforcing authorities, i.e., on the efficiency of the monitoring system and efforts of 
the police. 
70 
 
The rule of law index from World Governance Indicators (WGI) [Kaufmann et al. 
(2007)] tests hypothesis (3), i.e., that stronger law enforcement reduces the level of 
smuggling. This index measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts and is therefore an appropriate proxy for penalties and the perceived costs of 
smuggling. It ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values indicating a stronger police and 
judiciary system. I therefore expect a negative correlation between the rule of law index 
and smuggling. 
3.3.1.3 Corruption 
The previous empirical research shows (see Table 3.1) that smuggling is positively 
correlated to corruption: smuggling is easier in countries with corrupt bureaucrats who 
are more likely to abuse public power for private gains and allow smugglers, in exchange 
for a “small fee”, an escape when caught.47 The corruption index from the Index of 
Economic Freedom of the Heritage Foundation [Holmes et al. (2007)] tests hypothesis 
(4), i.e., that a more corrupt society has a higher level of smuggling. Alternatively, and as 
a robustness check, the measure of corruption from WGI [Kaufmann et al. (2007)] is 
used. Both corruption indices are defined in a way that higher values of the index 
indicate a lower level of corruption. Therefore I refer to each of them as a lack of 
corruption index and expect a negative correlation to smuggling.48 
3.3.1.4 Black Market Premium 
As explained above, a BMP can be an attractive incentive for smuggling. Smugglers can 
                                               
47
 This is the most general definition of corruption commonly used in the literature. The 
World Bank provides a narrower one: “[corruption] distorts the rule of law, weakens a nation’s 
institutional foundation, and severely affects the poor who are already the most disadvantaged 
members of the society.” [Word Bank (2009a)]. 
48
 Corruption might also be an indicator of illegal trade in an economy. In fact, smuggling is 
in close connection with bribery and other forms of corruption. Increasing illegal trade may 
affect the perception of corruption in the society. To consider this issue, specification 10 uses the 
corruption index of the Economic Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation [Holmes et al. 
(2007)] as an indicator. 
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underinvoice exports and supply the unrecorded revenues on the black foreign exchange 
market to realize additional profits. On the other hand, a high BMP means higher costs 
and thus reduces the incentive to smuggle. This is the case for illegal importers who have 
to acquire foreign exchange on the black market for the amount of imports not reported 
to authorities [De Macedo (1987)]. Because of the two contrasting types of evidence in 
the literature I do not formulate a specific hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
the BMP and smuggling. Depending on what kind of smuggling dominates in the 
sample, i.e., import/export smuggling, a negative/positive effect of an increasing BMP 
on smuggling may result.49 The sources for the BMP are Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) 
and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
3.3.2 Indicators of Smuggling 
3.3.2.1 Tax Revenues and GDP per capita 
Smuggling involves both real and monetary costs. Real costs of smuggling arise from the 
transfer of production factors, such as capital and labor, to the informal part of the 
economy. Monetary costs arise from the evasion of taxes and tariffs. Tax revenues are 
the predominant source of government revenues in most countries. While developed 
countries rely more on direct taxes, such as taxes on income, profits, and capital gains, 
developing countries depend more on indirect taxes, including taxes on international 
trade [Askari (2006), p. 135]. This is due to the fact that administrative and 
implementation costs are lower for indirect taxes than for direct ones. It is thus easier for 
developing countries to levy taxes in an environment of lower institutional quality that 
often prevails in those countries. 
Smugglers, by evading legal duties and taxes/tariffs, are an extra burden for a 
government’s budget. Naturally, their activities reduce the government’s ability 
                                               
49
 The main analysis examines the effect of the BMP as a causal variable on smuggling. 
However, it can be argued that changes of the BMP are due to changes in smuggling 
transactions. Export smugglers supply unreported foreign exchange in the black market and 
import smugglers demand the foreign exchange in the black market for financing their 
operations. For this reason, specifications 8 and 9 use the BMP as an indicator of smuggling. 
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(especially in developing countries as they rely more on indirect taxes) to provide public 
goods. This may have harmful consequences because the provision of public goods 
increases productivity of firms in the official economy [see, for example, Loayza (1996); 
Johnson et al. (1997); Johnson et al. (1998)]. Thus, by wasting scarce resources, 
smuggling has a negative effect on tax revenues and thus on productivity, economic 
development, and growth.50 My fifth hypothesis therefore is: 
(5) The higher the level of smuggling, the lower the foreign trade tax revenues, 
economic development and growth, ceteris paribus.51 
To test hypothesis (5) I use the GDP per capita and a measure of tax revenues as 
indicators.52 The source of GDP per capita is PWT (2002) and the expected correlation 
between smuggling and the GDP per capita is negative. Unfortunately, international 
trade taxes data has lots of missing values, especially for developing countries. For this 
reason, I have decided, instead, to use a general measure of tax revenues, i.e., total tax 
revenues from the World Bank (2006). The expected correlation between smuggling and 
government’s total tax revenues is negative. 
3.3.2.2 Misinvoicing  
Illegal foreign trade transactions are detectable using balance of payments data of partner 
country trade statistics. A reporting gap or trade data discrepancy occurs if the true value 
of exports or imports deviates from the amount of exports or imports reported to the 
authorities. Without smuggling (and measurement error) no systematic reporting gap 
                                               
50
 See, for example, Norton (1988) and Deardorff and Stolper (1990). 
51
 There is also another way to look at the relationship between smuggling and GDP per 
capita. If countries become richer, they can invest more in monitoring institutions and efficient 
and transparent trade procedures. Specification 10 tests this hypothesis using the GDP per capita 
as a cause. I expected a negative correlation between the GDP per capita and smuggling in 
specification 10. 
52
 The indicator GDP per capita takes also into account a country’s level of development and 
thus controls for the fact that smuggling in developing countries is often used to earn a sufficient 
income. 
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should exist. It is, therefore, common practice in the literature to use trade discrepancies 
in official trade data to uncover smuggling.53 Following this approach and expecting a 
positive correlation between trade discrepancies and the level of smuggling the sixth and 
final hypothesis is: 54 
(6) The higher the level of smuggling, the higher the reporting gaps/trade 
discrepancies in the partner country trade statistics, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis (6) is tested using official trade figures. The data is taken from the Directions 
of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this 
database, the export figures are in FOB (Free on Board) and imports are in CIF (Cost, 
Insurance, and Freight) prices. The IMF (1993, p. 8) suggests multiplying the export 
figures by an adjustment factor of 1.1 in order to make them comparable to import 
figures that take into account transport and insurance costs. More precisely, the 
following two equations are used to calculate import and export misinvoicing: 
( )Export misinvoicing CIF factori cX X= − ⋅ ,                                                         (3.4) 
( )Import misinvoicing CIF factorc iM M= − ⋅ .                                                       (3.5) 
The variables are defined as follows: iX  are imports from a specific country as recorded 
by industrial economies (or rest of the world), cX  are exports as reported by a specific 
country to industrial economies (or rest of the world), cM  are imports as reported by a 
specific country from industrial economies (or rest of the world), and iM  are exports of 
industrial economies (or rest of the world) to a specific country. 
While positive values in equation (3.4) refer to underinvoicing of exports, negative 
ones refer to overinvoicing of exports. In equation (3.5), positive values refer to 
                                               
53
 For recent empirical applications, see Fisman and Wei (2004; 2007), Berger and Nitsch 
(2008), Farzanegan (2009), and Buehn and Eichler (2009). 
54
 I use two similar control groups, namely industrialized economies and the rest of the world, 
to calculate trade discrepancies. Under the assumption – as common in the smuggling literature –
that trade data reported by industrialized countries are accurate, discrepancies in trade figures 
point to trade misinvoicing. 
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overinvoicing of imports and negative ones to import underinvoicing. The total 
misinvoicing is the sum of the absolute amount of import and export misinvoicing. The 
definitions and sources of all variables are summarized in Table C.1 in Appendix C. 
3.3.3 The Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes Model of Smuggling 
To summarize, the MIMIC model of smuggling estimated in this chapter uses the 
following causal variables: the lack of trade restrictions index, tariffs, the lack of 
corruption index, the BMP, and the rule of law. The precise specification of the structural 
equation (3.1) in the empirical model is: 
[ ] [ ]1 2 3 4 5
Lack of trade restrictions
Tariffs
Smuggling , , , , Lack of corruption
BMP
Rule of law
γ γ γ γ γ ς
 
 
 
= + 
 
 
  
.                            (3.6) 
The measurement model uses the GDP per capita, the trade discrepancy, and tax 
revenues as indicators. The measurement equation (3.2) of the MIMIC model is thus 
given by: 
[ ]
1 1
2 2
3 3
GDP per capita
Trade discrepancy Smuggling
Tax revenues
λ ε
λ ε
λ ε
    
    
= +
    
         
.                                                    (3.7) 
Figure 3.1 shows the path diagram. The small squares attached to the arrows indicate the 
expected signs in the empirical analysis following hypotheses (1)-(6). 
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Figure 3.1 Path Diagram of the Smuggling MIMIC Model 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Estimation Results 
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results of 10 different specifications of the MIMIC 
model for smuggling applying the maximum likelihood estimator.55 Specification 1 
serves as a baseline specification including the main causes of smuggling. The other nine 
specifications use different data sources and vary the set of causes and/or indicators in 
order to demonstrate the robustness of the results. The model is estimated over the period 
1991-1999. I use the variables’ average over the period for two reasons: data availability 
and to control for business cycle effects.56 Table 3.2 reports standardized coefficients to 
                                               
55
 All calculations have been carried out with LISREL® version 8.80. Applying the 
generalized least squares (GLS) estimator largely confirms the estimation results. 
56
 The time period is limited to the cut-off of 1999 because of the unavailability of 
information on some key variables such as the BMP beyond this period. Moreover, some of the 
data – the tariff rate for example – is only available as averages over the estimation period. 
Lack of 
trade 
restrictions 
Tariffs 
Lack of 
corruption 
BMP 
Rule of  
law 
Smuggling 
GDP per 
capita 
Trade 
discrepancy 
Tax 
revenues 
- 
+ 
- 
+/- 
- 
- 
+ 
- 
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highlight the relative effects of the causes on smuggling.57 These coefficients indicate – 
ceteris paribus – the response in standard deviation units of smuggling for a one standard 
deviation change in an explanatory, causal variable [Bollen (1989), pp. 123-126]. The 
following explains the estimation results starting with the causes of smuggling. 
                                               
57
 The standardized coefficients are calculated as ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ/sji ji ii jjγ γ σ σ= . Thereby the superscript 
s  indicates the standardized coefficient; i  denotes the causal and j  the latent variable. ˆiiσ  and 
ˆ jjσ  are the predicted variances of the ith  and jth  variable, respectively [Bollen (1989), p. 124]. 
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Table 3.2 Estimations Results (Standardized Coefficients) 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Causes           
Lack of trade 
restrictions index 
-0.15* 
(1.69) 
-0.15* 
(1.71) 
-0.18* 
(1.90) 
-0.18* 
(1.88) 
 -0.15* 
(1.68) 
-0.17* 
(1.76) 
-0.16* 
(1.71) 
  
Tariffs 0.12** 
(1.96) 
0.12* 
(1.95) 
0.09 
(1.47) 
0.12* 
(1.94) 
0.18*** 
(3.36) 
0.12* 
(1.85) 
0.11* 
(1.76) 
0.11* 
(1.81) 
0.18*** 
(3.19) 
0.02 
(0.25) 
Trade openness     0.04 
(0.77) 
0.03 
(0.57) 
  0.04 
(0.76) 
-0.09 
(1.11) 
Lack of corruption 
index 
-0.21*** 
(2.55) 
-0.21*** 
(2.58) 
-0.26*** 
(3.21) 
-0.30 3) 
(1.54) 
-0.23** 
(2.73) 
-0.25*** 
(3.20) 
-0.25** 
(3.15) 
-0.23*** 
(2.90) 
-0.25*** 
(3.09) 
 
BMP -0.10** 
(2.00) 
-0.10** 
(1.98) 
-0.05 2) 
(1.08) 
-0.10** 
(1.96) 
-0.10** 
(2.06) 
    -0.14* 
(1.68) 
Rule of law -0.54*** 
(6.10) 
-0.54*** 
(6.08) 
-0.56*** 
(5.66) 
-0.51*** 
(2.39) 
-0.74*** 
(8.36) 
-0.56*** 
(5.65) 
-0.56*** 
(5.60) 
-0.59*** 
(5.89) 
-0.69*** 
(8.34) 
-0.36* 
(1.67) 
GDP per capita          -0.66*** 
(2.94) 
Indicators           
GDP per capita 
(fixed) 
-0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95  
Misinvoicing 0.50*** 
(4.17) 
0.53 1),*** 
(4.45) 
0.52*** 
(4.28) 
0.51*** 
(3.97) 
0.49*** 
(4.03) 
0.51*** 
(4.27) 
0.51*** 
(4.27) 
0.51*** 
(4.25) 
0.50*** 
(4.11) 
0.52*** 
(4.13) 
Tax revenues -0.45*** 
(3.64) 
-0.45*** 
(3.64) 
-0.45*** 
(3.39) 
-0.43*** 
(3.48) 
-0.44*** 
(3.55) 
-0.42*** 
(3.35) 
-0.42*** 
(3.37) 
-0.42*** 
(3.35) 
-0.41*** 
(3.25) 
-0.45*** 
(3.50) 
(continued on next page)           
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Table 3.2 (cont.)           
BMP        0.33*** 
(2.57) 
0.34*** 
(2.60) 
 
Lack of corruption 
index (fixed) 
         -0.86 
Goodness-of-fit statistics          
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Degrees of freedom 21 21 21 21 21 21 15 21 21 22 
Chi-square 
(p-value) 
20.11 
(0.51) 
19.41 
(0.56) 
11.95 
(0.94) 
21.20 
(0.45) 
19.52 
(0.55) 
12.64 
(0.92) 
11.88 
(0.69) 
29.68 
(0.09) 
29.20 
(0.11) 
17.09 
(0.76) 
RMSEA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.00 
1) Misinvoicing with control group rest of the world. 
2) BMP from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
3) Corruption index of WGI. 
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. * Significance at the 10% level. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. The degrees 
of freedom are determined by 0.5 (p + q) (p + q + 1) – t; with p = number of indicators; q = number of causes; t = the number for free parameters. If 
the model fits the data perfectly and the parameter values are known, the sample covariance matrix equals the covariance matrix implied by the model. 
The null hypothesis of perfect fit corresponds to a p-value of 1. The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) measures the model’s fit 
based on the difference between the estimated and the actual covariance matrix. RMSEA values smaller than 0.05 indicate a good fit [Browne and 
Cudeck (1993)]. 
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The lack of trade restrictions index has a negative effect on smuggling in all 
specifications. Higher values of this index indicate fewer trade restrictions. The observed 
negative relationship between the lack of trade restriction index and smuggling means 
that fewer trade restrictions will, as expected, lower the level of smuggling. With respect 
to the average tariffs on imports, the results show that tariffs are positively correlated to 
smuggling. This relationship is statistically significant in all estimated specifications, 
except for specification 3. That is, the higher tariffs the more smuggling takes place, 
ceteris paribus. For example, in specification 1, a one standard deviation increase in 
average tariffs increases smuggling by 0.12 standard deviations. 
Trade openness enters in specifications 5, 6, 9, and 10. Its effect on smuggling is not 
conclusive. On the one hand, one can argue that more openness decreases the incentive 
for illegal trade, but on the other hand, as Pitt (1981) mentions, legal trade is used by 
illegal traders to camouflage their illegal activities.58 However, neither the positive 
correlation of this variable to smuggling in specifications 5, 6, and 9 nor the negative 
correlation in specification 10 is statistically significant. In summary, the statistical 
evidence confirms hypotheses (1) and (2) that more trade restrictions and higher tariffs 
increase the level of smuggling. Openness does not seem to be an important determinant 
of smuggling. 
All specifications demonstrate a negative and strongly significant impact of the rule of 
law index on smuggling. This index is used to proxy fine rates on smuggling and the 
quality of the police and the courts in a country as explained in Section 3.2. A one 
standard deviation increase in the rule of law index reduces smuggling by more than 0.50 
standard deviations. The statistical evidence thus confirms hypothesis (3). Given the 
large standardized coefficient of the rule of law index it seems that it is the ability to 
circumvent administrative rules, rather than high tariffs and trade restrictions that 
determine the level of smuggling. 
The lack of corruption index shows a consistent and negative effect on smuggling. 
This effect is statistically significant in all specifications, except for specification 4 
                                               
58
 The causal variable Trade Openness also controls for the fact that small countries are 
relatively specialized in production, thus trade more, and have a higher degree of trade openness. 
Following Pitt (1981), this may also explain a positive correlation between Trade Openness and 
the level of smuggling. 
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which uses the corruption index from WGI [Kaufmann et al. (2007)].59 A one standard 
deviation increase in the lack of corruption index decreases the smuggling by more than 
0.20 standard deviations. The statistical evidence confirms hypothesis (4) that higher 
levels of corruption make smuggling easier, ceteris paribus. 
Finally, the BMP shows a stable and significant negative effect on smuggling. This 
case is highly possible for import smuggling, in particular import underinvoicing, where 
smugglers must finance their illegal imports from the black market of exchange. An 
increasing premium functions like an extra burden for this group of illegal traders.60 
Specification 10 uses the GDP per capita as a cause to test the hypothesis that richer 
countries have better monitoring institutions as well as efficient and transparent trade 
procedures, which then reduce smuggling. The empirical evidence supports this 
hypothesis. The observed correlation between GDP per capita and smuggling is 
significant negative. That is, the more developed a country the lower the level of 
smuggling, ceteris paribus. 
The results for the indicators are fairly consistent across different specifications. As 
explained in Section 3.2, one of the coefficients of the indicators has to be normalized. I 
selected GDP per capita and set the coefficient of this variable to -1.61 The reason is that 
smuggling canalizes resources of an economy from the productive, formal part to the 
grabby, informal part, hindering the entire use of the economy’s potential capacity 
reducing economic growth and development.62 The second indicator of smuggling is the 
trade discrepancy variable.63 The standardized coefficients in the various specifications 
                                               
59
 Recall from Section 3.2 that for both indices lower index values imply a higher level of 
corruption. 
60
 Specification 3 making use of the BMP from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) does however not 
confirm this effect at any convenient significance level. 
61
 The coefficient of -1 corresponds to an estimated standardized coefficient of -0.95. 
62
 The choice of the indicator which is chosen to establish the scale of the latent variable does 
not affect the estimated coefficients because the maximum likelihood estimator is scale invariant 
[Swaminathan and Algina (1978)]. Typically, one selects the indicator that loads most on the 
unobservable variable, i.e., GDP per capita in the MIMIC model of smuggling. 
63
 Specification 2 demonstrates the robustness of the result using the rest of the world instead 
of the industrialized countries as control group for trade misinvoicing. 
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show that a one standard deviation increase in smuggling increases misinvoicing by 
approximately 0.50 standard deviations, ceteris paribus. The empirical results confirm 
hypothesis (6) that trade discrepancies, calculated as trade misinvoicing, are positively 
correlated to smuggling. 
The last indicator is tax revenues. Smuggling is, because of the evasion of taxes and 
tariffs, an extra burden for government budgets. Increasing smuggling by one standard 
deviation reduces tax revenues by about 0.40 standard deviations. Again, this effect is 
stable and significant across different specifications and supports hypothesis (5). 
While the main analysis examines the effect of the BMP as a causal variable on 
smuggling, specifications 8 and 9 use the BMP as an indicator in order to examine the 
argument that changes of the BMP can be due to changes in smuggling transactions.64 
Both specifications show a positive, statistically significant correlation between 
smuggling and the BMP. This positive correlation can occur in the case of import 
misinvoicing. The higher the level of smuggling the higher the BMP, ceteris paribus, 
because illegal importers have to acquire foreign exchange on the black market for 
imports not reported to authorities. A higher level of import smuggling increases the 
price for black foreign exchange. 
All estimated specifications show satisfactory goodness-of-fit statistics. The main 
statistics such as the chi-square and the RMSEA are given in Table 3.2, while additional 
goodness-of-fit statistics are presented in Table C.2 in Appendix C.65 The validity of the 
estimated MIMIC model is acceptable because the statistically significant determinants 
of smuggling have the theoretically expected signs and the goodness-of-fit statistics point 
to a good overall fit. The model is thus suitable to estimate an index of smuggling for the 
54 countries in the sample. The next section presents this index. 
3.4.2 The Smuggling Index 
The smuggling index is calculated by applying the coefficients of the significant causal 
variables to the corresponding observed variables. For the numerical example of the 
baseline specification 1 the smuggling index is given as: 
                                               
64
 See also footnote 48. 
65
 For a comprehensive discussion of these statistics, see Section A.3 in Appendix A. 
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Smuggling 1 2 3 4 50.15 x - 0.12 x - 0.21 x - 0.10 x - 0.54 x= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ .
66
                              (3.8) 
The higher the amount of the smuggling index the higher is the level of smuggling over 
the period of 1991-1999 in a particular country. In addition to specification 1, the 
smuggling index is also calculated using specifications 5 and 10 to check for the 
robustness of the calculated index.67 All three indices are presented in Table 3.3. The 
ranking of countries in the first column corresponds to specification 1 in column two, 
while the third and fourth columns give the countries’ ranking according to specification 
5 and 10. 
 
Table 3.3 Ranking of Countries 1991-1999 
Country  Specification 1  Specification 5  Specification 10 
  Ranking (index 
value) 
 Ranking (index 
value) 
 Ranking (index 
value) 
Switzerland  1  (-1.574)  1  (-1.709)  1  (-1.984) 
Finland  2  (-1.453)  2  (-1.585)  12  (-1.242) 
Sweden  3  (-1.429)  3  (-1.559)  7  (-1.452) 
Singapore  4  (-1.413)  5  (-1.537)  3  (-1.609) 
Austria  5  (-1.413)  4  (-1.544)  2  (-1.629) 
Netherlands  6  (-1.404)  6  (-1.534)  4  (-1.520) 
Iceland  7  (-1.324)  7  (-1.447)  8  (-1.437) 
Canada  8  (-1.308)  8  (-1.437)  6  (-1.507) 
Belgium  9  (-1.190)  9  (-1.312)  11  (-1.317) 
Australia  10  (-1.175)  10  (-1.285)  5  (-1.508) 
France  11  (-1.160)  11  (-1.282)  10  (-1.331) 
(continued on next page)     
                                               
66
 1x , 2x , 3x , 4x , and 5x  represent the lack of trade restriction index, tariffs, the lack of 
corruption index, the BMP, and the rule of law, respectively. 
67
 These two specifications are selected because specification 5 includes Trade Openness 
capturing the smuggling opportunities [Pitt (1981)] and specification 10 uses the lack of 
corruption index as an indicator of smuggling testing the relationship between illegal trade and 
the perception of corruption in a society. 
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Table 3.3 (cont.) 
Japan  12  (-1.1)  12  (-1.225)  9  (-1.426) 
Spain  13  (-0.875)  14  (-0.943)  14  (-0.828) 
Portugal  14  (-0.874)  13  (-0.951)  16  (-0.641) 
Italy  15  (-0.729)  15  (-0.815)  13  (-0.995) 
Estonia  16  (-0.557)  16  (-0.507)  21  (-0.045) 
Greece  17  (-0.436)  17  (-0.476)  18  (-0.285) 
Republic of 
Korea 
 18  (-0.337)  18  (-0.412)  20  (-0.242) 
Slovenia  19  (-0.304)  20  (-0.302)  17  (-0.582) 
Malaysia  20  (-0.263)  19  (-0.330)  25  (0.086) 
Uruguay  21  (-0.175)  21  (-0.214)  23  (0.042) 
Cyprus  22  (-0.151)  22  (-0.187)  15  (-0.650) 
Costa Rica  23  (-0.116)  24  (-0.135)  26  (0.210) 
Mauritius  24  (-0.109)  23  (-0.164)  19  (-0.259) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 25  (0.028)  25  (-0.001)  22  (0.018) 
Latvia  26  (0.097)  26  (0.118)  28  (0.334) 
Croatia  27  (0.199)  27  (0.338)  27  (0.310) 
Jordan  28  (0.331)  28  (0.339)  33  (0.581) 
Jamaica  29  (0.388)  30  (0.429)  37  (0.712) 
Panama  30  (0.389)  29  (0.364)  31  (0.541) 
Tunisia  31  (0.423)  31  (0.450)  32  (0.542) 
Mexico  32  (0.483)  32  (0.474)  35  (0.635) 
Turkey  33  (0.499)  34  (0.512)  34  (0.621) 
Algeria  34  (0.512)  52  (1.228)  24  (0.045) 
Ghana  35  (0.539)  33  (0.499)  51  (1.104) 
Brazil  36  (0.544)  36  (0.601)  30  (0.494) 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  37  (0.559)  35  (0.587)  36  (0.672) 
Bulgaria  38  (0.609)  37  (0.646)  29  (0.485) 
Sri Lanka  39  (0.639)  38  (0.657)  41  (0.782) 
Philippines  40  (0.678)  39  (0.706)  43  (0.795) 
(continued on next page)     
84 
 
Table 3.3 (cont.) 
Guatemala  41  (0.781)  40  (0.796)  49  (1.057) 
China  42  (0.784)  44  (0.939)  39  (0.760) 
Zambia  43  (0.797)  41  (0.821)  52  (1.163) 
Ecuador  44  (0.837)  42  (0.896)  44  (0.841) 
Peru  45  (0.850)  43  (0.908)  46  (0.928) 
Ukraine  46  (0.855)  45  (0.958)  42  (0.787) 
Nicaragua  47  (0.910)  46  (0.996)  47  (0.932) 
Dominican 
Republic 
 48  (0.919)  47  (0.999)  38  (0.744) 
Indonesia  49  (1.005)  48  (1.081)  48  (0.941) 
Paraguay  50  (1.023)  50  (1.121)  45  (0.847) 
India  51  (1.029)  49  (1.090)  40  (0.768) 
Kenya  52  (1.125)  51  (1.183)  53  (1.273) 
Pakistan  53  (1.407)  53  (1.457)  50  (1.072) 
Cameroon  54  (1.627)  54  (1.698)  54  (1.360) 
 
The ranking of the countries is not surprising; developing countries are typically reported 
as countries with higher levels of smuggling. According to specification 1, the country 
hit least by smuggling is Switzerland, followed by Finland, Sweden, Singapore, and 
Austria. With the exception of Singapore, Canada, Australia, and Japan, only Western 
European countries are among the top 15. At the bottom of the scale are Cameroon, 
Pakistan, Kenya, India, and Paraguay. Compared with the top, the bottom is more 
heterogeneous: among the 15 countries hit most by smuggling are 6 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, 5 Asian countries, 3 African ones, and one country from Eastern 
Europe. A comparison of the three indices shows that the results are robust although 
some differences in the ranking exist. For example, Austria has the 5th lowest level of 
smuggling according to specification 1 but ranks 4th and 2nd according to specifications 5 
and 10, respectively. It can also be seen that for some countries, for example Finland and 
Sweden, the ranking according to specification 10 is somewhat different compared to 
specifications 1 and 5. This might have to do with the different set of causes and 
indicators in specification 10. Specifications 1 and 5 use the GDP per capita as a causal 
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variable and the corruption index of the Heritage Foundation as an indicator. 
Specification 10 however uses the GDP per capita as an indicator and the corruption 
index as a cause. Both variables, i.e., corruption and the GDP per capita are not perfectly 
interchangeable although almost all available evidence suggests that corruption varies 
strongly inverse with development [see, for example, Mauro (1995); Paldam (2003)]. 
Minor differences in the raking between specifications 1/5 and 10 are therefore not 
surprising. Moreover, the estimated standardized coefficients demonstrate that GDP per 
capita is the slightly better indicator. The selected three MIMIC model specifications 
yield nevertheless a similar outcome with respect to the ranking of countries. The 
correlation coefficients between the three indices are: 0.9948 (specification 1 and 5), 
0.9575 (specification 5 and 10), and 0.9688 (specification 1 and 10). In order to test 
whether the correlation coefficients are significantly different from zero, I use Fisher’s 
variance stabilizing transformation ( ) ( )0.5ln 1 1Z r r= + −   , where r  is the correlation 
coefficient. The Z-statistic is approximately normally distributed with a mean of 
( )E( ) 0.5ln 1 1Z ρ ρ= + −    and a variance of ( )V( ) 1 3Z N= − , where ρ  is the null, 
and N  is the number of observations [see Kendall and Stuart (1973)]. Under 0ρ =  the 
test statistic is ( ) ( )0.5ln 1 1 3Z r r N= + − −  ɶ . For the two-sided test, the rejection 
region is 2.5758,  1.9600,  1.6449Z >ɶ  at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, 
respectively. For the sample ( 54N = ) I can reject the null of a zero correlation 
coefficient at the 1%level of significance for each correlation pair. 
Table 3.4 shows averages of the smuggling index for different regions/country groups 
in order to develop a better understanding of the regional differences in smuggling.68 
According to specification 1, smuggling is, by far lowest in the high-income countries of 
the OECD, with an average index value of -1.167. The ranking for the other regions is as 
follows: Eastern Europe (0.150), Asia (0.243), Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
(0.362), Latin America and the Caribbean (0.528), and finally Africa (0.796). Within the 
high-income countries of the OECD smuggling is the biggest problem in Greece 
followed by Italy and Portugal. According to the smuggling index, the worst countries in 
                                               
68
 The classification/grouping of countries is based on the World Bank’s definition [World 
Bank (2009b)]. 
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Eastern Europe are the Ukraine and Bulgaria. While Pakistan and India show the highest 
level of smuggling in Asia, Egypt and Algeria rank last in the MENA region. Uruguay, 
Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago perform best, while Paraguay, the Dominican 
Republic, and Nicaragua perform worst in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although 
only a few African countries are in the sample, this region seems on average to be the 
most affected by smuggling. Within this region, smuggling is the biggest problem in 
Cameroon and Kenya. 
 
Table 3.4 Ranking of Countries According to Geographical Regions 
Country  Specification 1  Specification 5  Specification 10 
  Ranking (index 
value) 
 Ranking (index 
value) 
 Ranking (index 
value) 
High-income OECD countries     
Switzerland  1  (-1.574)  1  (-1.709)  1  (-1.984) 
Finland  2  (-1.453)  2  (-1.585)  12  (-1.242) 
Sweden  3  (-1.429)  3  (-1.559)  7  (-1.452) 
Austria  5  (-1.413)  4  (-1.544)  2  (-1.629) 
Netherlands  6  (-1.404)  6  (-1.534)  4  (-1.520) 
Iceland  7  (-1.324)  7  (-1.447)  8  (-1.437) 
Canada  8  (-1.308)  8  (-1.437)  6  (-1.507) 
Belgium  9  (-1.190)  9  (-1.312)  11  (-1.317) 
Australia  10  (-1.175)  10  (-1.285)  5  (-1.508) 
France  11  (-1.160)  11  (-1.282)  10  (-1.331) 
Spain  13  (-0.875)  14  (-0.943)  14  (-0.828) 
Portugal  14  (-0.874)  13  (-0.951)  16  (-0.641) 
Italy  15  (-0.729)  15  (-0.815)  13  (-0.995) 
Greece  17  (-0.436)  17  (-0.476)  18  (-0.285) 
Average  -1.167  -1.227  -1.263 
(continued on next page)     
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Table 3.4 (cont.) 
Eastern Europe       
Estonia  16  (-0.557)  16  (-0.507)  21  (-0.045) 
Slovenia  19  (-0.304)  20  (-0.302)  17  (-0.582) 
Latvia  26  (0.097)  26  (0.118)  28  (0.334) 
Croatia  27  (0.199)  27  (0.338)  27  (0.310) 
Bulgaria  38  (0.609)  37  (0.646)  29  (0.485) 
Ukraine  46  (0.855)  45  (0.958)  42  (0.787) 
Average  0.150  0.209  0.215 
Asia       
Singapore  4  (-1.413)  5  (-1.537)  3  (-1.609) 
Japan  12  (-1.1)  12  (-1.225)  9  (-1.426) 
Republic of Korea  18  (-0.337)  18  (-0.412)  20  (-0.242) 
Malaysia  20  (-0.263)  19  (-0.330)  25  (0.086) 
Sri Lanka  39  (0.639)  38  (0.657)  41  (0.782) 
Philippines  40  (0.678)  39  (0.706)  43  (0.795) 
China  42  (0.784)  44  (0.939)  39  (0.760) 
Indonesia  49  (1.005)  48  (1.081)  48  (0.941) 
India  51  (1.029)  49  (1.090)  40  (0.768) 
Pakistan  53  (1.407)  53  (1.457)  50  (1.072) 
Average  0.243  0.243  0.193 
MENA       
Cyprus  22  (-0.151)  22  (-0.187)  15  (-0.650) 
Jordan  28  (0.331)  28  (0.339)  33  (0.581) 
Tunisia  31  (0.423)  31  (0.450)  32  (0.542) 
Turkey  33  (0.499)  34  (0.512)  34  (0.621) 
Algeria  34  (0.512)  52  (1.228)  24  (0.045) 
Egypt, Arab 
Republic 
 37  (0.559)  35  (0.587)  36  (0.672) 
Average  0.362  0.488  0.301 
(continued on next page)     
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Table 3.4 (cont.) 
Latin America and the Caribbean     
Uruguay  21  (-0.175)  21  (-0.214)  23  (0.042) 
Costa Rica  23  (-0.116)  24  (-0.135)  26  (0.210) 
Trinidad and Tobago  25  (0.028)  25  (-0.001)  22  (0.018) 
Jamaica  29  (0.388)  30  (0.429)  37  (0.712) 
Panama  30  (0.389)  29  (0.364)  31  (0.541) 
Mexico  32  (0.483)  32  (0.474)  35  (0.635) 
Brazil  36  (0.544)  36  (0.601)  30  (0.494) 
Guatemala  41  (0.781)  40  (0.796)  49  (1.057) 
Ecuador  44  (0.837)  42  (0.896)  44  (0.841) 
Peru  45  (0.850)  43  (0.908)  46  (0.928) 
Nicaragua  47  (0.910)  46  (0.996)  47  (0.932) 
Dominican Republic  48  (0.919)  47  (0.999)  38  (0.744) 
Paraguay  50  (1.023)  50  (1.121)  45  (0.847) 
Average  0.528  0.556  0.615 
Africa       
Mauritius  24  (-0.109)  23  (-0.164)  19  (-0.259) 
Ghana  35  (0.539)  33  (0.499)  51  (1.104) 
Zambia  43  (0.797)  41  (0.821)  52  (1.163) 
Kenya  52  (1.125)  51  (1.183)  53  (1.273) 
Cameroon  54  (1.627)  54  (1.698)  54  (1.360) 
Average  0.796  0.807  0.928 
 
As argued above and also demonstrated by others [see, for example, Fisman and Wei 
(2007); Berger and Nitsch (2008)], smuggling often involves other types of criminal and 
corrupt activities. Figure 3.2 also illustrates the strong positive correlation between 
smuggling and corruption using specification 1 of the smuggling index calculated in this 
chapter and the 1999 corruption perception index of Transparency International (1999) 
(henceforth, CPI99). Because higher levels of the CPI99 represent a lower level of 
corruption in a particular country, its reverse is used. The reverse of the CPI99, displayed 
on the horizontal axis, ranges from 0 to 9 while the estimated index of smuggling is 
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displayed on the vertical axis. Figure 3.2 shows that countries such as Switzerland or 
Australia have low levels of corruption and smuggling. They are among the best 
performing countries according to the smuggling index. On the contrary, countries with 
very high levels of corruption such as Cameroon, Kenya, and Pakistan also show very 
high levels of smuggling. Some exceptions should be noted. Belgium, for example, has a 
much lower level of smuggling compared to Slovenia or Estonia but performs worse 
with respect to corruption. The same holds true, for example in the case of Croatia, 
where corruption is as prolific as it is in the most corrupt countries but smuggling is a 
smaller problem. Nevertheless, despite few exceptions, Figure 3.2 clearly demonstrates 
the positive relationship between smuggling and corruption. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Relationship Between Smuggling and Corruption 
3.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The smuggling index presented in this chapter provides the first ranking of smuggling 
around the world during the 1990s. While previous research mostly employs trade 
discrepancies to uncover smuggling, this chapter uses a structural model that 
Austria
Australia
Cameroon
Ecuador
Ukraine
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Indonesia
Kenya
Jamaica
Brazil
Uruguay
Croatia
India
Greece
Tunisia
Mauritius
Belgium
Estonia
Japan
Slovenia
Switzerland
-2.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
0 2 4 6 8 10
Reversed CPI
In
de
x
 
o
f s
m
u
gg
lin
g 
g 
90 
 
simultaneously deals with the causes and indicators of smuggling within a unified 
framework for 54 countries. This approach has two important advantages. Firstly, in 
contrast to existing empirical studies, which use narrow concepts as a proxy of 
smuggling, the MIMIC approach uses its most important determinants simultaneously. 
The empirical analysis shows a highly statistically significant influence of the rule of law 
and of the level of corruption on smuggling. Trade restrictions and tariffs provide 
incentives for traders to engage in smuggling. The magnitude of the standardized 
coefficients indicates that it is the inferiority of institutions, rather than high tariffs and 
trade restrictions, which drive smuggling, although the latter are also important 
determinants. The second advantage of the MIMIC approach is that the ranking one 
retrieves across countries is tied to the causal variables that were used to estimate the 
model. As such, the model produces a cardinal index of smuggling and considers the 
common criticisms aimed at perception based indices. According to the index of 
smuggling presented in this chapter, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries Sweden 
and Finland, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Austria are among the countries with the 
lowest level of smuggling. Paraguay, India, Kenya, Pakistan, and Cameroon have the 
highest level. 
Of course, one may argue that the estimated model does not capture the extent of 
smuggling. There are two ways to test for the validity of a structural model. Firstly, it is 
necessary to examine the fit of the model. Secondly, variables that determine smuggling 
from a theoretical point of view should have the expected impact [Dell’Anno (2007)].69 I 
have dealt with these two validity tests above: all variables show the theoretically 
expected correlation to smuggling and the various estimated specifications show 
satisfactory goodness-of-fit statistics. 
Some policy conclusions may be drawn. Countries that endeavor to reduce the size of 
smuggling can strengthen their institutions. Increasing the rule of law and reducing 
corruption are suitable policies to get control of smuggling. Reducing trade barriers such 
as tariffs and quotas is another possibility. Although even the countries most committed 
to free trade still have restrictions, the situation has changed for the better since the mid 
1990s: average tariffs have become lower and are continuing to decrease. 
                                               
69
 For a detailed discussion on validity and reliability with respect to structural equations 
models see, for example, Bollen (1989, pp. 184-223). 
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The smuggling index based on the MIMIC approach is likely to be of interest for 
different user groups. One such group is the policy-based academic community which 
evaluates the consequences of smuggling. For various non-governmental organizations 
such as the Institute for New Democracies that base their decisions on the institutional 
environment of a particular country, the MIMIC approach would also be useful. 
Calculating an index of smuggling, as outlined here for different time periods, may help 
non-governmental organizations to monitor how smuggling (being a potential indicator 
of the general institutional quality in a country) varies over time. Since the MIMIC 
approach is based on measurable time variant causes and indicators, the performance of a 
country in controlling smuggling can be measured. 
Clearly, the MIMIC approach to smuggling presented in this chapter is only an 
additional step in furthering the understanding of smuggling. Depending on data 
availability, the model can be estimated over different sub-periods to assess how 
smuggling has changed over time for each country. Another promising avenue for future 
empirical research on smuggling is the analysis of the impact of economic, political, and 
institutional reforms, such as the implementation of free trade zones or the improvement 
of institutional quality, on smuggling. 
 
 
  
CHAPTER FOUR 
SMUGGLING ILLEGAL AND LEGAL GOODS ACROSS THE  
U.S.-MEXICO BORDER∗ 
“If you have a lot of what people want and can’t get, then you can supply the demand 
and shovel in the dough.” 
Charles “Lucky” Luciano (1896-1962) 
While the preceding chapter has estimated an index of smuggling for 54 countries, this 
chapter studies smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border from 1975 to 2004. Using 
Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) models I capture the latent nature of 
smuggling and identify its determinants and long-run trends.70 I also argue that the 
analysis of smuggling has been incomplete so far: existing studies merely analyze the 
causes of trade misinvoicing (see Table 3.1), i.e., illegal trade or smuggling of legal 
goods, which represents only a fraction of total illegal trade. To improve the 
understanding of illegal trade further, I now distinguish between smuggling illegal goods 
and smuggling legal goods in the U.S.-Mexican context. 
The types of smuggling differ with respect to the goods being smuggled, the agents 
involved in smuggling, the smuggling incentive, and the intensity of law enforcement. 
Trade misinvoicing occurs when entrepreneurs misreport the value of legal exports or 
imports to evade tariffs and taxes and is commonly considered a peccadillo (petty 
                                               
∗
 This chapter follows Buehn and Eichler (2009). Copyright © 2009 by the Southern 
Economic Association. 
70
 MIMIC approaches were previously applied to estimate the development of the shadow 
economy [see, for example, Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003); Schneider (2005); and Dell’Anno 
(2007)]. A comprehensive overview of such studies is provided in Schneider and Enste (2000; 
2002). 
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offense): smugglers usually bribe officials or are fined a fee. Smuggling illegal goods 
such as illegal drugs and illegal immigrants, however, often involves dangerous 
criminals who commit serious offenses and, if caught, face severe punishment. As a 
result, their incentive to smuggle is related to the intensity of law enforcement rather than 
tax or tariff evasion. 
Studying the U.S.-Mexican case is particularly interesting as most illegal drugs and 
immigrants enter the United States via the Mexican border. The large income disparity 
between the two nations may explain the high U.S. demand for illegal goods, which 
relatively poor Mexicans are willing to meet despite the risks involved. I also examine 
whether the Clinton and Bush Administrations succeeded in reducing smuggling across 
the border through intensified border enforcement. 
Using a (simple) microeconomic framework, I determine which microeconomic 
incentives affect the two types of smuggling. The hypotheses are then tested in a MIMIC 
model which studies the impact of observable causes (the microeconomic incentives to 
smuggle) on the unobservable phenomenon, smuggling, as indicated by observable 
macroeconomic variables. Applying the benchmarking procedure promoted by 
Dell’Anno and Schneider (2006) and Dell’Anno (2007), I calculate a time series for each 
type of smuggling. 
I find that smuggling in illegal goods from Mexico to the United States decreases 
when Mexican labor market conditions improve and U.S. border enforcement is 
intensified. The Mexican recessions in 1982/83 and 1995 led to large temporary 
increases in smuggling to $113 billion and $87 billion, respectively. Smuggling in illegal 
goods decreased overall, however, from $116 billion in 1984 to $27 billion in 2004, 
which can be attributed to stricter U.S. border enforcement and better Mexican job 
prospects. 
Smuggling legal goods is driven by the real exchange rate and tariff and tax evasion. 
Export misinvoicing fluctuated between underinvoicing values of $0.2 billion and 
overinvoicing values of $0.7 billion while import misinvoicing switched from 
underinvoicing – peaking at $1.6 billion in 1983 – to recent overinvoicing – up to $3.8 
billion in 2002. This pattern can be attributed to substantial tariff reductions in 
accordance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1987 and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 briefly addresses the theoretical 
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smuggling literature. Section 4.2 considers the incentives driving the two types of 
smuggling in a microeconomic framework. Section 4.3 explains the empirical 
methodology. Section 4.4 describes the indicators of smuggling. Section 4.5 presents the 
estimation results and long-term trends for the smuggling of illegal and legal goods. 
Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.1 Literature 
The literature on smuggling has already been reviewed in Section 3.1.1. For this reason, I 
only summarize the main findings of the theoretical literature – which motivate the 
theoretical analysis of illegal and legal goods smuggling in Section 4.2 – in Section 4.1. 
For the empirical literature on smuggling I refer to Section 3.1.1 and Table 3.1. 
The theoretical literature on smuggling focuses on trade misinvoicing, i.e., the false 
declaration of legal imports and exports. One strand of the theoretical literature analyzes 
the welfare effects of trade misinvoicing. Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) show that 
smuggling – despite the classic view – can distort welfare as legal traders are squeezed 
out by smugglers who operate at inferior terms of trade but profit by circumventing 
tariffs. Pitt (1981) shows that the welfare consequences of smuggling are ambiguous. He 
argues that legal trade and smuggling coexist as firms camouflage their smuggling 
activities by also conducting legal trade. 
Another strand of the theoretical literature, initiated by Pitt (1981), analyzes the 
determinants of trade misinvoicing. He argues that smuggling is positively correlated 
with a price disparity, defined as the difference between the actual domestic and the 
tariff-inclusive world market price. If, for example, the domestic price of an exportable 
good exceeds its world market price, it can only be exported legally at a loss, suggesting 
that most of the actual exports are traded illegally. Martin and Panagariya (1984) and 
Norton (1988) consider the costs of smuggling. They find that stricter law enforcement 
serves as a deterrent to smuggle. Pitt (1984) analyzes the black market premium (BMP) 
for foreign exchange as a determinant of smuggling. He finds that the black market 
equilibrates the supply of foreign exchange from illegal exports and its demand to 
purchase illegal imports. Biswas and Marjit (2007) find that export (import) 
underinvoicing is positively (negatively) correlated with the BMP since the foreign 
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exchange from the unreported transaction is sold (acquired) on the black market. 
4.2 Micro-Foundations of Smuggling Incentives  
I argue that smugglers of illegal goods respond to different incentives than smugglers of 
legal goods. The following uses a (simple) microeconomic approach to determine the 
expected impact of different determinants on both types of smuggling.71 
4.2.1 Determinants of Illegal Goods Smuggling 
The representative risk-neutral Mexican smuggler maximizes her expected profit with 
respect to the amount of illegal goods or persons to be smuggled into the United States, 
illS . Equation (4.1) outlines the revenue from smuggling illegal goods, ( )illR S :  
( ) ( )1ill US illR S v ep S= + .                                                                                          (4.1) 
The smuggler sells illS  illegal Mexican goods at price USp  in the United States and 
converts the dollar-denominated proceeds on the black market into Mexican pesos, 
earning the BMP v  over the official exchange rate e .72 The expected costs of 
smuggling, ( )illE C S   , arise from the risk of being caught by U.S. Border and Customs 
Protection73 as outlined in equation (4.2):  
( ) ( ),ill illE C S prob S H F  =  ,                                                                                (4.2) 
with ( ), 0ill illprob S H S∂ ∂ > , ( ) ( )22 , 0ill illprob S H S∂ ∂ > , and ( ), 0illprob S H H∂ ∂ > . 
The smuggler is apprehended with probability ( )HSprob ill ,  and faces the punishment 
cost F . I assume that the probability of apprehension is a convex function of the amount 
of illegal goods being smuggled and depends positively on the exogenous border 
                                               
71
 Biswas and Marjit (2007) use a similar approach to study the rationale for trade mis-
invoicing. 
72
 The exchange rate e  is defined as the price of one U.S. dollar in terms of Mexican pesos. 
Thus, a rise in the exchange rate corresponds to a depreciation of the peso against the U.S. dollar. 
73
 Until 2003, the U.S. Customs Service. 
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enforcement, H , i.e., the more officers patrolling the U.S.-Mexico border, the more 
likely smugglers are to be caught. 
If the smuggler is apprehended, she will be sentenced to prison. The cost of 
punishment F  therefore represents the opportunity cost of lost labor income, ( )1 u w− , 
during imprisonment. The higher Mexican wages, w , are, and the lower the Mexican 
unemployment rate, u , is, the higher the cost of punishment, F :  
( ){ }1F f u w= − ,                                                                                                     (4.3) 
with ( ){ }1 0f u w u∂ − ∂ <  and ( ){ }1 0f u w w∂ − ∂ > . Using equations (4.1)-(4.3), the 
expected nominal profit from smuggling illegal goods is:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 , 1ill US ill illE v ep S prob S H f u wpi = + − − .                                            (4.4) 
To study the determinants of smuggling illegal goods in real terms, I denominate the 
expected profit in Mexican goods by dividing equation (4.4) by the Mexican price index, 
MEXp . Equation (4.5) shows the expected real profit from smuggling, whereby the real 
exchange rate is defined as US MEXep pε = :  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }11 ,
ill
ill ill
MEX MEX
E f u w
v S prob S H
p p
pi
ε
−
= + − .                                                (4.5) 
Real profit optimization with respect to the amount of smuggling, illS , yields the result 
that the marginal revenue from smuggling equals the marginal cost of smuggling:  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }, 11 illill MEXprob S H f u wv S pε
∂
−
+ =
∂
,                                                                   (4.6) 
with ( ) ( )22 , 0ill illprob S H S∂ ∂ > . Equation (4.6) determines how the optimal amount 
of illegal goods to smuggle, illS , reacts to changes in the incentive variables. I derive the 
following hypotheses:  
(1) A higher BMP, v , increases the incentive to smuggle, 0illdS dv > , ceteris 
paribus, as converting U.S. dollars into pesos on the black market is more 
profitable. 
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(2) A higher real exchange rate, i.e., a real depreciation of the peso against the U.S. 
dollar, increases smuggling, 0illdS dε > , ceteris paribus, as revenues rise in 
terms of Mexican goods.74 
(3) Higher Mexican wages and lower Mexican unemployment reduce the incentive 
to smuggle, i.e., both 0illdS dw <  and 0illdS du >  hold. Hence, better Mexican 
job prospects decrease smuggling by raising the opportunity costs ( )1 u w−  of 
imprisonment if apprehended. Thus, I expect smuggling activities to rise during 
Mexican recessions when Mexican labor market conditions worsen. 
(4) More intense border enforcement should lead to a decrease in the smuggling of 
illegal goods, 0illdS dH < , ceteris paribus, as this increases the probability of 
apprehension and, thus, the expected cost of smuggling. 
4.2.2 Determinants of Legal Goods Smuggling/Trade Misinvoicing 
4.2.2.1 Export Misinvoicing 
A Mexican entrepreneur exports a given amount of legal goods X  to the United States. 
In order to save on Mexican income taxes and to benefit from the BMP, she has an 
incentive not to report the total amount of exports. Export underinvoicing, 0xS > , thus 
means that the reported amount of exports, xSX − , is lower than the actual amount of 
exports, X .75 Equation (4.7) describes the Mexican exporter’s expected profit, ( )xE pi :  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1x US x US x xE t ep X S v ep S prob S Fpi = − − + + − ,                                         (4.7) 
where ( ) 0x xprob S S∂ ∂ >  and ( ) ( )22 0x xprob S S∂ ∂ > . Given the total amount of 
                                               
74
 Per definition, 1v > −  holds and, thus, 0illdS dε >  generally applies. 
75
 I define misinvoicing as underinvoicing, i.e., as the difference between the actual and the 
reported export/import figures. Defining misinvoicing as overinvoicing would just reverse the 
theoretical hypotheses. 
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exports, X , the Mexican exporter decides how many exports to report and how many to 
underinvoice. She sells the reported (legal) exports xX S−  at USp  in the United States 
and converts the dollar-denominated proceeds at the official exchange rate e  into pesos, 
generating a legal after-tax export revenue of ( ) ( )1 US xt ep X S− − .76 The unreported 
(misinvoiced) exports, xS , are sold at USp  in the United States. The dollar-denominated 
smuggling revenue is then converted into pesos on the black market where the 
misinvoicer profits from the BMP, v , over the official exchange rate, e . 
The expected cost of export underinvoicing arises from the risk that the misinvoicing 
will be detected by the authorities with probability ( )xprob S  and that the exporter will 
subsequently face the punishment cost F  – which represents exogenous expenses for 
bribes or fines. The detection probability is assumed to be convex in the amount of 
export underinvoicing. Dividing equation (4.7) by the Mexican price index, MEXp , and 
using the definition of the real exchange rate, US MEXep pε = , yields the Mexican 
export underinvoicer’s real expected profit:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
x
x x
MEX MEX
E F
t X v t S prob S
p p
pi
ε ε= − + + − .                                               (4.8) 
Real profit optimization with respect to the amount of export underinvoicing, xS , again 
yields the result that the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of smuggling:  
( ) ( )xx MEXprob S Fv t S pε
∂
+ =
∂
,                                                                                   (4.9) 
with ( ) ( )22 0x xprob S S∂ ∂ > . I hypothesize the following effects of smuggling 
incentives on export underinvoicing:  
(1) A higher BMP, v , should cause export underinvoicing to rise ceteris paribus, 
0xdS dv > , as the exchange rate-adjusted price spread between unreported and 
reported exports increases. 
                                               
76
 The variable t  denotes the Mexican profit/income tax. Obviously, only legal transactions 
are subject to taxation. For simplicity, I do not consider any production or procurement costs. 
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(2) A real depreciation of the peso against the U.S. dollar should lead to higher 
export underinvoicing ceteris paribus, 0xdS dε > , as Mexican goods become 
more competitive.77 
(3) Higher Mexican income/profit taxes, t , should lead to more export 
underinvoicing ceteris paribus, 0xdS dt > , as illegal/unreported Mexican 
exports are not subject to taxation and thus become more competitive over 
legal/reported Mexican exports. Tax evasion therefore appears to be an important 
motive for export misinvoicing. 
4.2.2.2 Import Misinvoicing  
The Mexican entrepreneur imports a fixed amount of legal goods M  from the United 
States and decides how many imports to report, MM S− , and how many to 
underinvoice, 0MS > . Equation (4.10) describes the Mexican importer’s expected profit, 
( )ME pi :  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1M US M US M ME t R M ep q M S v ep S prob S Fpi  = − − + − − + −  , 
                                                                                                                                (4.10) 
where ( ) 0M Mprob S S∂ ∂ >  and ( ) ( )22 0M Mprob S S∂ ∂ > . The Mexican entrepreneur 
imports M  goods – some reported, some unreported – from the United States and sells 
them in Mexico, earning ( )R M  pesos. She spends ( ) ( )1US Mep q M S+ −  pesos to 
import the reported (legal) American goods, where q  denotes the Mexican import tariff 
levied on reported American goods. After paying the Mexican income/profit tax, t , the 
Mexican importer makes an after-tax profit of ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1US Mt R M ep q M S − − + −   
pesos on her reported transactions. For the unreported (misinvoiced) U.S. imports, MS , 
she spends ( )1 US Mv ep S+  pesos paying the BMP, v , to buy the required U.S. dollars on 
                                               
77
 0xdS dv >  is true as 0v t+ >  holds in the sample. 
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the black market. The import misinvoicer faces the expected cost of punishment 
( )Mprob S F , where ( )Mprob S  denotes the probability of being caught and F  the 
subsequent bribes or fines. Equation (4.11) describes the Mexican importer’s real 
expected profit: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1
M
M M
MEX MEX MEX
E R M F
t q M t q v S prob S
p p p
pi
ε ε
 
= − − + + − + − + −    
 
. 
                                                                                                                                     (4.11) 
Real profit optimization with respect to the amount of import underinvoicing, MS , 
yields the result that the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of smuggling:78 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 MM MEXprob S Ft q v S pε
∂
− + − + =   ∂
,                                                     (4.12) 
with ( ) ( )22 0M Mprob S S∂ ∂ > . Intuitionally, the optimal amount of import 
underinvoicing MS  reacts to changes in incentives in the opposite direction of the 
optimal amount of export underinvoicing: 
(1) A higher BMP, v , decreases the incentive to underinvoice imports ceteris 
paribus, 0MdS dv < , as it becomes more expensive to buy U.S. dollars for 
unreported imports on the black market. 
(2) A real depreciation of the peso against the dollar should decrease the amount of 
import underinvoicing ceteris paribus, 0MdS dε < , as Mexican products gain 
competitiveness over misinvoiced American products. 
(3) A rise in Mexican income/profit taxes should reduce import underinvoicing 
ceteris paribus, 0MdS dt < , as illegal/unreported Mexican imports cannot be 
                                               
78
 The profit maximizing Mexican importer focuses on minimizing costs. Underinvoicing 
imports, 0MS > , therefore means cutting back on legal expenditures ( )( )1 1 Mt q Sε− +  but 
increasing illegal expenditures ( )1 Mv Sε+ . Thus, the importer underinvoices if avoided legal 
costs exceed additional illegal costs, ( )( ) ( )1 1 1 0t q v− + − + > . 
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claimed as tax exempt and, thus, lose profitability compared to legal/reported 
Mexican imports. 
(4) Finally, I expect higher tariff rates to increase import underinvoicing, ceteris 
paribus, 0MdS dq > , as tariff evasion increases the profitability of unreported 
imports. 
4.3 Empirical Methodology 
The MIMIC model relates observable causal and indicator variables to a per se 
unobservable phenomenon.79 Thus, it allows me to deal with the multiple causes and the 
multiple effects of illegal and legal goods smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border. The 
MIMIC model has two parts: the structural equation model and the measurement 
model.80 In the structural equation model, smuggling is determined by a set of exogenous 
causes, here the microeconomic smuggling incentives described above. The structural 
equation model is given by: 
t t tη ς′= +γ x ,                                                                                                           (4.13) 
where each 
  1, ,itx , i q= …  in the q  vector tx  is a potential cause of the latent variable 
tη  and ( ), , , '1 2 qγ γ γ′ =γ …  is a q  vector of coefficients describing the relationships 
between the latent variable and its causes.81 The error term tς  represents the component 
of the latent variable tη  not explained by the causes. The variance of tς  is denoted by 
ψ . 
The measurement model links the latent variable to its indicators:  
t t tη ε= +y λ .                                                                                                           (4.14) 
                                               
79
 While Section 4.3 describes the MIMIC model in brief, Appendix A provides a detailed 
description. 
80
 A similar presentation of the MIMIC methodology is presented in Chapter 2 and can be 
found in Buehn and Schneider (2008) and Buehn et al. (2009). 
81
 As denoted in Chapter 2, the subscript t indicates the time series dimension of the variables. 
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In the measurement model, ( ), , ,t 1t 2t pty y y ′′ =y …  is a p  vector of indicator variables 
that measure the latent variable smuggling (see Section 4.4), λ  is a p  vector of 
regression coefficients, and tε  is a p  vector of white noise disturbances, i.e., 
( )~ ,t εε 0 Θ . 
The structural and the measurement model equations can be used to derive a reduced-
form regression model:  
t t t= +y Πx z ,                                                                                                         (4.15) 
where ′=Π λγ  is a ( )p q×  matrix. The endogenous variables  ,  1, ,jty j p= …  in 
equation (4.15) are the indicators for smuggling, and the exogenous variables 
 ,  1, ,itx i q= …  are its causes. The error term t t tς= +z λ ε  is a p  vector of a linear 
transformation of the white noise error terms tς  and tε  resulting from the structural 
equation and the measurement model, i.e., ( )~tz 0,Ω . The ( )p p×  covariance matrix 
Ω  is given by ( ) ( ) ( )Cov E t t t tς ς ψ ′ ′= = + + = +  t εΩ z λ ε λ ε λ λ Θ  and ( )E ′=ε t tΘ ε ε . 
The goal of the SEM estimation procedure is to estimate a model covariance matrix 
)(θΣ , )ˆ(ˆ θΣΣ = , that is as close as possible to the sample covariance matrix of the 
observed causes and indicators.82 Identification and estimation of the model is however 
not possible without placing restrictions on certain model parameters. Among others, a 
restriction often imposed on the model is that one element of the vector λ , i.e., one 
indicator, is set to an a priori value (often 1 or -1). In this way the researcher also 
establishes an interpretable scale for the latent variable [Bollen (1989), pp. 91, 183].83 
The first step in the estimation is selecting appropriate causes and indicators of illegal 
and legal goods smuggling that address the hypothesized theoretical relationships as 
                                               
82
 θ  is a vector that contains the parameters of the model and ( )Σ θ  is the covariance matrix 
as a function of θ  implying that each element of the covariance matrix is a function of one or 
more model parameters. 
83
 An alternative is to set the variance of the unobservable variable tη  to one. However, 
setting one element of λ to an a priori value is often more convenient for economic interpretation 
and thus typically done [Dell’Anno and Schneider (2009)]. 
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outlined in Sections 4.2 and 4.4 and to estimate three different MIMIC models, i.e., a 
MIMIC model for illegal goods smuggling, export misinvoicing as well as import 
misinvoicing. After model identification and determination of the latent variable’s scale, 
the coefficients and model parameters are estimated and the hypothesized relationships 
between illegal and legal goods smuggling and the particular causes and indicators 
tested. The second step is to use the model’s estimation results to calculate the latent 
variables scores for each point in time. Finally, a benchmarking procedure is applied to 
estimate “real world” figures of illegal and legal goods smuggling. The next section 
presents the theoretical reasoning for the selection of the indicators. 
4.4 Measurement of Smuggling 
In the measurement model, the indicators are regressed on a – per se undefined – 
unobservable (latent) variable. After defining each type of smuggling I select indicators 
to measure each type appropriately. Thus, the meaning of the latent variable depends on 
how well the indicators correspond to the operational definition. 
Of course, indicators are often only imperfectly linked to the latent variable [Bollen 
(1989), p. 17], but it is obvious from equation (4.14) that all of them are alternative 
measures of the same latent variable, i.e., a change in the latent variable affects its 
indicators. This can be clarified further by taking the structural model into account. 
Within the theoretical framework from Section 4.2, I identify the microeconomic 
incentives that determine the profitability of each type of smuggling. If, for example, 
border enforcement is intensified, the cost for smugglers of illegal goods increases and 
the latent macroeconomic amount of illegal goods smuggled should decrease. Thus, a 
change in the microeconomic incentive structure transmits uniformly to the 
macroeconomic aggregate of all types of smugglers of illegal goods – be it smugglers of 
illegal drugs or illegal immigrants. The indicators discussed below all measure the total 
amount of each type of smuggling, as determined by the microeconomic incentive 
structure. 
4.4.1 Indicators for Smuggling of Illegal Goods 
The conceptual definition of illegal goods smuggling comprises the inflow of illegal 
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drugs and illegal immigrants from Mexico to the United States. I do not consider 
smuggling in other types of illegal goods, for example, alcohol or bootlegs. The reasons 
for this are that, illegal drugs and immigrants are at the center of the political debate on 
whether to increase border patrol in the United States and estimates about the size of 
these types of smuggling – necessary to calculate the time trend in “real world” figures – 
are available. 
To explain illegal goods smuggling, in particular illegal drugs and immigrants, in the 
measurement model, I use the following macroeconomic indicators: linewatch and non-
linewatch apprehensions, real drug seizures, and the availability of drugs in the United 
States. 
Smugglers of illegal drugs and illegal immigrants have in common that they have to 
cross the U.S.-Mexico border to bring their illegal “freight” to the United States. To stop 
this illegal inflow, the U.S. Border Patrol makes an enormous effort to apprehend 
smugglers crossing the border. One of the objectives of the National Border Patrol 
Strategy of 2004 is to “detect, apprehend, and deter smugglers of humans, drugs, and 
other contraband” [Office of Border Patrol (2004), p. 6]. If illegal goods smuggling 
increases the number of apprehensions should also increase, ceteris paribus. Thus, I 
expect that linewatch and non-linewatch apprehensions, i.e., the number of persons 
apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border and inside the United States, are positively 
correlated with the smuggling of illegal goods. 
Another indicator of illegal goods smuggling is drugs seized by the U.S. Border 
Patrol. Given the efforts of the United States to fortify the border against the inflow of 
illegal goods, I expect drug seizures to increase as illegal goods smuggling rises, ceteris 
paribus. Of course, several smugglers successfully cross the border and succeed in their 
smuggling activities. Thus, I also include the availability of drugs as another indicator in 
order to account for illegal goods that have been smuggled into the United States 
successfully (i.e., undetected). I expect drug availability to increase as illegal goods 
smuggling rises, ceteris paribus. 
4.4.2 Indicators for Smuggling of Legal Goods 
In contrast to smugglers of illegal goods, smugglers of legal goods break the law from 
their offices rather than at the border. As no data on convicted misinvoicers are available, 
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I employ balance of payments data – in particular trade discrepancies and data on errors 
and omissions – to proxy legal goods smuggling as common in the literature. Assuming 
that industrialized countries like the United States correctly report trade figures, 
discrepancies between U.S. figures and Mexican figures result from misreporting by 
Mexican importers/exporters. Export underinvoicing by Mexican exporters is the 
difference between U.S. imports from Mexico (reported by the United States) and 
Mexican exports to the United States (reported by Mexico).84 Import underinvoicing by 
Mexican importers is the difference between U.S. exports to Mexico (reported by the 
United States) and Mexican imports from the United States (reported by Mexico). 
Data on errors and omissions are included in the Mexican balance of payments and 
are used as a second indicator of legal goods smuggling.85 Unreported Mexican exports 
(export underinvoicing) lead to inflows of foreign exchange. These exports do not appear 
in the trade balance but rather increase the errors and omissions of the Mexican balance 
of payments by the amount of export underinvoicing. I therefore conclude that the higher 
the export underinvoicing, the higher the errors and omissions, ceteris paribus. Likewise, 
the lower the import underinvoicing, the higher the errors and omissions. 
4.5 Empirical Analysis 
This section presents the results of the MIMIC model estimations and the long-term 
trends in the smuggling of illegal goods and legal goods (export and import 
misinvoicing) across the U.S.-Mexico border. Recognizing these different types of 
smuggling as outlined in Section 4.2, I estimate three different MIMIC models. Table 
                                               
84
 The export figures are in FOB (Free on Board) prices, and the import figures are in CIF 
(Cost, Insurance, and Freight) prices. In order to make them comparable, I multiply the export 
figures by a factor of 1.1 as suggested by the International Monetary Fund [IMF (1993), p. 8], in 
order to adjust for transportation and insurance costs. 
85
 In addition to trade misinvoicing, errors and omissions reflect misreporting of capital flows 
and different schedules for reporting goods in transit [see, for example, Fausten and Pickett 
(2004)]. However, trade misinvoicing is a popular instrument to camouflage capital flight 
[Eggerstedt et al. (1995)]. Therefore, I assume the size of errors and omissions to be mainly 
driven by trade misinvoicing. 
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D.1 in Appendix D presents the empirical identification, data sources, and definitions of 
the variables. 
The first model tests whether the microeconomic causal variables affect the 
smuggling of illegal goods as hypothesized in Section 4.2.1. Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
path diagram of illegal goods smuggling using the indicators explained in Section 4.4.1. 
The second and third models test the determinants of legal goods smuggling, also 
hypothesized in Section 4.2 using the indicators outlined in Section 4.4.2. Figures 4.2 
and 4.3 display the path diagrams for export and import misinvoicing, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Path Diagram for Smuggling of Illegal Goods 
 
Note: The squares attached to the arrows indicate the expected signs for the 
relationships between the causes (indicators) and the latent variable as 
hypothesized in Section 4.2.1 (Section 4.4.1). 
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Figure 4.2 Path Diagram for Export Misinvoicing 
 
Note: The squares attached to the arrows indicate the expected signs for the 
relationships between the causes (indicators) and the latent variable as hypothesized 
in Section 4.2.2 (Section 4.4.2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Path Diagram for Import Misinvoicing 
 
Note: The squares attached to the arrows indicate the expected signs for the 
relationships between the causes (indicators) and the latent variable as hypothesized 
in Section 4.2.2 (Section 4.4.2). 
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4.5.1 Data 
To estimate the MIMIC models, I use monthly data from 1975 to 2004. Because data on 
the BMP is only available through December 1998 (the date of the last issue of Pick’s 
World Currency Report) and data on errors and omissions in the Mexican balance of 
payments is only available from January 1980, however, some of the estimations are 
limited to 1980-1998. 
I test for unit roots as MIMIC models with nonstationary time series produce 
misleading estimates. I therefore examine each time series for those periods subsequently 
used in the estimations under the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of 
stationarity using the ADF test. The KPSS test, which tests stationarity against the 
alternative of the presence of a unit root, is used to cross-check the ADF test’s results.86 
I find that most variables, except for the BMP and the real exchange rate 1975-1998 and 
1975-2004, are not stationary in levels. However, for 1980-1998 and 1980-2004, I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the BMP as both unit root tests 
produce conflicting results. Consequently, I use the BMP in first differences in the 
estimations covering these time periods. Other variables found nonstationary in levels 
are also transformed in this way and re-tested. As the null hypothesis of a unit root is 
now rejected, I use the first difference of all variables except for the BMP and real 
exchange rate 1975-1998 and 1975-2004 in the MIMIC model estimations. Tables 4.1 
and 4.2 present the unit root tests for smuggling of illegal and smuggling of legal goods. 
 
 
                                               
86
 Unit root tests have already been introduced in Section 2.4.2. See also the literature cited 
there. 
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Table 4.1 Analysis of Stationarity for Smuggling of Illegal Goods 
Variable Test statistics for variables in levels (first differences) 
 1975-1998 1975-2004 1980-1998 1980-2004 
 ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF KPSS 
Causes         
BMP -3.459** 
(--) 
0.386 
(--) 
-3.459** 
(--) 
0.386 
(--) 
-2.938* 
(-21.211***) 
0.862 
(0.033) 
-2.938* 
(-21.211***) 
0.862 
(0.033) 
Real exchange rate -2.948** 
(--) 
0.304 
(--) 
-3.053** 
(--) 
0.276 
(--) 
-2.838* 
(--) 
0.222 
(--) 
-2.849* 
(--) 
0.453 
(--) 
Unemployment 
rate 
-1.834 
(-5.424***) 
1.014 
(0.069) 
-2.149 
(-19.230***) 
1.247 
(0.111) 
-1.739 
(-4.685***) 
0.357 
(0.062) 
-1.975 
(-5.474***) 
0.518 
(0.064) 
Real wages -1.539 
(-4.711***) 
1.158 
(0.060) 
-1.859 
(-5.252***) 
1.050 
(0.093) 
-2.313 
(-3.554***) 
0.603 
(0.109) 
-2.706* 
(-4.076***) 
0.377 
(0.159) 
Probability of 
apprehension 
-0.246 
(-18.737***) 
0.740 
(0.117) 
0.004 
(-21.272***) 
1.382 
(0.187) 
-0.787 
(-15.867***) 
1.258 
(0.369) 
-0.098 
(-19.312***) 
1.539 
(0.386) 
(continued on next page)        
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Table 4.1 (cont.)          
Indicators ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF KPSS 
Linewatch 
apprehensions 
-2.131 
(-17.585***) 
1.578 
(0.036) 
-2.196 
(-20.312***) 
1.703 
(0.062) 
-2.047 
(-14.938***) 
1.301 
(0.037) 
-2.134 
(-18.139***) 
1.238 
(0.053) 
Non-linewatch 
apprehensions 
-2.093 
(-17.285***) 
0.215 
(0.050) 
-1.413 
(-19.591***) 
0.889 
(0.065) 
-1.834 
(-15.232***) 
0.361 
(0.053) 
-1.241 
(-17.754***) 
1.096 
(0.050) 
Drug seizures -1.081 
(-29.132***) 
1.629 
(0.058) 
-1.562 
(-18.931***) 
1.737 
(0.085) 
-1.250 
(-15.070***) 
1.510 
(0.059) 
-1.719 
(-17.260***) 
1.280 
(0.107) 
Drug availability -0.817 
(-29.138***) 
0.450 
(0.359) 
-1.473 
(-4.092***) 
0.335 
(0.121) 
-1.640 
(-2.420) 
0.428 
(0.630) 
-2.169 
(-3.138**) 
0.439 
(0.218) 
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. * Significance at the 10% level. The order of the autoregressive correction for the 
unit root tests was chosen using the modified Akaike information criterion (ADF test). For the KPSS test, I use the Bartlett kernel estimator and the 
Newey-West (1994) data-based automatic bandwidth parameter method. The MacKinnon (1996) critical values for the ADF tests are: -3.64, -2.95, and 
-2.61 for the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. The LM statistics critical values of the KPSS test – taken from Kwiatkowski et al. 
(1992) – are: 0.739, 0.463, and 0.347 for the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.2 Analysis of Stationarity for Smuggling of Legal Goods 
Variable Levels First differences 
 1980-1998 1980-2004 1980-1998 1980-2004 
 ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF KPSS 
Causes         
BMP -2.940* 0.862 -2.940* 0.862 -21.210*** 0.033 -21.210*** 0.033 
Real 
exchange rate 
-2.838* 0.222 -2.850* 0.453 -- -- -- -- 
Tax on 
income/ 
profit 
-2.020 0.302 -2.070 0.384 -3.150** 0.142 -3.600** 0.106 
Tax on 
international 
trade 
-1.940 0.880 -2.050 1.384 -3.710*** 0.105 -4.300*** 0.100 
Indicators         
Import 
misinvoicing 
-0.160 1.459 -1.310 1.474 -26.590*** 0.200 -28.340*** 0.178 
Export 
misinvoicing 
-0.580 1.349 -0.690 1.792 -25.620*** 0.222 -28.230*** 0.134 
Errors and 
omissions 
-3.040** 0.312 -3.690*** 0.170 -- -- -- -- 
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. * Significance at the 10% 
level. The order of the autoregressive correction for the unit root tests was chosen using the 
modified Akaike information criterion (ADF test). For the KPSS test, I use the Bartlett kernel 
estimator and the Newey-West (1994) data-based automatic bandwidth parameter method. The 
MacKinnon (1996) critical values for the ADF tests are: -3.64, -2.95, and -2.61 for the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. The LM statistics critical values of the KPSS test – 
taken from Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) – are: 0.739, 0.463, and 0.347 for the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. 
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4.5.2 Estimation Results 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the results of the MIMIC model estimations for smuggling 
illegal and legal goods applying the maximum likelihood estimator.87 As explained in 
Section 4.3, the estimation of a MIMIC model requires the normalization of one 
indicator for each latent variable that also determines the unit of measurement of the 
latent variable [Bollen (1989), pp. 91, 183].88 In the illegal goods smuggling estimations, 
I set the coefficient of linewatch apprehensions to 1. In the case of legal goods 
smuggling, I set the coefficient for errors and omissions to 1 for export misinvoicing and 
to -1 for import misinvoicing.89 
For the smuggling of illegal goods, I estimate seven different MIMIC model 
specifications by varying either the time period or the set of indicator variables. I include 
all causal variables considered in Section 4.2 except for the BMP, which is not included 
in estimations through 2004.90 In the four model specifications for the smuggling of legal 
goods, I vary the time period only because alternative indicator variables are not 
available. 
 
                                               
87
 All calculations have been carried out with LISREL® Version 8.80. 
88
 The choice of the indicator to fix the scale of the latent variable does not affect the results 
because the maximum likelihood estimator is scale invariant [Swaminathan and Algina (1978)]. 
Typically, one selects the indicator that loads most on the unobservable variable. 
89
 To calculate the smuggling indices, I use the fixed indicator as an index variable whose 
value is expressed relative to the base year value. Linewatch apprehensions are therefore used as 
an index variable equal to (linewatch apprehensions at t)/(linewatch apprehensions 2000) while 
errors and omissions are used as an index equal to (errors and omissions at t)/(errors and 
omissions 1984). 
90
 The simple reason is that the last issue of Pick’s World Currency Report appeared in 1998. 
Moreover, I could not estimate specification 3 by varying the set of indicators because the 
variable drug availability still exhibits a unit root for 1980-1998, even after taking the first 
difference. 
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Table 4.3 MIMIC Model Estimations for Illegal Goods Smuggling 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Time period 1975 
- 
1998 
1975 
- 
1998 
1980 
- 
1998 
1975 
- 
2004 
1975 
- 
2004 
1980 
- 
2004 
1980 
- 
2004 
Causes        
BMP (through 1998) 0.02 
(0.99) 
0.02 
(0.99) 
-0.01 
(0.61) 
    
Real exchange rate -0.02 
(0.80) 
-0.02 
(0.57) 
-0.02 
(0.68) 
0.02 
(0.65) 
0.02 
(0.44) 
0.03 
(0.67) 
 0.02 
(0.43) 
Unemployment rate 0.05** 
(2.20) 
0.05*** 
(2.34) 
0.05** 
(2.24) 
0.05* 
(1.69) 
0.05* 
(1.73) 
0.06** 
(2.00) 
0.07** 
(2.05) 
Real wages -0.03** 
(2.26) 
-0.05*** 
(3.25) 
-0.05*** 
(3.18) 
-0.05* 
(1.91) 
-0.05** 
(2.20) 
-0.06*** 
(2.36) 
-0.06*** 
(2.67) 
Border enforcement -2.02*** 
(16.11) 
-2.01*** 
(16.27) 
-2.05*** 
(15.87) 
-0.64*** 
(9.15) 
-0.63*** 
(9.18) 
0.63*** 
(9.01) 
-0.61*** 
(8.99) 
Indicators        
Linewatch 
apprehensions (fixed) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Non-linewatch 
apprehensions  
1.02*** 
(9.33) 
1.03*** 
(9.23) 
1.09*** 
(9.57) 
0.49*** 
(13.66) 
0.50*** 
(13.34) 
0.48*** 
(13.34) 
0.49*** 
(12.95) 
Drug seizures 0.12*** 
(2.49) 
 0.09* 
(1.68) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
 0.00 
(0.08) 
 
Drug availability  0.02 
(0.58) 
  0.04 
(0.75) 
 0.04 
(0.76) 
(continued on next page)        
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Table 4.3 (cont.)         
Goodness-of-fit statistics       
Observations 282 282 223 358 358 300 300 
Degrees of freedom 25 25 25 18 18 18 18 
Chi-square 
(p-value) 
5.27 
(0.99) 
14.88 
(0.94) 
2.79 
(0.97) 
5.22 
(0.99) 
9.96 
(0.93) 
4.91 
(0.99) 
9.34 
(0.95) 
RMSEA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. * Significance at the 10% 
level. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. The degrees of freedom are determined by 0.5 (p + q) 
(p + q + 1) – t; with p = number of indicators; q = number of causes; t = the number for free 
parameters. If the model fits the data perfectly and the parameter values are known, the sample 
covariance matrix equals the covariance matrix implied by the model. The null hypothesis of 
perfect fit corresponds to a p-value of 1. The root mean squared error of approximation 
(RMSEA) measures the model’s fit based on the difference between the estimated and the actual 
covariance matrix. RMSEA values smaller than 0.05 indicate a good fit [Browne and Cudeck 
(1993)]. 
 
The MIMIC model estimations for the smuggling of illegal goods show that this kind of 
smuggling reacts only to changes in smuggling costs. Thus, the unemployment rate, real 
wages, and border enforcement are the major causes and have the theoretically expected 
impact on smuggling. Higher wages and lower unemployment increase opportunity costs 
during imprisonment and, thus, reduce smuggling in illegal goods. More intense border 
enforcement significantly deters illegal goods smuggling for all specifications estimated. 
This variable approximates the probability of being caught smuggling at the border. The 
higher this probability, the higher the expected costs for smugglers and, thus, the lower 
the smuggling of illegal goods, ceteris paribus. By contrast, changes in the variables 
affecting revenues from smuggling illegal goods do not significantly influence 
smuggling, i.e., the BMP and the real exchange rate are not significant for any 
specification. It seems that smugglers live at the subsistence level and have to smuggle 
illegal goods to earn a living for their families. The decision whether or not to engage in 
smuggling is then based on the opportunity cost, i.e., on the employment opportunities in 
the official economy and on the probability of being apprehended. 
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Turning to the indicators, I find a strongly significant, positive relationship between 
illegal goods smuggling and the number of apprehensions, which confirms my 
hypothesis that the number of failed smuggling attempts indicates the level of illegal 
goods smuggling. The relationship between drug seizures/drug availability and 
smuggling is only sometimes statistically significant. While I find the hypothesized 
positive sign for all specifications, drug seizures are significant for specifications 1 and 3 
only while drug availability is not significant. 
In the MIMIC models for the smuggling of legal goods, all causal variables except for 
the BMP are statistically significant at conventional significance levels and have the 
expected sign. Hence, the data confirms the theoretical hypotheses in Section 4.2. A real 
depreciation of the peso against the U.S. dollar leads to higher export underinvoicing as 
the competitiveness of Mexican goods increases. Moreover, the higher Mexican 
income/profit taxes are, the stronger the incentive to underinvoice exports as 
illegal/unreported Mexican exports are not taxed and thus more competitive. Again, an 
important motive to underinvoice exports is tax evasion. In the case of import 
misinvoicing, real peso depreciation against the U.S. dollar decreases the amount of 
import underinvoicing as Mexican products gain competitiveness over misinvoiced U.S. 
imports. A rise in Mexican income/profit taxes lowers import underinvoicing. 
Illegal/unreported Mexican imports cannot be claimed as tax exempt and thus lose 
profitability compared to legal/reported Mexican imports, which confirms the tax 
evasion argument. In contrast, a higher tariff rate increases import underinvoicing, 
supporting the common view that import underinvoicing is motivated by tariff evasion. 
All estimated MIMIC models show satisfactory goodness-of-fit statistics, i.e., the 
models fit the data fairly well. While the main statistics are given in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, 
Tables D.2 and D.3 in Appendix D present additional goodness-of-fit statistics of the 
MIMIC models for illegal and legal goods smuggling.91 I accept the validity of the 
estimated models and conclude that all specifications are suitable to calculate long-term 
trends in the smuggling of illegal and legal goods. 
                                               
91
 For a description of the goodness-of-fit statistics, see Section A.3 in Appendix A. 
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Table 4.4 MIMIC Model Estimations for Legal Goods Smuggling 
 Export misinvoicing Import misinvoicing 
Specification 8 9 10 11 
Time period 1980-1998 1980-2004 1980-1998 1980-2004 
Causes     
BMP (through 1998) -0.02 
(0.46) 
 -0.01 
(0.27) 
 
Real exchange rate 0.16*** 
(2.82) 
0.17*** 
(3.52) 
-0.13*** 
(2.45) 
-0.16*** 
(3.45) 
Taxes on income/profit 0.11*** 
(2.54) 
0.14*** 
(3.15) 
-0.10*** 
(2.79) 
-0.13*** 
(3.24) 
Taxes on international 
trade 
  0.06** 
(1.96) 
0.06* 
(1.68) 
Indicators     
Errors and omissions 
(fixed) 
1.00 1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Import misinvoicing   0.17 
(0.67) 
0.23 
(0.97) 
Export misinvoicing 0.19 
(0.52) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
  
Goodness-of-fit statistics     
Observations 228 305 228 305 
Degrees of freedom 8 4 9 8 
Chi-square 
(p-value) 
1.85 
(0.98) 
0.91 
(0.92) 
5.38 
(0.80) 
1.74 
(0.98) 
RMSEA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. * Significance at the 10% 
level. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. The degrees of freedom are determined by 0.5 (p + q) 
(p + q + 1) – t; with p = number of indicators; q = number of causes; t = the number for free 
parameters. If the model fits the data perfectly and the parameter values are known, the sample 
covariance matrix equals the covariance matrix implied by the model. The null hypothesis of 
perfect fit corresponds to a p-value of 1. The RMSEA measures the model’s fit based on the 
difference between the estimated and the actual covariance matrix. RMSEA values smaller than 
0.05 indicate a good fit [Browne and Cudeck (1993)]. 
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4.5.3 Long-term Trends in Illegal Goods Smuggling 
The estimated MIMIC coefficients allow me to determine the dimensionless time pattern 
of smuggling only. To obtain the market value of smuggling over time, I convert the 
MIMIC index into “real world” figures measured in U.S. dollars. In the first step, I 
calculate an exogenous base value for illegal goods smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico 
border in 2000 using expert estimates. As mentioned in Section 4.4, I focus on the two 
types of smuggled illegal “goods” prominently discussed in the media: illegal 
immigrants and illegal drugs.92 In the second step, this base value is used to calibrate a 
time series of smuggling by applying the benchmarking procedure promoted by 
Dell’Anno and Schneider (2006), Dell’Anno (2007), and Dell’Anno and Solomon 
(2008). 
The average inflow of illegal (unauthorized) adult Mexican immigrants to the United 
States is estimated at about 330,000 per year between 2000 and 2007 [Hoefer et al. 
(2008), p. 4; Passel and Cohn (2008), p. 14]. Because I cannot assess the “market value” 
of these illegal immigrants, I calculate the average wage earned while working in the 
United States illegally using the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) database. Since 
1982, the MMP has conducted annual surveys of (illegal) Mexican immigrants. Using 
data on the employment characteristics of Mexicans who entered the United States 
illegally, and their duration of stay, I calculate the average salary an illegal Mexican 
immigrant earns during her stay in the United States. Table 4.5 illustrates that illegal 
Mexican immigrants, on average, worked in the United States for 20.08 months and 
earned $26,325. Based on the underlying sub-sample of 270 survey respondents, I 
calculate that the 330,000 illegal Mexican immigrants earn wages amounting to $8.7 
billion each year. 
 
                                               
92
 Although the MIMIC index of illegal goods smuggling may include other types of illegal 
goods, the calculation of “real world figures” is limited to illegal immigrants and illegal drugs. 
The reason is that the political debate on whether to increase border patrol in the United States 
centers on these two types of illegal goods and estimates about the size of these types of 
smuggling – necessary to calculate the time trend in “real world” figures – are available. 
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Table 4.5 Employment Characteristics of an Average Illegal Mexican Immigrant During 
Her Stay in the United States. 
Duration in the 
United States 
(in months)  
Months worked 
per year  
Hours worked 
per week 
Hourly wage 
(in U.S. dollars) 
Illegal wages 
earned in the 
United States (in 
U.S. dollars) 
20.08 9.41 46.51 8.62 26,325 
Source: Mexican Migration Project (MMP) database. The MMP data is available online at 
http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu. 
Note: These average characteristics are drawn from a sub-sample of 270 survey respondents who 
entered the United States illegally, i.e., with or without false documents, between 2000 and 2006. 
 
To calculate the base value of illegal drugs smuggled across the U.S.-Mexico border, I 
employ expert estimates as illustrated in Table 4.6. According to Rhodes et al. (2001, 
p. 31), Americans spent $61.2 billion on illegal drugs in 2000. Using the estimated 
“Mexican” share of these drugs,93 I quantify the market value of drugs smuggled across 
the U.S.-Mexico border at $31.4 billion in 2000. Aggregating the calculated size of 
illegal immigration and illegal drugs smuggling, I obtain an exogenous estimate for 
illegal goods smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border of $40.1 billion in 2000. 
 
                                               
93
 According to expert estimates shown in Table 4.6, most of the cocaine and marijuana 
available in the United States is smuggled via the Mexican border. 
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Table 4.6 Base Value for Illegal Drugs Smuggled via the U.S.-Mexico Border in 2000 
 Cocaine Heroin Marijuana Metham-
phetamine 
Total 
Total U.S. expenditures on 
illegal drugs in 2000 (in 
billion U.S. dollars) 1) 
35.3 10.0 10.5 5.4 61.2 
Estimated average percentage 
arriving in the United States 
via the U.S.-Mexico border 
66% 2) 18% 3) 55.6% 4) 9.1% 5)  
Estimated value of illegal 
drugs smuggled through the 
U.S.-Mexico border in 2000 
(in billion U.S. dollars) 
23.3 1.8 5.8 0.5 31.4 
1) Source: Rhodes et al. (2001, p. 31). 
2) The Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement estimates that 66% of cocaine in the 
United States flows through Mexico [Ford (2008), p. 7]. 
3) According to the Drug Availability Steering Committee (2002, p. 61), 16% to 20% of heroin 
in the United States in 2000 originated in Mexico. 
4) The Drug Availability Steering Committee (2002, pp. 106, 119) estimates that 4651 metric 
tons of Mexican marijuana arrived on the U.S. market in 2000. The total amount of marijuana in 
the United States in 2000 is estimated at between 5,577 and 16,731 metric tons, which 
corresponds to a Mexican market share of between 27.8% and 83.4%. 
5) According to the Drug Availability Steering Committee (2002, pp. 82-85) 8.6%-9.6% of 
methamphetamines in 2000 came from Mexico. 
 
This base value allows me to calculate a time series for illegal goods smuggling applying 
a benchmarking procedure. Unfortunately, no consensus exists in the literature about 
which benchmarking procedure to use. I use the methodology promoted by Dell’Anno 
and Schneider (2006), Dell’Anno (2007), and Dell’Anno and Solomon (2008). In the 
first step, the MIMIC model index of smuggling is calculated by multiplying the 
coefficients of the significant causal variables by the respective raw time series. For the 
numerical example of specification 4 the structural equation is given as: 
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1 2 3
2000
t
t t t0.05 x 0.05 x 0.64 xSmugglers
η
= ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅
ɶ
,
94
                                                 (4.16) 
and measures illegal goods smuggling per apprehended smuggler in 2000 according to 
the MIMIC model’s identification rule.95 Next, this index is converted into a time series 
of illegal goods smuggling which takes up the base value of $40.1 billion in 2000. Thus, 
the annual U.S. dollar amount of illegal goods smuggling tηˆ  at time t  is given as: 
2000
2000 2000
2000 2000 2000
ˆ
t t
t
Smugglers
Smugglers
η ηη η η
η η
∗ ∗
= =
ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ
,                                           (4.17) 
where ( )2000/t Smugglersηɶ  denotes the value of the MIMIC index at t  according to 
equation (4.16), ( )2000 2000/ Smugglersηɶ  is the base value of this index in 2000, and 2000η∗  
is the exogenous estimate of illegal goods smuggling amounting to $40.1 billion in 2000. 
The final estimates of illegal goods smuggling over the last three decades are 
calculated using specifications 4 through 7.96 As shown in Figure 4.4, all calculated 
indices have a similar pattern.97 Table D.4 in Appendix D presents selected annual 
estimates for illegal goods smuggling. 
Illegal goods smuggling seems to be driven largely by macroeconomic conditions in 
Mexico and by changes in U.S. border enforcement policy. The two major Mexican 
recessions, triggered by a debt crisis in 1982/83 and by a currency crisis in 1994/95, 
resulted in a significant increase in the smuggling of illegal goods to $113 billion in 1983 
and $87 billion in 1995. Both economic downturns were associated with rising 
unemployment and falling real wages in Mexico and were a push factor for Mexican 
                                               
94
 1tx , 2tx , and 3tx  represent the unemployment rate, real wages, and border enforcement, 
respectively. 
95
 As outlined in Section 4.5.2, linewatch apprehensions are used as an index variable where 
the denominator equals linewatch apprehensions in the base year 2000. As the latent variable is 
measured in units of the fixed indicator, illegal goods smuggling is measured per apprehended 
smuggler at the border in 2000. 
96
 Specifications 1 to 3 cannot be used as they do not cover the base year 2000. 
97
 The pattern of the illegal goods smuggling index is not dominated by one or two of the 
causes although the variable ‘probability of apprehension’ has a large coefficient and thus 
influences the dynamics mostly. 
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smugglers. As Mexican labor market conditions worsened, many Mexicans chose to 
engage in illegal smuggling activities as an alternative source of income. 
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Figure 4.4 Smuggling of Illegal Goods 
Note: The grey bars mark the Mexican recessions in 1982/83 and 1995 and changes in 
U.S. drug policy in 2003. 
 
I also find evidence that a stricter U.S. border enforcement policy since the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 may have contributed to a long-term decline in 
the smuggling of illegal goods, which fell from $116 billion in 1986 to $27 billion in 
2004. The number of man-hours spent by the U.S. Border Patrol policing the U.S.-
Mexico border increased from 2.7 million in 1986 to 9.7 million in 2004. This rise in 
border enforcement activities effectively raised the probability of apprehension, thereby 
reducing smuggling. In 2003, the pattern of illegal goods smuggling reversed as an 
unintended consequence of a change in U.S. drug policy [Carpenter (2005)]. U.S. 
officials believed that by focusing on the drug cartels’ top figures, rather than on petty 
B
ill
io
n
 
co
n
st
an
t 2
00
0 
U
.
S.
 
do
lla
rs
 
122 
 
smugglers at the border, they could achieve huge decreases in drug trafficking. But the 
new policy only led to a decentralization of the drug trade: instead of the kingpins who 
had controlled it before, there are now more than three hundred small groups engaged in 
illegal drug smuggling [Carpenter (2005)]. 
4.5.4 Long-term Trends in Legal Goods Smuggling 
As with illegal goods smuggling, equation (4.17) is applied to convert the MIMIC index 
into a time series of legal goods smuggling using the significant causal variables in 
specifications 9 (export misinvoicing) and 11 (import misinvoicing).98 The base values 
for benchmarking are taken from Eggerstedt et al. (1995), who present estimates for 
misinvoicing in the U.S.-Mexican trade using U.S. Department of Commerce and Banco 
de Mexico data. I use the overinvoicing estimate of $588.3 million in 1984 as the base 
value for export misinvoicing and the underinvoicing value of $914.4 in 1984 for import 
misinvoicing. 
Figure 4.5 shows the estimated time series for legal goods smuggling. While export 
misinvoicing exhibits temporary fluctuations but no time trend, import misinvoicing is 
permanently affected by U.S.-Mexican trade integration. The reduction of Mexican 
tariffs on U.S. imports after Mexico’s accession to GATT in 1987 and to NAFTA in 
1994 resulted in a permanent switch from import underinvoicing – motivated by tariff 
evasion – to import overinvoicing – motivated by tax evasion. 
 
 
                                               
98
 Specifications 9 and 11 are selected because they cover the entire observation period 1980-
2004. 
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Figure 4.5 Smuggling of Legal Goods 
Note: The grey bars mark Mexico’s accession to GATT in 1987 and to NAFTA in 
1994. 
4.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter examines the determinants of and long-term trends in smuggling across the 
U.S.-Mexico border, distinguishing between the smuggling of illegal and legal goods. 
Working out the microeconomic incentives of the two types of smuggling, I hope to 
improve the understanding of this phenomenon. It seems reasonable to assume that 
smugglers who traffic illegal drugs or illegal immigrants respond to different incentives 
than trade misinvoicers. As smuggling is an informal (illegal) and, thus, unobservable 
activity, I use a MIMIC approach for the analyses of illegal and legal goods smuggling 
across the U.S.-Mexico border. 
The results of the MIMIC model are robust and confirm most of the theoretical 
hypotheses. I find that illegal goods smuggling declines when Mexican labor market 
conditions improve or U.S. border enforcement activities are intensified as the cost of 
smuggling rises in this context. Confirming the competitiveness argument, export 
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(import) misinvoicing is positively (negatively) correlated with real peso depreciation. 
Import misinvoicing is positively correlated with Mexican import tariffs, pointing to the 
incentive of tariff evasion. Export (import) misinvoicing is positively (negatively) 
correlated with Mexican taxes on income and profit, pointing to the incentive of tax 
evasion. 
The estimated long-term trends for both types of smuggling show the sensitivity of 
smuggling to major macroeconomic events. Import misinvoicing has switched from 
underinvoicing to overinvoicing over the last twenty years as a result of reduced import 
tariffs following Mexico’s accession to GATT (1987) and NAFTA (1994). Illegal goods 
smuggling rose temporarily during the Mexican recessions in 1982/83 and 1995, but the 
overall trend is negative, decreasing by almost $90 billion from 1984 to 2004, which can 
be attributed to improved labor market conditions in Mexico and a successful U.S. 
border enforcement policy. Indeed, the increase in U.S. Border Patrol man-hours has 
increased the probability of apprehension and strengthened the deterrent to smuggle. 
Analyzing smuggling using a MIMIC model has some shortcomings that are, 
however, widely accepted in other fields studying unobservable phenomena such as the 
shadow economy or corruption. First, although the model tracks the development of 
smuggling over time, the estimations for the volume of smuggling depends on the 
exogenous estimate used for calibration. Researchers can carefully check its size and 
reliability, but the final estimate remains an approximation. Second, other variables such 
as tax morality or socioeconomic factors may influence smuggling, for which data are 
not available. 
Nevertheless, in this chapter I contribute to the understanding of smuggling and the 
results have important implications for the policy debate. The smuggling of illegal drugs 
and immigrants across the U.S.-Mexico border remains a major issue for U.S. national 
security. Illegal drug abuse leads to casualties, rising health care costs, and lower 
employment in the United States [French et al. (2001)]. Illegal immigration, as well, not 
only affects labor market conditions in the United States but is a serious humanitarian 
crisis. It is unbearable that myriad Mexicans die w
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illegally.99 
Despite the successful border enforcement policy, several options are available to 
further reduce illegal goods smuggling. Increased bilateral trade, U.S. aid, and foreign 
direct investment to Mexico, for example, would improve Mexican labor market 
conditions, thereby reducing the incentive to smuggle. The United States could also 
further increase linewatch hours or invest in border patrol technologies. Finally, the 
United States could provide financial and/or technical support to intensify patrolling 
activities on the Mexican side of the border. 
Trade misinvoicing seems to be a less serious problem given that it is a relatively 
small-scale financial crime with no loss of human life. Also, the scope for political 
intervention is limited. Tariffs have already been reduced significantly, and it is unlikely 
that exchange rate policy would be used to combat trade misinvoicing. 
                                               
99
 The U.S.-Mexico case seems to be especially relevant in this context as illegal immigration 
is typically the more likely, the poorer and the less distant the source country [see, for example, 
Bratsberg (1995)]. 
  
CHAPTER FIVE 
FINAL REMARKS 
“Mixing one’s wines may be a mistake, but old and new wisdom mix admirably.” 
Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956) 
5.1 Summary and Conclusion 
This dissertation has studied different types of economic activities: DIY, or household, 
activities, shadow economic activities, the smuggling of legal goods, and the smuggling 
of illegal goods. Although different, these activities are bound together by a common 
characteristic: they are all informal economic activities. The first chapter briefly 
explained two important concepts: the diversity of the informal economy and the 
attractiveness of informal economic activities as research topic for economists. Chapter 2 
focused on DIY and shadow economic activities in Germany. Chapter 3 studied the 
smuggling of legal goods – often referred to as trade misinvoicing – in an international 
perspective. Chapter 4 widened the analysis of smuggling to include both the smuggling 
of legal and illegal goods within the U.S.-Mexican context. 
Together, Chapters 2-4 examined the different types of informal economic activities 
using structural equation models (SEMs) with latent variables. Because of their informal 
character and because participants usually hide such activities, statistics on informal 
economic activities are not typically available. Instead, researchers must develop 
methods to estimate the informal economy. These techniques range from direct 
approaches, such as surveys, to indirect ones, such as the currency demand approach. 
This dissertation relies on SEMs with latent variables because they are able to determine 
the structural relationships between (unobservable) variables using the multiple causes 
and multiple indicators of each unobservable variable. These models thus avoid the 
problems of other macroeconomic approaches which often take into account only one 
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cause or indicator, such as the burden of taxation or the amount of electricity consumed. 
SEMs consider the multiple causes leading to the existence and growth of informal 
economic activities as well as their multiple effects explicitly. This makes it a superior 
statistical methodology for the analysis of these types of activities. A minor drawback of 
using SEMs with unobservable variables is however that these models can track the 
development of informal economic activities over time but the estimation of “real world” 
figures depends on the exogenous estimate used for calibration. 
Chapter 2 presented empirical evidence that the shadow economy makes up a 
significant portion of the German GDP. Many researchers have contributed to this 
analysis using a variety of methods: surveys, discrepancy methods, the physical input 
method, the currency demand approach, and latent estimation procedures such as the 
Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model. Estimates of the size of the 
German shadow economy vary depending on the methodology applied: they range from 
1.0% (surveys) to 38.5% (discrepancy method) of official German GDP.  
Although substantial research already exists, some questions have yet to be answered: 
makes the DIY economy up also a significant part of the German GDP or not? How have 
shadow economic and DIY activities developed over time? What effect did reunification 
have on these two parts of the informal economy? The models estimated in Chapter 2 
provide new estimates of the size and development of shadow economic and DIY 
activities in Germany. They also show that the German shadow economy grew from 
around 1-2% to around 17% of official GDP between 1970 and 2005 while DIY 
activities grew only marginally from 4% to around 5% of official GDP during the same 
time. This suggests that DIY activities are not as dynamic a part of the hidden economy 
as shadow economic activities. Together, however, shadow economic and DIY activities 
comprised a remarkable 22% of official German GDP in 2005. With regard to the 
determinants of the shadow economy, statistically significant correlations exist for 
institutional variables such as the level of regulation and tax and social security 
contribution burdens. The DIY economy, on the other hand, appears to be driven by 
unemployment. 
Although the results presented in Chapter 2 are only an additional step towards a 
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of DIY and shadow economic activities, 
they nevertheless point to the fact that both types of activities have become a significant 
part of the German economy. To reduce the hidden economy and stimulate the official 
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economy, German policymakers have two options. The empirical results suggest that 
fewer (business) regulations and lower tax and social security contribution burdens might 
be the two means of shifting more activity into the official economy. This would create 
more jobs – especially part-time work and specialty (craftsmen) trades – in the official 
economy and possibly reduce participation in the DIY economy. 
A household runs most efficiently when some members invest in human capital by 
working in paid employment while others work at home and maximize their individual 
utility through, for example, rearing children [Becker (1993), pp. 30-55]. The relatively 
stable index of DIY activities calculated in Chapter 2 might be an indication of the 
relevance of this theory and the strong separation of responsibilities within a household. 
Although it is not clear if a reduction in DIY activities is a desirable policy goal, an 
effective policy measure might be the further deregulation of the labor market in 
Germany to increase the availability of low-skilled and/or part times jobs. 
The dynamic growth of the shadow economy in Germany over the past 30 years 
suggests that minor policy reforms, by and large, have been ineffective. Major policy 
reforms, such as a comprehensive revision of the tax system and a substantial reduction 
of rules and regulations in the administrative procedure in Germany, are needed. It will 
be interesting to see whether the tax reforms the newly-elected German government 
wants to implement are suitable to reduce the size of the shadow economy in the future. 
The smuggling index presented in Chapter 3 provides a ranking of smuggling for 54 
countries during the 1990s. While previous research employs mostly trade discrepancies 
to estimate smuggling, I use an SEM that accounts both for the informal nature of 
smuggling as well as the smuggling’s multiple causes and indicators. The empirical 
analyses show a highly statistically significant influence of the rule of law and the level 
of corruption on smuggling. Trade restrictions and high tariffs provide incentives to 
engage into smuggling. The cross-country analysis, however, indicates that the quality of 
institutions – measured by the rule of law and corruption – rather than high tariffs and 
trade restrictions drive smuggling, although the latter are also important determinants of 
smuggling. Overall, I conclude that legal goods smuggling is lowest in the high-income 
countries of the OECD and highest in the low-income countries of Latin America and 
Africa. 
Two important policy conclusions may be drawn from the cross-country analysis of 
legal goods smuggling. First, like individuals who engage in shadow economic activities 
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individuals who engage in the smuggling of legal goods are motivated by tax and tariff 
evasion. Reducing these barriers to trade may thus reduce smuggling in legal goods. 
Second, the analysis suggests that, even more so than barriers to trade, the rule of law 
and corruption are important determinants of smuggling. Thus, countries that wish to 
reduce the size of smuggling should strengthen their institutions, i.e., by strengthening 
the rule of law and reducing corruption. Ideally, a combination of lower taxes and tariffs 
and stronger institutions would best address the issue of smuggling. 
Chapter 4 widened the analysis of smuggling to include the smuggling of both illegal 
and legal goods within the U.S.-Mexican context. The microeconomic model shows that 
traffickers of illegal goods, such as drugs and immigrants, respond to different incentives 
than smugglers of legal goods, i.e., trade misinvoicers. The robustness of the results 
confirms the theoretical hypotheses, from which two general conclusions may be drawn. 
First, illegal goods smuggling declines when Mexican labor market conditions improve 
and/or when U.S. border enforcement is intensified. This confirms previous findings that 
higher expected costs reduce illegal goods smuggling. Second, the smuggling of legal 
goods is strongly motivated by the incentive to evade taxes and tariffs. The estimated 
long-term trends for both types of smuggling show the sensitivity of smuggling to major 
macroeconomic events. Mexico’s accession to GATT (1987) and NAFTA (1994), for 
example, affected the smuggling of legal goods while the Mexican recessions in 1982/83 
and 1995 and stricter U.S. border enforcement policies affected the smuggling of illegal 
goods. Indeed, the expansion of U.S. Border Patrol man-hours has increased the 
probability of apprehension and thus the expected costs for illegal goods smugglers, 
strengthening the deterrent to smuggle. 
In general, the results of this dissertation show that the informal economy is 
significant and that growth of the informal economy is not exclusive to developing 
countries, although it is a more serious problem in these countries. Moreover, although 
the informal economy covers a wide range of rather diverse economic activities, a few 
similarities exist. These are important, especially for policymakers, in first understanding 
what drives informal economic activities and second designing appropriate policies to 
deter them. 
Tax evasion is an important determinant of two types of informal economic activities: 
shadow economic activities and the smuggling of legal goods. Governments need to take 
this problem seriously as tax evasion places a disproportionate burden on the other 
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members of society who do pay taxes. Since the government makes decisions about 
which goods and services to provide to its citizens, financed through taxes, tax evaders 
benefit twice. On the one hand, they benefit from the evasion of taxes as their profits 
increase. Second, they enjoy publicly provided goods and services – some of which are 
necessary to carry out their economic activities, such as infrastructure – for free. Tax 
evaders are thus free riding at the expense of the rest of the society. Reducing incentives 
for tax evasion, governments can not only lessen pure tax evasion but also informal 
shadow economic activities and the smuggling of legal goods. 
The expected costs are important determinants of informal economic activities. 
Increasing the man-hours spent patrolling the U.S.-Mexico border, for example, raises 
the probability of apprehension and is thus a significant deterrent for smugglers of illegal 
goods. Strengthening institutions by encouraging the rule of law and reducing corruption 
also deter illegal activities. 
Regulation – and its enforcement – is another determinant of informal economic 
activities. Societies regulate formal economic activities: licenses are required to 
undertake certain types of businesses (medicine, cooking, elderly care) and the way 
businesses operate is regulated according to environmental, health, and safety standards. 
These types of regulations are necessary to enforce minimum standards for consumers as 
well as employees. Individuals carrying out informal economic activities may impose a 
burden on society by using hazardous materials, providing unsafe working conditions, 
employing child labor, or exploiting workers. While stricter regulations drive individuals 
into informal economic activities, countries with a stronger rule of law and less 
corruption however have smaller informal economies. On the one hand, countries with 
greater economic regulation tend to have larger informal economies. On the other hand, 
enforcement of regulations by corrupt bureaucrats is a burden levied on businesses and 
individuals which drives them into the informal economy. This suggests that 
governments should put more emphasis on improving institutions and enforcing existing 
laws and regulations rather than creating new ones. Some governments, however, may 
choose to increase regulation to reduce informal economic activities because it increases 
bureaucratic power and creates jobs in the public sector. 
Although none of the chapters presented a detailed microeconomic analysis, one can 
speculate on who participates in different informal economic activities. Entrepreneurs, 
for example, who seek to increase profits, are most likely to engage in shadow economic 
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activities and the smuggling of legal goods. Households, which seek to maximize 
efficiency by assigning various activities according to the comparative advantages of the 
different household members, are most likely to engage in DIY activities. Individuals 
living at the subsistence level, trying to earn a living for their families, are most likely to 
engage in the smuggling of illegal goods. The decision whether or not to engage in 
informal economic activities is thus based on the opportunity cost, i.e., on employment 
opportunities in the official economy and on the probability of being caught. 
The informal economy offers an escape from the burdens of participating in the 
formal economy. Informal economic activities however shed light on rules and 
regulations that are ineffective and which need to be reassessed. That is, determining the 
areas of growth in the informal economy may expose the weaknesses of current 
economic policies. In some cases, such as the smuggling of illegal drugs – which 
imposes costs on society in the form of higher health care expenditures, increased crime, 
and decreased productivity – an appropriate solution may be stricter law enforcement. 
Growth of the informal economy as a whole may be an indication that a combination of 
policy measures – including revising outdated and inefficient rules, regulations, and tax 
laws – is necessary. 
5.2 Future Research 
While this dissertation provides a plethora of previously unknown information about the 
informal economy, it also makes clear that there is still much to learn. Most of the 
literature focuses on the size and development of the shadow economy in a particular 
country or for a set of countries. What these papers fail to provide are disaggregated 
values for specific regions. Policymakers may be interested in breaking the shadow 
economy down according to region, level of urban development, or income. The 
relationship between the size of the shadow economy in the United States and the 
proportion of illegal immigrants from Mexico in the individual states may also be of 
value to U.S. lawmakers. 
Various non-governmental organizations, such as the Institute for New Democracies, 
make their decisions based on the institutional environment of a particular country. The 
index of smuggling – a potential indicator of the general institutional quality in a 
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particular country – outlined in Chapter 3 may help non-governmental organizations 
monitor the institutional environment over time. Another promising avenue for future 
empirical research is studying the impact of economic, political, and institutional 
reforms, such as the implementation of free trade zones or the improvement of 
institutional quality, on smuggling. 
The smuggling of illicit drugs across the U.S.-Mexico border into Arizona, California, 
New Mexico, and Texas is a major challenge for the United States. Treating smuggling 
as an unobservable phenomenon, one can use several indicators of smuggling 
simultaneously to estimate the level of smuggling. Analyzing the determinants of 
smuggling at the state-level using state-specific determinants, these estimates can then be 
used to determine whether the illicit drug trade is in fact correlated with crime rates and 
violence, as the media often claims. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS∗ 
Structural equation models (SEMs) are used extensively in the social sciences, for 
example in sociology, psychology, and education. Such models take into account 
unobservable variables which can be defined or described by observable variables. SEMs 
are thus particularly suitable to analyze informal economic activities such as the shadow 
economy and smuggling. Cooley (1978) argues that SEMs allow one to establish a 
theoretical model in order to determine the degree to which the explanatory (observable) 
variables are related to unobservable variables. They are a generalization of many 
familiar techniques such as regression, path analysis, discriminant analysis, and 
confirmatory factor analysis. All of these methods can be treated as special cases of 
SEMs, and several authors give the SEM approach a high value. For Stevens (1996, 
p. 415) SEMs are “one of the most important advances in quantitative methodology in 
many years”. Also Capraro et al. (2002, p.10) argue that SEMs “subsume all other 
parametric statistical analyses and provide some interesting options for the researcher”. 
SEMs have been also termed “the single most important contribution of statistics to the 
social and behavioral sciences during the past twenty years” [Lomax (1989), p. 171]. 
The statistical idea behind SEMs is to compare a sample covariance matrix, i.e., a 
covariance matrix of observable variables, with the parametric structure imposed on this 
matrix by a hypothesized model.100 The relationships among the observable variables are 
described in terms of their covariances and it is assumed that they are generated by 
                                               
∗
 I would like to thank Alexander Karmann for his suggestion to include this appendix. 
100
 Estimation of an SEM with latent variables can be done by means of a computer program 
for the analysis of covariance structures, such as LISREL (Linear Structural Relations). A useful 
overview of the LISREL software package in an economics journal is Cziraky (2004). General 
overviews about the SEM approach are given in Hayduk (1987), Bollen (1989), Hoyle (1995), 
Maruyama (1997), Byrne (1998), Muthen (2002), and Cziraky (2005). 
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(usually a smaller number of) unobservable variables. To analyze the observable 
variables’ covariance matrix, this matrix is decomposed into two steps. Firstly, the 
unobservable variables are linked to observable variables in a factor analytical model 
also called measurement model. Secondly, the relationships between the unobservable 
variables or between unobservable and observable variables are specified through a 
structural model. Therefore, an SEM is the simultaneous specification of a factor and a 
structural model. In this sense, SEMs test the consistency of a “structural” theory through 
data and are thus a confirmatory, rather than an exploratory technique. In fact, in a 
confirmatory factor analysis a model is constructed in advance, whether an unobservable 
(latent) variable or factor influences an observable variable is specified by the researcher, 
and parameter constraints are imposed. Thus, an economic theory is tested by examining 
the consistency of actual data with the hypothesized relationships between the 
unobservable (latent) variables or factors and the observable (measurable) variables.101 
In general, a confirmatory factor analysis has two goals: (i) to estimate parameters 
such as coefficients and variances and (ii) to assess the fit of the model. For the analysis 
of informal economic activities these two goals mean (i) to estimate the relationships 
between a set of observable variables, divided into causes and indicators, and the 
respective informal economic activity (unobservable variable), and (ii) to test if the 
researcher’s theory or the derived hypotheses as a whole fit the data. SEMs are, 
compared to regression models, a rarely used method by economists what might be due 
                                               
101
 On the contrary, in an exploratory factor analysis a model is not specified in advance, i.e., 
beyond the specification of the number of latent variables (factors) and observed variables the 
researcher does not specify any structure of the model. This means that one assumes that all 
factors are correlated, all observable variables are directly influenced by all factors, and all 
measurement errors are uncorrelated with each other. In practice however, the distinction 
between a confirmatory and an exploratory factor analysis is less strong. Facing poorly fitting 
models, researchers using SEM techniques or a confirmatory factor analysis often modify their 
models in an exploratory way in order to improve the fit. Thus, most applications fall between 
the two extreme cases of exploratory (non-specified model structure) and confirmatory (ex-ante 
specified model structure) factor analysis [Long (1983a), pp. 11-17]. 
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to an under-evaluation of their capabilities with respect to the potential contribution for 
economic research.102 
Several authors however have applied Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) 
models, a particular type of an SEM, to estimate the size and development of the shadow 
economy. One of the earliest studies was Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) who use a 
MIMIC model to analyze the shadow economy in 17 OECD countries, followed by other 
economists, who also use this approach to estimate the size of the shadow economy.103 
The analysis of other informal economic activities using an SEM or a MIMIC model has 
become an interesting area in the literature recently. For example, Dreher et al. (2007) 
use a MIMIC model to derive an index of corruption for approximately 100 countries 
over the period 1976-1997. Buehn and Farzanegan (2008) apply this type of model to 
analyze smuggling in 54 countries during the 1990s. Buehn et al. (2009) use two distinct 
MIMIC models and a more general SEM to analyze Do-it-yourself (DIY) and shadow 
economic activities in Germany. Farzanegan (2009) and Buehn and Eichler (2009) use 
MIMIC models to estimate the size and development of smuggling in Iran and across the 
U.S.-Mexico border, respectively. Buehn and Schneider (2009) use an SEM to shed 
more light on the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy. 
Appendix A is organized as follows. First, Section A.1 explains the types of SEMs 
used in this dissertation. Section A.2 then shows how SEMs are estimated. Section A.3 
describes how one can assess the fit of SEMs. Section A.4 critically evaluates the 
advantages and disadvantages of the application of SEMs in economics. Section A.5 
finally summarizes and concludes. 
                                               
102
 Seminal studies using an SEM and/or a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) 
model include Zellner (1970), Hauser and Goldberger (1971), Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975), 
and Aigner et al. (1984). 
103
 Important studies on the shadow economy are Loayza (1996) for Latin American 
countries, Giles (1995; 1999) for New Zealand, Giles and Tedds (2002) for Canada, Dell’Anno 
(2003) for Italy, Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003) for OECD countries, Cziraky and Gillman 
(2003) for Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria, Bajada and Schneider (2005) for Asian-pacific 
countries, Schneider (2005) for 110 countries all over the world, Pickhardt and Sardà Pons 
(2006) for Germany, Dell’Anno (2007) for Portugal, Dell’Anno et al. (2007) for France, Greece, 
and Spain, and Dell’Anno and Solomon (2008) for the USA. 
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A.1 The Structural Equation Model Approach 
A.1.1 The Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes Model 
The main idea behind SEMs is to examine the relationships among unobservable 
variables and/or between unobservable and observable variables in terms of the 
relationships among a set of observable variables by using their covariance information. 
This section investigates a particular alternative of an SEM with one latent variable 
which can be the shadow economy, DIY activities, or smuggling, and a number of 
observable variables. The observable variables are divided into causes and indicators of 
the latent variable. The key benefits of this so-called MIMIC model are that it allows 
modeling the respective informal economic activity as an unobservable (latent) variable 
and that it takes into account its multiple determinants (causes) and multiple effects 
(indicators). 
Formally, the MIMIC model consists of two parts: the structural equation model and 
the measurement model. In the measurement model, the unobservable variable tη  
determines a p  vector ( ), , ,1t 2t pty y y ′='ty …  of indicators subject to a p  vector of random 
error terms ( ), , , '1t 2t ptε ε ε='tε … .104 The unobservable variable tη  is a scalar and λ  is a 
p  column vector of parameters that relates ty  to tη . The measurement equation is given 
by: 
tη= +t ty λ ε .              (A.1) 
The structural model determines the unobservable variable tη  by a set of exogenous 
causes, ( ), , ,1t 2t qtx x x ′′ =tx … , subject to a structural disturbance error term tς . The 
structural equation is given by: 
t tη ς= +' tγ x ,              (A.2) 
                                               
104
 Appendix A follows the standard LISREL notation of Jöreskog and Sörbom (2001). The 
subscript t indicates the time series dimension of the variables. Except for Chapter 3 which is a 
cross-sectional analysis of smuggling in 54 countries, all applications presented in this 
dissertation analyze the size and development of informal economic activities over time. 
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where 'γ  is a q  row vector of structural parameters. Without loss of generality, all 
variables are taken as standardized deviations from their means. In equations (A.1) and 
(A.2) it is assumed that tς  and the elements of tε  are normally, independently, and 
identically distributed,105 the variance of the structural disturbance term tς  is denoted by 
ψ , and ( )E ′=ε t tΘ ε ε  is the ( )p p×  covariance matrix of the measurement errors.106 
Figure A.1 shows the path diagram of the standard MIMIC model.  
 
 
Figure A.1 Path Diagram of a Standard MIMIC Model 
 
In the following, I use the S-DIY MIMIC model of Chapter 2, in particular the shadow 
economy (S) part of this model, as an example to further demonstrate the nomenclature 
                                               
105
 The assumption of independence between the structural disturbance tς  and each itε , 
 , ,and i 1 p= … , could be considered as too restrictive, when mainly using an economic dataset 
and, consequently, espoused to question the validity of this approach. However, Hayduk (1987, 
p. 193) explains that this assumption “is purely a matter of arbitrary convention” for an SEM 
analysis. 
106
 In the standard MIMIC model the measurement errors are assumed to be independent of 
each other, but this restriction could be relaxed [Stapleton (1978), p. 53]. 
Indicators 
1ty  
ptε  
2tε  
1tε  
1tx  
2tx  
qtx
tη  2t
y  
pty  
Causes 
⋮  ⋮  
tς  
 
1γ  
 
2γ  
1λ  
2λ  
qγ  pλ  
153 
 
of the MIMIC model. The S-DIY MIMIC model analyzes the shadow economy in 
Germany using 5 observable variables as causes and 3 observable variables as indicators 
(see Figure 2.3). Within this model, equations (A.1) and (A.2) are specified as follows: 
1t 1t1
2t 2t2 t
33t 3t
y
y
y
ελ
ελ η
λ ε
    
    
= ⋅ +
    
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.            (A.4) 
Substituting equation (A.1) into (A.2) yields a reduced form equation which expresses 
the relationships between the observed causes and indicators, i.e., between tx  and ty . 
This is shown in equation (A.5):  
t t ty = Πx + z ,              (A.5) 
where: = 'Π λγ  is a ( )3 5×  reduced form coefficient matrix and tς= +t tz λ ε  is a  
reduced form vector of a linear transformation of disturbances that has a ( )3 3×  reduced 
form covariance matrix Ω  given as: 
Cov( ) E[( )( ) ]t tς ς ψ′ ′= = + + = +t t t εΩ z λ ε λ ε λ λ Θ .         (A.6) 
In equation (A.6), Var( )tψ ς=  and ( )E ′=ε t tΘ ε ε  is the covariance matrix of the 
measurement errors. 
The models used in this dissertation to analyze the different types of informal 
economic activities, i.e., the S-DIY model of shadow economic and DIY activities in 
Germany (Chapter 2), the model analyzing smuggling in 54 countries (Chapter 3), and 
the models analyzing smuggling of illegal and legal goods across the U.S.-Mexico 
border (Chapter 4), are such MIMIC models.107 Only the H-DIY model of Chapter 2 is a 
more general type of an SEM. This model is explained in the next section.  
                                               
107
 Consequently, these models have the same formal structure as presented in equations (A.3) 
(measurement equation) and (A.4) (structural equation) although different numbers of causes and 
indicators may be used. 
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A.1.2 The H-DIY Structural Equation Model 
The more general H-DIY SEM of Chapter 2 analyzes the hidden economy in Germany and 
models DIY activities as part of it using several causes and indicators for each of the two 
unobservable variables (see Figure 2.4). Formally, this SEM has also two parts: the 
measurement model and the structural equation model. The measurement model again links 
the latent variable to its observable indicators and is specified as: 
= +t t ty Λη ε .            (A.7) 
The p  vectors ty  and tε  are defined as in equation (A.1). In equation (A.7) however, tη  
is a column vector of two latent variables, ( ),1t 2tη η ′′ =tη , and Λ  is a ( )p 2×  matrix of 
parameters relating ty  to tη . The two main differences of this model compared to the 
standard MIMIC model are that it (i) explains two instead of one latent variable and (ii) the 
structural equation not only describes the relationships between the set of causes tx  and the 
unobservable variables tη  but additionally the relationship between the two 
unobservable variables 1tη  and 2tη . Hence, the structural equation model is given by: 
= + +t t t tη Βη Γx ς ,            (A.8) 
where tx  is a q  vector defined as in equation (A.2) and ( ),1t 2tς ς ′′ =tς  is a column vector 
of structural error terms. The ( )2 q×  matrix Γ  describes the relationships between the latent 
variables and the observable causes and the ( )2 2×  coefficient matrix Β  the link between the 
two unobservable variables, i.e., between the hidden economy and DIY activities. The precise 
nomenclatures of equations (A.7) and (A.8) in the H-DIY SEM are as follows: 
0
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Equation (A.9) represents the measurement model equation and equation (A.10) is the 
structural model equation of the H-DIY SEM. The parameter 21β  explains the relationship 
between the two latent variables 1tη  and 2tη , i.e., between the hidden economy and DIY 
activities. 
Re-arranging equation (A.8), ( ) ( )-1 -1= - + -t t tη Ι Β Γx Ι Β ς , and substituting it into 
equation (A.7) yields a reduced form equation which expresses the relationships between 
the observed variables tx  and ty . This is shown in equation (A.11):  
= +t t ty Πx z ,         (A.11) 
where ( )-1= −Π Λ Ι Β Γ  is a ( )4 5×  reduced form coefficient matrix and 
( ) 1−= +t t tz Λ I - B ς ε  is a reduced form vector of disturbances that has a ( )4 4×  
reduced form covariance matrix Ω  given by: 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
Cov( ) E
 ,
-1 -1
-1 -1
= - + - +
= - - +
 ′
=  
 
′ ′
t t t t t
ε
Ω z Λ I B ς ε Λ I B ς ε
Λ I B Ψ I B Λ Θ
      (A.12) 
where ( )E= 't tΨ ς ς  is the ( )2 2×  covariance matrix of the structural equation 
disturbances and ( )E ′=ε t tΘ ε ε  is the ( )4 4×  covariance matrix of the measurement 
errors tε . The next section explains how the information contained in the covariance 
matrix of causes and indicators is used to estimate an SEM. 
A.2 Application of Structural Equation Models 
In general, estimation of an SEM uses covariance information of sample data to derive 
estimates of population parameters. Instead of minimizing the distance between observed 
and predicted individual values as in standard econometrics, SEMs minimize the 
distance between an observed (sample) covariance matrix and the covariance matrix 
predicted by the model the researcher imposes on the data. 
The idea behind the SEM approach is that the covariance matrix of the observed 
variables is a function of a set of model parameters: 
( )=Σ Σ θ ,            (A.13) 
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where Σ  is the population covariance matrix of the observed variables ty  and tx , θ  is a 
vector that contains the parameters of the model, and ( )Σ θ  is the covariance matrix as a 
function of θ  implying that each element of the covariance matrix is a function of one or 
more model parameters. If the hypothesized model is correct and the parameters are 
known, the population covariance matrix would be exactly reproduced, i.e., Σ  will equal 
( )Σ θ . In practice, however, one does not know either the population variances and 
covariances, or the parameters but instead uses the sample covariance matrix and sample 
estimates of the unknown parameters for estimation [Bollen (1989, p. 256]. However, 
before an SEM can be estimated, its identification must be verified. 
A.2.1 Identification 
An SEM is said to be identified if a unique solution for each parameter in θ  exists. This 
means sufficient information to obtain a unique solution for the parameters to be 
estimated. In other words, it must be possible to solve each parameter of the model in 
terms of the variances and covariances of the observed variables [Long (1983a), pp. 34-
36]. 
If the information is not sufficient, the model is said to be unidentified or under-
identified. In this case, a unique solution cannot be obtained and, as a consequence, one 
can find an infinite number of values for the parameters to be estimated and fit any 
covariance matrix to the model.108 For a model to be identified it is thus necessary that 
the number of independent parameters being estimated is less than or equal to the 
number of non-redundant, i.e., unique, elements of the sample covariance matrix S  of 
the observed causes and indicators. To determine if the model meets this condition one 
can use the following formula: t s≤ . This so called t-rule tests if the number of 
parameters to be estimated in θ , t, i.e., the number of independent parameters, is less 
than or equal to the number of unique elements in the variance-covariance matrix of the 
observed variables calculated as ( ) ( ) /s p q p q 1 2= + + +  [Bollen (1989), pp. 93-94]. 
                                               
108
 This problem is similar to the one that arises if one were asked to find a unique solution for 
the equation A B 20⋅ = . Being faced with two unknowns and one equation one can find infinite 
solutions for ,A B ∈ℝ  [Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2000), p. 49]. 
157 
 
If t s> , the t-rule is violated and the model is thus under-identified. This problem can 
be corrected by the researcher by modifying the model. A solution to the identification 
problem is to impose more constraints on the model by (i) including more observable 
variables (i.e. indicators) in the model, (ii) fixing additional parameters to zero, and (iii) 
setting parameters equal to each other [Bollen (1989), p. 91; Diamantopoulos and 
Siguaw (2000), p. 49]. Of course, such model modifications should not be randomly 
established to achieve identification but theoretically justified. 
A model is said to be identified if t s=  or t s< . If t s= , the model is said to be just 
identified and a single unique solution for the parameter estimates can be obtained. All 
information available is used to derive the parameter estimates and the degrees of 
freedom are zero.109 If t s< , the model is over-identified and more than one estimate of 
each parameter can be obtained. Consequently, the degrees of freedom are positive and 
equal to s t− . In over-identified models, it is possible for the sample covariance matrix 
S  of the observed causes and indicators to differ from the estimated covariance matrix 
ˆΣ . This means, that one can test if the restrictions imposed on the model leading to 
over-identification, are valid. Over-identification of at least one parameter thus provides 
the possibility to test the model as models containing over-identified parameters will 
generally not fit the data exactly [MacCallum (1995)]. Thus, with over-identified models 
one can find that the model fits the observed data poorly providing evidence that it is 
incorrect. 
The fact that the model satisfies the condition t s≤  does not, however, guarantee that 
the model is in fact identified because this condition is only necessary and not sufficient. 
Unfortunately, no easily applicable sufficient or necessary and sufficient conditions are 
available [Long (1983b), p. 66]. To demonstrate through algebraic manipulations that a 
model is identified and each of its parameters can be solved in terms of the variances and 
covariances of the observed variables is often, in even moderately complex models, 
virtually impossible [Bollen (1989), p. 247]. There are, however, a few steps one can use 
                                               
109
 With exactly identified models, the sample covariance matrix S  of the observed variables 
is always equal to the estimated covariance matrix ˆΣ  and no information remains to test the 
model. In other words, the model has always perfect fit that in no way indicates the scientific 
usefulness of a model [James et al. (1982), p. 135]. For this reason, the overall goodness-of-fit 
measures described in Section A.3 are not applicable in exactly identified models. 
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to make reasonably sure that the model is indeed identified.110 The first step is to ensure 
that each unobservable variable in the model has been assigned a measurable scale which 
can be done by either setting one of the coefficients of the indicators to a constant, 
usually 1 or -1 [Bollen (1989), p. 91]. An alternative is to fix the variance of the 
unobservable variable tη  to 1 but the former is more convenient for economic 
interpretation and thus typically used [Dell’Anno and Schneider (2009)]. The second 
step is to check that t s<  is satisfied and the degrees of freedom are positive. A third 
possibility is to use results of previous research, i.e., to scan the literature whether the 
particular model used has already proven to be identified. Finally, the LISREL program 
itself provides a very handy diagnostic facility for detecting identification problems. If 
identification problems are detected the program will provide a warning message that 
certain parameters “may not be identified”.111 All models estimated in this dissertation 
have been carefully checked and proven to be identified using each of the four steps. 
A.2.2 Estimation 
Estimation of an SEM can be thought of as follows. The starting point is the sample 
covariance matrix S  of the observed causes and indicators because the population 
covariance matrix Σ  is unknown. The diagonal elements of S  are the variances of 
causes and indicators, the off-diagonal elements are their covariances. Thus, S  can be 
thought of as the following partitioned matrix: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
Cov Cov
Cov Cov
,
,
 
=  
  
t t t
t t t
y y x
S
x y x
.          (A.14) 
                                               
110
 For a discussion of further identification rules see Bollen (1989, pp. 93-103). 
111
 This assessment is based on the so called information matrix which is almost certainly 
positive definite if the model is identified [Jöreskog and Sörbom (2001), pp. 24, 326]. The 
advantage of this approach is that it can even detect empirical under-identification problems. 
Such problems can occur if the calculations of the model parameters involve division of 
covariances which are zero or almost zero. While it is theoretically possible to express all 
parameters as functions of sample variances and covariances, their actual calculation will fail 
because division by zero is not defined. 
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An estimate of the population covariance matrix Σ , ( )ˆˆ =Σ Σ θ , is then defined in terms 
of estimates of ( ):= −B I Bɺɺ , Λ , Γ , Ψ , εΘ , and Φ , the covariance matrix of the 
causes. These estimates are contained in the vector ˆθ , i.e., ( )ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆf= εθ Β,Λ,Γ,Ψ,Φ,Θɺɺ : 
 ( )  ( )
 ( )  ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
Cov Cov
ˆ
Cov Cov
E
E  .
,
,
 
 =
  
 ′ ′
 =
′ ′ 
 
 ′ ′+ + +
 
=
 ′ ′+ 
t t t
t t t
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t t
t t t t t
y y x
Σ
x y x
y y y x
x y x x
Λη ε Λη ε x Λη ε
x Λη ε x x
 
After multiplication, distribution of the expectation operator, making use of the 
assumptions that 
1. the variables are measured as deviations from mean, i.e., 
E( ) E( ) E( ) E( ) E( ) 0= = = = =t t t t tη x ς y ε , 
2. the error terms do not correlate to the causes, i.e., E( ) E( ) 0′ ′= =t t t tx ς ς x  and 
E( ) E( ) 0′ ′= =t t t tx ε ε x , 
3. the error terms do not correlate across equations, E( ) E( ) 0′ ′= =t t t tε ς ς ε , 
4. the errors of the measurement model do not correlate to the latent variable, i.e., 
E( ) E( ) 0′ ′= =t t t tη ε ε η , and 
5. ( )-1−I B  exists, i.e., ( )−I B  is nonsingular meaning that non of the structural 
equation is redundant, 
the covariance matrix can be derived [Long (1983b), pp. 42-59]. In the following I 
demonstrate calculation of the covariance matrix using the H-DIY SEM of Chapter 2. 
For this SEM, the covariance matrix is obtained as follows: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
E E
E
E
 ,
-1 -1 -1 -1
-1
-1
+ +
+
 ′
′ = + +
  
′ ′= +
′ 
′= + 
 
′ ′ ′= +
t t t t t t
t t ε
t t t t ε
ε
y y Λη ε Λη ε
Λ η η Λ Θ
Λ Β Γx Β ς Β Γx Β ς Λ Θ
ΛΒ ΓΦΓ Ψ Β Λ Θ
ɺɺ ɺɺ ɺɺ ɺɺ
ɺɺ ɺɺ
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
E E
E
E
 ,
-1 -1
-1
+
 ′
′ = +
  
′ ′=
 ′
′=  
 
′ ′ ′=
t t t t t
t t
t t t
x y x Λη ε
x η Λ
x Β Γx Β ς Λ
ΦΓ Β Λ
ɺɺ ɺɺ
ɺɺ
 
( ) ( )E E
 ,
-1
′ ′= +  
=
t t t t ty x Λη ε x
ΛΒ ΓΦɺɺ
 
( )E ′ =t tx x Φ . 
The estimate of the population covariance matrix Σ , ˆΣ , defined in terms of the 
estimated parameters contained in the vector ˆθ  is thus given by:  
( )ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
-1 -1 -1
-1
+ ′ ′ ′ +
 
=
 
′ ′ ′  
εΛΒ ΓΦΓ Ψ Β Λ Θ ΛΒ ΓΦ
Σ
ΦΓΒ Λ Φ
ɺɺ ɺɺ ɺɺ
ɺɺ
,        (A.15) 
where ‘^ ’ indicates that the matrices contain estimates of the population parameters. Of 
course, these estimates must satisfy all constraints imposed on the model by the 
researcher. Equation (A.15) is called covariance equation. Estimation is performed by 
finding values for ( )ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , , , ,f= εθ Β Λ Γ Ψ Φ Θɺɺ  that produce an estimate of the models 
covariance matrix ˆΣ  that most closely corresponds to the sample covariance matrix S . 
During this estimation procedure, all possible matrices that meet the imposed restrictions 
are considered. If an estimate ∗Σ  of ˆΣ  is close to S , one might conclude that 
( )* * * * * * *, , , , ,f= εθ Β Λ Γ Ψ Φ Θɺɺ  is a reasonable estimate of the model’s parameters. Hence, 
estimation of an SEM is reduced to the problem of measuring how close *Σ  is to S  and 
if this estimate is the most accurate, i.e., if it is the best estimate given the set of all 
possible estimates that meet the imposed restrictions [Long (1983b), pp. 42-45]. 
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Estimation of a MIMIC model proceeds accordingly although less parameters must be 
estimated, i.e., only estimates for λ , γ ,Φ , ψ , and εΘ  must be found to produce an 
estimate of Σ  that most closely corresponds to S . That is, ( )ˆˆ =Σ Σ θ  and 
( )ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ, , , ,f ψ= εθ λ γ Φ Θ . Going through the same algebraic steps as shown for the H-DIY 
SEM, the covariance equation of the MIMIC model can be derived. It has the following 
functional form: 
( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ
ψ ′ ′ ′+ +
 =
 ′
 
ελ γ Φγ λ Θ λγ Φ
Σ
Φγλ Φ
.         (A.16) 
The function that measures how close a given ∗Σ  is to the sample covariance matrix S  
is called fitting function ( )*F ;S Σ . The *θ of all possible *θ  that meets the imposed 
constraints on Bɺɺ , Λ , Γ , Ψ , Φ , and εΘ  ( λ , γ ,Φ , ψ , and εΘ  in the case of the 
MIMIC model) and minimizes the fitting function, given the sample covariance matrix 
S , is the sample estimate ˆθ  of the population parameters. This means that if one set of 
estimates *1θ  produces the matrix 
*
1Σ  and a second set 
*
2θ  produces the matrix 
*
2Σ  and if 
( ) ( )* *F ; F ;1 2<S Σ S Σ , *1Σ  then is considered to be closer to S  than *2Σ  [Long (1983a), 
pp. 56-57]. 
The most widely used fitting function for SEMs is the Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
function.112 Under the assumption that ( )Σ θ  and S  are positive definite, i.e., 
                                               
112
 Other estimation procedures such as Unweighted Least Squares (ULS) and Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) are also available. ULS has the advantage that it is easier to compute, leads 
to a consistent estimator without the assumption that the observed variables have a particular 
distribution. Important disadvantages of ULS are however, that ULS does not lead to the 
asymptotically most efficient estimator of θ  and that ULSF  is not scale invariant. The GLS 
estimator has similar statistical properties like the ML estimator but the significance tests are no 
longer accurate if the distribution of the observed variables has very “fat” or “thin” tails. 
Moreover, GLSF  accepts the wrong model more often than ML and parameter estimates tend to 
suffer when using GLSF . Thus, ML seems to be superior [see, for example, Bollen (1989), pp. 
111-115; Olsson et al. (1999); Olsson et al. (2000); Jöreskog and Sörbom (2001), pp. 20-24].  
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nonsingular, and S  has a Wishart distribution, the following fitting function is 
minimized: 
( ) ( )MLF log log ( )-1tr p q = + − − + Σ θ SΣ θ S ,       (A.17) 
where log  is the log of the determinant of the respective matrix and ( )p q+  is the 
number of observed variables. In general, no closed form or explicit solution for the 
structural parameters that minimize MLF  exists. Hence, the values of B , Λ , Γ , Ψ , Φ , 
and εΘ  ( λ , γ ,Φ , ψ , and εΘ  in the case of the MIMIC model) that minimize the fitting 
function are estimated applying iterative numerical procedures.113 
The ML estimator is widely used because of its desirable properties.114 First, the ML 
estimator is asymptotically unbiased. Second, the ML estimator is consistent, i.e., 
ˆplim =θ θ  ( ˆθ  is the ML estimator and θ  is the population parameter). Third, the ML 
estimator is asymptotically efficient, i.e., among all consistent estimators no other has a 
smaller asymptotic variance. Fourth, the ML estimator is asymptotically normally 
distributed, meaning that the ratio of the estimated parameter and its standard error 
approximate a z-distribution in large samples. Fifth, a final important characteristic of the 
ML estimator is scale invariance [Swaminathan and Algina (1978)]. The scale invariance 
property implies that changes of the measurement unit of one or more of the observed 
variables do not change the value of the fitting function. This means that ˆBɺɺ , ˆΛ , ˆΓ , ˆΨ , 
ˆΦ , and ˆεΘ  ( ˆλ , γˆ , ˆΦ , ψˆ , and ˆεΘ  in the case of the MIMIC model) are the same for any 
change of scale. 
The ML and GLS estimation procedures assume multivariate normal data and a 
reasonable sample size.115 If non-normality and excessive kurtosis threaten the validity 
                                               
113
 See Appendix 4C in Bollen (1989) for details. 
114
 This appendix briefly reviews these properties. For a detailed discussion see Bollen (1989, 
pp. 107-123). 
115
 There are several rules of thumb about the sample size in the literature: the sample size 
should at least contain 50 observations or have more than 8 times the number of observations 
then are independent variables in the model [Garson (2005)]. Bentler and Chou (1987) 
recommend at least 5 observations per parameter estimate (including error terms as well as path 
coefficients). If possible, one should go beyond these minimum sample size recommendations 
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of the ML significance tests, corrections are helpful. A convenient approach is to find 
transformations that lead to better approximate multi-normality or remove excessive 
kurtosis. After successful transformation, one can apply GLSF  or MLF  to the data as 
usual. If the data are continuous but not normally distributed, an alternative method is an 
asymptotically distribution free estimation procedure, known as Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS). Although this estimator allows for non-normality, it is asymptotically efficient in 
large samples only.116 If transformations do not lead to sufficient normality or WLS is 
not applicable because of a to small sample size, ML is still justified but the statistical 
tests need to be interpreted with caution [Jöreskog and Sörbom (2001), p. 170; Kmenta 
(1971), p. 579]. 
To summarize, the first step in the estimation procedure is thus to translate the 
underlying economic theory into a structural model. In the second step, it is necessary to 
check identification of the model and to fix one coefficient to an a priori value in order 
to give the latent variable an interpretable scale. In a third step the estimation method has 
to be chosen which defines the fitting function for the estimation of an SEM and finally 
provides estimates for the population parameters. 
A.3 Assessing the Fit of Structural Equation Models 
This section briefly reviews selected statistics for assessing an SEM’s overall goodness-
of-fit.117 In general, these statistics assess the hypothesis that Σ  equals ( )Σ θ by using 
their sample counterparts S  and ˆΣ . They are all a function of the sample size and the 
degrees of freedom and often take into account not only the fit of the model but also its 
complexity. When the model’s fit is not adequate, it has become common practice to 
modify the model by excluding the non-significant parameters in order to improve the fit 
                                                                                                                                           
particularly when the data are not normally distributed or are incomplete. 
116
 Hu et al. (1992) and Olsson et al. (2000) find that the WLS method has a tendency to 
overestimate the true goodness-of-fit. The interval of the overestimation bias is however 
moderate in samples with more than 250 observations. 
117
 See Bollen (1989, pp. 256-281) for a detailed description. 
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and to find the most suitable model.118 Before evaluating the overall fit of a model, one 
should also carefully examine the estimated coefficients. Questions such as whether the 
estimated coefficients are significant and have the expected (correct) sign, whether their 
magnitudes correspond to previous research (and why they differ if they do) need to be 
addressed before turning to the evaluation of the model’s overall fit. 
Measures assessing the overall fit of an SEM determine the degree to which the model 
as a whole is consistent with the analyzed data. A widely used overall goodness-of-fit 
test is the chi-square goodness-of-fit measure:119 
( ) ( )ˆF ,2 N 1χ = − S Σ ,           (A.18) 
where N is the sample size and ( )ˆF ,S Σ  is the value of the fitting function at 
convergence. This statistic directly assesses how well the predicted covariance matrix 
reproduces the sample covariance matrix of the observed variables, i.e., it tests how close 
ˆΣ  is to S . In particular, it tests the null hypothesis 0 ˆH : =Σ S , i.e., that a given model 
estimated by the covariance equation ˆΣ  reproduces S  as well as possible [Bollen 
(1989), p. 256].120 Typically, the predicted covariance matrix ˆΣ  does not reproduce S  
perfectly, due to the constraints imposed on the model’s parameters. The chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test thus tests the imperfect, though acceptable, fit under 0H  against the 
                                               
118
 As mentioned above (see footnote 100), in practice researchers often modify their ex-ante 
hypothesized model in an exploratory way to achieve a better fit, although SEMs are rather a 
confirmatory technique. 
119
 Although this statistic is the most widely used overall goodness-of-fit measure, its 
application is seldom justified because one of the assumptions (that the observed variables are 
normally distributed, that the analysis is based on the covariance rather than the correlation 
matrix, and that the sample is large enough to ensure the asymptotic properties of the chi-square 
test) is often violated [Bentler and Bonett (1980); Jöreskog und Sörbom (2001), pp. 28-29]. 
Jörekog and Sörbom therefore suggest using the chi-square as a goodness-of-fit measure in the 
sense that large (small) values, relative to the degrees of freedom, indicate a bad (good) fit, rather 
than as formal hypothesis test. 
120
 In this sense, the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is a simultaneous test that all residuals are 
zero because the null hypothesis is equivalent to ˆ 0− =S Σ  [Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2000), 
p. 83]. 
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alternative hypothesis 1H  that ˆΣ  is any positive definite unrestricted matrix. That is, 
“the standard of comparison is the perfect fit of ˆΣ  equal to S ” [Bollen (1989), p. 266].  
The higher the chi-square’s probability, the closer is the fit of ˆΣ  under 0H  to the 
perfect fit. Hence, the larger the difference between the two matrices, the larger is the 
chi-square and the lower is its probability. Large, statistically significant, values of the 
chi-square indicate an imperfect model fit and result in the rejection of 0H  leading to the 
conclusion that the hypothesized model did not generate the data.121 Thus, in contrast to 
standard hypothesis testing the aim is not to reject 0H . Unfortunately, the chi-square is 
affected by the sample size in the sense that in large samples even very small 
discrepancies between S  and ˆΣ  become significant and thus point to a rejection of the 
model. On the contrary, in a small sample the null hypothesis might not be rejected 
although the model fits the data rather poorly.122 
For this reason, alternative measures of fit were developed and are additionally used 
in the literature. One of the most important alternative overall fit measures is the root 
mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA): 
( )RMSEA
2 df
df N 1
χ −
=
−
.           (A.19) 
Again, N denotes the sample size, while df is the degrees of freedom calculated as 
( ) ( )12 p q p q 1 t+ + + − , where t is the number of parameters to be estimated. The 
RMSEA also focuses on the discrepancy between S  and ˆΣ  but controls for the number 
                                               
121
 In other words, smaller values of the chi-square indicate a better fit, i.e., a smaller chi-
square does not reject the null hypothesis that the model reproduces the sample covariance 
matrix S  of causes and indicators [Long (1983b), p. 74]. 
122
 Because ( )2 MLFN 1χ = − , the estimate of the chi-square is in direct proportion to the 
sample size N  and the power of the test increases as N  increases. In large samples, the 
statistical test will almost certainly be significant and researchers face the problem of whether a 
statistically significant chi-square indicates a serious specification error or whether the test has 
excessively high power. Alternatively, in a very small sample the test has low power and a non-
significant chi-square can occur although the model is mis-specified [Bollen (1989), pp. 268, 
338-349].  
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of observations and takes the complexity of the model (i.e., the number of observed 
variables and parameters to be estimated) into account. Of course, it also measures the 
model’s fit based on the difference between the estimated and the sample covariance 
matrix. The literature considers models with a RMSEA of 0.05 or less, between 0.05 and 
0.08, and above 0.08 as having a good, acceptable, and poor fit [Browne and Cudeck 
(1993)]. 
Other popular measures are the following absolute fit indices: the goodness-of-fit 
index (GFI), the adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI), and the parsimony goodness-of-
fit index (PGFI) [Bollen (1989), p. 276; Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2000), p. 87]. 
These indices are shown in equations (A.20)-(A.22) with respect to the ML fitting 
function MLF :
123
 
( )
( )MLGFI
2
-1
-1
tr
1 -
tr
 
− −
  
=
 
−
 
Σ S I
Σ S
,          (A.20) 
( ) ( )MLAGFI GFIp q p q 11- 1-2df
+ + + 
=  
 
,        (A.21) 
MLPGFI GFI
0
df
df= .           (A.22) 
The GFI measures how much of the relative amount of the variances and covariances in 
S  is accounted for by the model, i.e., the GFI shows how well ˆΣ  (in other words the 
model) predicts the observed covariance matrix. Unfortunately, the GFI does not take the 
number of model parameters, i.e., the complexity of the model, into account. This 
problem is solved by the AGFI which additionally adjusts according to the degrees of 
freedom relative to the number of variables in the model. Hence, the AGFI rewards 
simpler models with fewer variables for any number of variables p q+  and given GFI. 
The parsimony goodness-of-fit index (PGFI) makes a different type of adjustment for the 
model’s complexity. It multiplies the GFI by the so called parsimony index 0df df , 
where df and 0df  are the degrees of freedom of the estimated and the null model, 
                                               
123
 For a discussion of these indices with respect to the ULSF , GLSF , and WLSF  fitting 
functions, see Bollen (1989, p. 277) and Mulaik et al. (1989). 
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respectively.124 The PGFI thus compensates for the increase in fit of a less restricted 
model.125 The GFI, AGFI, and PGFI indices are maximal when S  equals ˆΣ . Models are 
considered to have a good fit if their GFI and AGFI values are larger than 0.90. Values 
of the PGFI are usually much smaller and reflect a good fit if they are above 0.50 
[Mulaik et al. (1989)]. 
Another useful indicator for the evaluation of a model’s overall fit is the expected 
cross validation index (ECVI). The ECVI measures the discrepancy between the fitted 
covariance matrix and the expected covariance matrix of another sample of equivalent 
size, i.e., this measure assesses how valid a model is across samples of the same size 
from the same population. To assess a model’s fit the ECVI is usually compared to the 
ECVIs of the independence and the saturated model (denoted as the independence and 
saturated models ECVI). The former is a model of complete independence among the 
variables (the null model), while in the latter the number of parameters is exactly equal 
to the number of variances and covariances among the observed variables. This means 
that the saturated model is just identified. The fit of the hypothesized model is acceptable 
if its ECVI is below the ECVIs of the independent and saturated models [Byrne (1998), 
p. 113; Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2000), p. 86]. 
The final fit measure I use in this dissertation is the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) for which smaller values indicate a better fit of the hypothesized model. As in the 
case of the ECVI, the model’s AIC is compared to the independence and saturated 
models’ AIC (denoted as the independence and saturated models AIC). An estimated 
model has a good fit if its AIC is smaller than the independence and saturated models’ 
AIC [Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2000), p.86]. 
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 The null or independence model is a model of complete independence among all variables, 
i.e., all observed variables are uncorrelated. This model – being the most restrictive model – has 
p q+  parameters and ( )( )p q p q 1 2+ + −  degrees of freedom [Diamantopoulos and 
Siguaw (2000), p. 86]. 
125
 Estimation of less restrictive models, i.e., freeing more parameters, improves the model’s 
fit to the observed covariance matrix as removing constraints on the final solution allows for a 
better fit of the model-reproduced covariance matrix ˆΣ  to the sample covariance matrix S  
[Mulaik et al. (1989)]. While the model’s fit improves, the degrees of freedom reduce. 
Consequently, the parsimony index 0df df  decreases. 
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A.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Structural Equation Models 
It is widely accepted by most scholars who estimate the size and development of 
informal economic activities using the SEM approach that such an empirical exercise is a 
“minefield” regardless which method is used. For example, in evaluating the currently 
available shadow economy estimates of different scholars, one should keep in mind, that 
already Schneider (1997) and Schneider and Enste (2000) warned that there is no best or 
commonly accepted method. Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses and can 
provide specific insights and results. Although SEM/MIMIC model applications in 
economics are “accompanied” by criticisms,126 they are increasingly used for estimating 
the shadow economy and other informal economic activities.127  
In comparison to other statistical methods, SEMs/MIMIC models offer several 
advantages for the estimation of informal economic activities. According to Giles and 
Tedds (2002), the MIMIC approach is a wider approach than most other competing 
methods, since it allows one to take multiple indicator and causal variables into 
consideration at the same time. Moreover, it is quite flexible, allowing one to vary the 
choice of causal and indicator variables according to the particular features of the 
informal economic activity studied, the period in question, and the availability of data. 
SEMs/MIMIC models lead to a formal estimation and to testing procedures, such as 
those based on the method of maximum likelihood. These procedures are well known 
and are generally “optimal”, if the sample is sufficiently large [Giles and Tedds (2002)]. 
A further advantage of SEMs/MIMIC models has been stressed by Schneider and 
Enste (2000). They emphasize that these models lead to some progress in estimation 
techniques for the size and development of the shadow economy, because this 
methodology allows a wide flexibility in its application. Therefore, they consider it 
potentially superior over all other estimation methods. Cassar (2001) argues that, when 
compared to other methods, SEMs/MIMIC models do not need restrictive assumptions to 
operate. Analogously, Thomas (1992, p. 168) argues that the only real constraint of this 
approach is not in its conceptual structure but the choice of variables. These positive 
                                               
126
 Compare, for example, the criticism by Helberger and Knepel (1988) with respect to the 
pioneering work of Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984). 
127 Compare the studies quoted at the beginning of Appendix A and in footnote 102. 
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aspects of the SEM approach in general and the MIMIC model in particular do not only 
apply in its application to the shadow economy but to all informal economic activities. 
Of course this method has its disadvantages or limitations which are identified in the 
literature. The three most important points of criticism focus on the model’s 
implementations, the sample used, and the reliability of the estimates: 
 
(1) When estimating informal economic activities using SEMs the most common 
objection concerns the meaning of the latent variable [Helberger and Knepel (1988); 
Giles and Tedds (2002); Smith (2002); Hill (2002); Dell’Anno (2003)]. The 
confirmatory rather than exploratory nature of this approach means that one is more 
likely to determine whether a certain model is valid than to “find” a suitable model. 
Therefore, it is possible that the specified model includes potential definitions or 
informal economic activities other than the one studied. For example, it is difficult for a 
researcher to ensure that traditional crime activities such as drug dealing are completely 
excluded from the analysis of the shadow economy. This criticism which is probably the 
most common in the literature remains difficult to overcome as it goes back to the 
theoretical assumptions behind the choice of variables and empirical limitations on the 
availability of data. In this dissertation however, I hope to have provided a sound 
reasoning, based on previous theoretical and empirical findings of the literature 
(Chapters 2 and 3) and a (simple) microeconomic model (Chapter 4), for the choice of 
causes and indicators of the respective informal economic activity. 
 
(2) Another objection is expressed by Helberger and Knepel (1988). They argue that 
SEM/MIMIC model estimations lead to instable coefficients with respect to changes of 
the sample size and alternative model specifications. Dell’Anno (2003) shows however 
that instability disappears asymptotically as the sample size increases. Another issue is 
the application of SEMs to time series data because only simple analytical tools such as 
q- and stemleaf plots are available to analyze the properties of the residuals [Dell’Anno 
(2003)]. Time series applications of the SEM/MIMIC approach are nevertheless common 
practice in economics and had already been used in Karmann (1990b).128 
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 Moreover, with respect to time series applications the assumptions ( ) ( )E Var2ik iς ς=  for 
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(3) Criticism is also related to the benchmarking procedure used to derive “real world” 
figures of informal economic activities [Breusch (2005a; 2005b)]. It has its origin in the 
complications one faces when converting the index estimated by an SEM or MIMIC 
model into meaningful estimates. This is not an easy task, as the latent variable and its 
unit of measurement are not observed. SEMs just provide a set of estimated coefficients 
from which one can calculate an index that shows the dynamics of the unobservable 
variable. 
Application of the so called calibration or benchmarking procedure, regardless which 
one is used, requires experimentation, and a comparison of the calibrated values in a 
wide academic debate. Unfortunately, at this stage of research on the application of the 
SEM/MIMIC approach in economics it is not clear which benchmarking method is the 
best or the most reliable. In which way to proceed is still extensively discussed in the 
literature.129 
 
The economic literature using SEMs is well aware of these limitations. Consequently, it 
acknowledges that it is not an easy task to apply this methodology to an economic 
dataset but also argues that this does not mean one should abandon the SEM approach. 
On the contrary, following an interdisciplinary approach to economics, SEMs are 
valuable tools for economic analysis, particularly when studying informal (unobservable) 
economic activities. However, the mentioned objections should be considered as an 
incentive for further (economic) research in this field rather than as a suggestion to 
abandon this method. 
                                                                                                                                           
all k (homoscedasticity assumption) and ( )Cov , 0ik ilς ς =  for all k l≠  (no autocorrelation in the 
error terms) are critical. Unfortunately, corrections for autocorrelated and heteroscedastic error 
terms have yet received insufficient attention in models with unobservable variables [Bollen 
(1989), p. 58]. An interesting exception, dealing with the problem of autocorrelated observation, 
is Folmer and Karmann (1992). 
129
 See Dell’Anno and Schneider (2009) for a detailed discussion and comparison of different 
benchmarking procedures. 
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A.5 Summary 
This appendix presented a summary of SEMs, their application to economic activities, 
esp. macroeconomic informal ones, and discusses advantages as well as disadvantages. 
Although economic theory has become increasingly open to methodologies of the social 
sciences (e.g. in behavioral and experimental economics), SEMs are not widely used in 
empirical economic research. Opening empirical economics further towards 
methodologies of other social sciences can help economists to improve empirical 
methodologies to analyze informal economic activities such as the shadow economy and 
smuggling. 
The advice to use methods of other disciplines in economics more often is not a new 
one. Unfortunately, it seems discouraging to observe that, after more than thirty years, 
Goldberger’s advice on “numerous incentives for econometricians to break through those 
fences which still separate the social sciences” is still largely unheard [Goldberger 
(1972), p. 999]. The application of SEMs to different informal economic activities as 
undertaken in this dissertation is a small step forward in this direction showing that 
SEMs are appropriate econometric tools to study informal, unobservable economic 
activities. 
The growth of human knowledge gains from problems and from attempts to solve 
them. These attempts require the formulation of theories which must go beyond existing 
knowledge and therefore require creativity and imagination. In the empirical analysis of 
informal economic activities, where the estimation step is particularly challenging, 
researchers are often forced to use “imagination” because existing estimation procedures 
have limitations and complications still exist. 
For this reason, Appendix A also discusses the weaknesses of SEM applications in 
economics. These difficulties go back to the properties of SEMs being a quantitative 
method in the social sciences. This means that time series analysis using this method and 
conversion of the estimated index into “real world” figures are subject to controversial 
debate. Further attempts to improve this procedure are certainly necessary. 
In applied economics, the measurement of the size and trend of an informal economic 
activity is just one important aspect in the context of a broader economic analysis. 
Economists are at least as interested to understand the economic determinants behind 
informal economic activities as they are eager to measure their actual size. In fact, for 
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policymakers and economists it is just as appealing to be aware of the main causes for 
the dynamics of informal economic activities as it is to have a detailed knowledge of 
their size and development over time. This, bearing in mind the lack of other reliable 
methods and the additional information provided by the SEM approach, leads me to the 
conclusion that this approach is a valuable tool for the analysis of informal economic 
activities. Given the current state of the art, it is still one of the best approaches to 
analyze informal economic activities and a good example for the advantages of an open-
minded, multidisciplinary approach to economic research. A greater opening and a 
broader interdisciplinary debate may create further fruitful discussions among 
researchers in order to overcome the existing difficulties regarding the SEM approach. 
 
 
  
APPENDIX B: SHADOW ECONOMIC AND DO-IT-YOURSELF ACTIVITIES 
Table B.1 Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable  Definition Source 
Causes   
Dummy one for 1991 and 1992, null else  
Income natural logarithm of the per 
capita real disposable income 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Inflation inflation rate Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany, own calculations 
Regulation number of employed in public 
service (% of total population) 
excluding individuals employed 
by railways and the postal 
service, which were previously 
state-run 
Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany, own calculations 
Tax burden public revenues (% of GDP) OECD 
Unemploy-
ment 
natural logarithm of the number 
of unemployed 
Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany 
Wages natural logarithm of the average 
gross hourly earnings of male 
workers in the small business 
sector 
Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany, own calculations 
(continued on next page)  
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Table B.1 (cont.)  
Indicators    
M0 natural logarithm of real 
domestic M0 
Deutsche Bundesbank, own 
calculations 
Growth rate 
GDP 
growth rate of real GDP Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany 
Working 
hours 
natural logarithm of the average 
hours worked per week 
Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany 
Turnovers natural logarithm of real 
turnovers in DIY stores 
A.C. Nielsen Company 
GmbH, own calculations 
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Table B.2 Further Goodness-of-fit Statistics of the Estimated Models 
Goodness-of-fit statistics Full model 
 S-DIY H-DIY 
AGFI 0.80 0.78 
PGFI 0.64 0.62 
ECVI 2.34 1.63 
ECVI independence model 4.12 2.90 
ECVI saturated model 3.77 2.57 
AIC 66.87 54.19 
AIC independence model 144.21 101.56 
AIC saturated model 132.00 90.00 
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Table B.3 Robustness Checks S-DIY Model 
 
1971-2005 1972-2005 1973-2005 1970-2004 1970-2003 1970-2002 
Parsimonious 
model 1) 
(1970-2005) 
 S DIY S DIY S DIY S DIY S DIY S DIY S DIY 
Causes               
Regulation 12.12*** 
(2.63) 
 
12.17*** 
(2.59) 
 
12.48*** 
(2.55) 
 
11.83*** 
(2.55) 
 
12.08*** 
(2.59) 
 
13.08*** 
(2.63) 
 
11.94*** 
(2.64) 
 
Income 1.34*** 
(3.22)  
1.34*** 
(3.11)  
1.41*** 
(3.02)  
1.34*** 
(3.16)  
1.25*** 
(2.97)  
1.45*** 
(3.23)  
1.28*** 
(3.12)  
Inflation -0.25 
(0.39) 
-0.62** 
(2.33) 
-0.24 
(0.35) 
-0.59** 
(2.21) 
-0.35 
(0.49) 
-0.58** 
(2.09) 
-0.27 
(0.42) 
-0.57** 
(2.15) 
-0.11 
(0.18) 
-0.55** 
(2.03) 
-0.49 
(0.72) 
-0.54** 
(2.08)  
-0.53** 
(2.28) 
Dummy 0.09*** 
(2.38) 
0.05*** 
(4.01) 
0.09** 
(2.33) 
0.05*** 
(3.86) 
0.09** 
(2.34) 
0.04*** 
(3.63) 
0.09*** 
(2.41) 
0.05*** 
(3.92) 
0.09** 
(2.29) 
0.05*** 
(3.77) 
0.10*** 
(2.45) 
0.05*** 
(4.08) 
0.09** 
(2.37) 
0.04*** 
(4.25) 
Tax burden 0.11** 
(2.34) 
-0.01 
(0.35) 
0.11** 
(2.28) 
-0.01 
(0.35) 
0.11** 
(2.22) 
-0.01 
(0.35) 
0.11** 
(2.29) 
-0.00 
(0.27) 
0.12*** 
(2.43) 
-0.01 
(0.44) 
0.12** 
(2.18) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
0.09** 
(2.12)  
Unemploy-
ment  
0.03** 
(2.11)  
0.03** 
(2.04)  
0.03* 
(1.86)  
0.03** 
(2.19)  
0.03** 
(2.15)  
0.03*** 
(2.44)  
0.04*** 
(2.75) 
Wages 
 
0.15 
(0.78) 
 
0.16 
(0.78) 
 
0.17 
(0.68) 
 
0.11 
(0.58) 
 
0.11 
(0.56) 
 
0.09 
(0.46) 
  
(continued on next page) 
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Table B.3 (cont.) 
Indicators 
M0 (fixed) 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
Growth rate 
GDP 
0.27*** 
(3.25)  
0.27*** 
(3.17)  
0.26*** 
(3.06)  
0.27*** 
(3.19)  
0.30*** 
(3.13)  
0.25*** 
(3.07)  
0.28*** 
(3.29)  
Working 
hours 
-0.02 
(1.31)  
-0.02 
(1.16)  
-0.02 
(1.12)  
-0.02 
(1.17)  
-0.02 
(1.04)  
-0.01 
(0.77)    
Turnovers 
(fixed)  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00 
Goodness-of-fit statistics 
Observations 35 34 33 35 34 33 36 
Degrees of 
freedom 50 50 50 50 50 50 34 
Chi-square 
(p-value) 
33.48 
(0.96) 
33.97 
(0.96) 
35.42 
(0.94) 
35.15 
(0.94) 
34.28 
(0.96) 
33.66 
(0.96) 
24.92 
(0.97) 
RMSEA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1) The parsimonious model excludes all insignificant variables. 
Note: ***, **, * Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. The degrees of freedom are determined by 0.5 
(p + q) (p + q + 1) – t; with p = number of indicators; q = number of causes; t = the number for free parameters. If the model fits the data perfectly and 
the parameter values are known, the sample covariance matrix equals the covariance matrix implied by the model. The null hypothesis of perfect fit 
corresponds to a p-value of 1. The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) measures the model’s fit based on the difference between the 
estimated and the actual covariance matrix. RMSEA values smaller than 0.05 indicate a good fit [Browne and Cudeck (1993)]. 
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Table B.4 Robustness Checks H-DIY Model 
 
1971-2005 1972-2005 1973-2005 1970-2004 1970-2003 1970-2002 
Parsimonious 
model 1) 
1970-2005 
 H DIY H DIY H DIY H DIY H DIY H DIY H DIY 
Causes               
Regulation 11.59*** 
(2.55)  
11.46*** 
(2.45)  
11.61*** 
(2.40)  
11.17*** 
(2.44)  
11.90*** 
(2.54)  
11.71*** 
(2.43)  
10.59*** 
(2.47)  
Income 1.40*** 
(3.42) 
 
1.43*** 
(3.36) 
 
1.48*** 
(3.23) 
 
1.39*** 
(3.33) 
 
1.38*** 
(3.23) 
 
1.43*** 
(3.29) 
 
1.18*** 
(3.01) 
 
Inflation -0.86 
(1.31)  
-1.18 
(1.63)  
-1.70*** 
(2.52)  
-0.85 
(1.29)  
-0.68 
(1.03)  
-1.00 
(1.44)    
Dummy 0.12*** 
(3.13)  
0.13*** 
(3.22)  
0.13*** 
(3.20)  
0.13*** 
(3.15)  
0.12*** 
(2.96)  
0.14*** 
(3.21)  
0.11*** 
(2.81)  
Tax burden 0.09** 
(2.06) 
 
0.09* 
(1.90) 
 
0.09* 
(1.83) 
 
0.09* 
(2.02) 
 
0.11** 
(2.18) 
 
0.10* 
(1.96) 
 
0.09** 
(2.04) 
 
(continued on next page)             
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1) The parsimonious model excludes all insignificant variables. 
Note: ***, **, * Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. The degrees of freedom are determined by 0.5 
(p + q) (p + q + 1) – t; with p = number of indicators; q = number of causes; t = the number for free parameters. If the model fits the data perfectly and 
the parameter values are known, the sample covariance matrix equals the covariance matrix implied by the model. The null hypothesis of perfect fit 
corresponds to a p-value of 1. The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) measures the model’s fit based on the difference between the 
estimated and the actual covariance matrix. RMSEA values smaller than 0.05 indicate a good fit [Browne and Cudeck (1993)]. 
Table B.4 (cont.)              
Indicators 
              
M0 (fixed) 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
Growth rate 
GDP 
0.23*** 
(3.17)  
0.21*** 
(3.00)  
0.20*** 
(2.84)  
0.23*** 
(3.11)  
0.25*** 
(3.15)  
0.22*** 
(2.95)  
0.29*** 
(3.26)  
Working 
hours 
-0.01 
(1.10)  
-0.01 
(0.95)  
-0.01 
(0.91)  
-0.01 
(0.96)  
-0.01 
(0.83)  
-0.01 
(0.59)    
Turnovers 
(fixed)  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00 
Latent variable              
H → DIY 
 
0.13* 
(1.96)  
0.13** 
(2.00)  
0.13** 
(1.98)  
0.13* 
(1.88)  
0.11 
(1.58)  
0.14** 
(2.00)  
0.14* 
(1.84) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics             
Observations 35 34 33 35 34 33 36 
Degrees of 
freedom 33 33 33 33 33 33 19 
Chi-square 
(p-value) 
28.87 
(0.67) 
29.09 
(0.66) 
27.79 
(0.72) 
30.22 
(0.61) 
29.56 
(0.64) 
27.71 
(0.73) 
11.35 
(0.91) 
RMSEA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table B.5 Further Goodness-of-fit Statistics for the Parsimonious Models 1) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics S-DIY parsimonious 
model 
(1970-2005) 
H-DIY parsimonious 
model 
(1970-2005) 
AGFI 0.79 0.88 
PGFI 0.64 0.62 
ECVI 1.60 1.06 
ECVI independence model 2.95 2.18 
ECVI saturated model 2.57 1.60 
AIC  46.92 29.35 
AIC independence model 103.39 76.18 
AIC saturated model 90.00 56.00 
1) The parsimonious models refer to the specifications excluding all insignificant 
variables [see last columns of Tables B.2 (S-DIY model) and B.3 (H-DIY model)]. 
 
  
APPENDIX C: SMUGGLING AROUND THE WORLD 
Table C.1 Data Sources and Definitions 
Name of variable Definition  Sources 
Causes   
Tariff burden average tariff rate (%) Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003) 
Trade restrictions 
index 
index of trade restrictions Index of globalization, 
KOF Swiss Economic 
Institute [Dreher 
(2006)] 
Openness openness index defined as sum of 
exports and imports over GDP 
PWT (2002) 
Black market 
premium 
difference between the parallel 
exchange rate and the official 
exchange rate divided by the official 
exchange rate (The exchange rate is 
defined as number of units of 
domestic currency per U.S. dollar.) 
Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2002) 
1) Index of Economic 
Freedom, Heritage 
Foundation [Holmes et 
al. (2007)] 
Lack of corruption 
index 
perception of corruption in the 
business environment, including 
levels of governmental legal, judicial, 
and administrative corruption 
2) WGI, World Bank, 
[Kaufmann et al. 
(2007)] 
(continued on next page)  
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Table C.1 (cont.)  
Rule of law agents’ confidence in and abidance 
by the rules of society, in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, 
the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence 
WGI, World Bank, 
[Kaufmann et al. 
(2007)] 
Indicators   
Real GDP per 
capita 
 PWT (2002) 
Tax revenues  World Bank (2006) 
Trade discrepancy calculated according to equation (4.7) 
and (4.8) 
IMF Directions of 
Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
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Table C.2 Further Goodness-of-fit Statistics 
Goodness-of-fit statistics Specification 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AGFI 0.85 0.86 0.91 0.84 0.86 0.90 0.89 0.79 0.79 0.88 
PGFI 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.56 
ECVI 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 1.06 1.13 1.12 0.94 
ECVI independence model 8.36 8.45 7.97 8.88 5.68 8.19 7.87 8.36 5.68 5.68 
ECVI saturated model 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.05 1.36 1.36 1.36 
AIC  50.11 49.40 41.95 51.20 49.52 42.64 37.88 59.68 59.20 45.09 
AIC independence model 442.96 447.86 422.53 470.61 300.96 434.12 417.21 442.96 300.96 300.96 
AIC saturated model 72.00 72.00 72.00 72.00 72.00 72.00 56.00 72.00 72.00 72.00 
 
 
  
APPENDIX D: SMUGGLING ILLEGAL AND LEGAL GOODS ACROSS THE 
U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 
Table D.1 Data Sources and Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
BMP (black market 
premium) 
(black market exchange rate - 
official exchange rate ) / 
official exchange rate 
1975-1982: Pick (1955-
1982), various issues; 
1983-1998: Pick (1983-
1998), various issues 
Real exchange rate nominal official exchange rate 
(peso/U.S. dollar)*U.S. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
/MX CPI 
nominal exchange rate: 
International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) International 
Financial Statistics; 
Mexican (MX) CPI: 
Banco de Mexico; U.S. 
CPI: Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
MX unemployment rate unemployed persons as % of 
total labor force, seasonally 
adjusted 
1975-84: Fleck and 
Sorrentino (1994); 1985-
2004: Organization for 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
(OECD) Main Economic 
Indicators 
(continued on next page)   
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Table D.1 (cont.)   
MX real wages nominal wage in 
manufacturing deflated with 
Mexican CPI, seasonally 
adjusted 
1975M1-1998M5: 
Hanson and Spilimbergo 
(1999); 1998M6-2004M4: 
Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, Geografía e 
Informática (INEGI) 
U.S. border enforcement number of person-hours spent 
by the U.S Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) for 
border patrols / total 
apprehensions, seasonally 
adjusted 
unpublished records of 
the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service 
(INS); Hanson (2006) 
U.S. linewatch 
apprehensions 
individuals apprehended by 
the CBP at international 
boundaries of the United 
States, seasonally adjusted 
unpublished records of 
the INS; Hanson (2006) 
U.S. non-linewatch 
apprehensions 
individuals apprehended by 
the CBP inside the United 
States at traffic checkpoints, 
raids on businesses or interior 
patrols, seasonally adjusted 
unpublished records of 
the INS; Hanson (2006) 
U.S. real drug seizures illegal drugs seized by the 
CBP, in million U.S. dollars, 
deflated by U.S. CPI 
Department of Homeland 
Security; Hanson (2006) 
U.S. drug availability % of U.S. 12th-graders 
reporting that "marijuana is 
fairly or very easy" to get 
Johnston et al. (2007) 
(continued on next page)   
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Table D.1 (cont.)   
MX taxes on 
income/profit 
% of GDP 1975-2000 IMF 
Government Statistics; 
2001-2004 OECD 
Revenue Statistics 
MX taxes on international 
trade 
% of imports 1975-2000 IMF 
Government Statistics; 
2001-2004 OECD 
Revenue Statistics 
MX errors and omissions balance of payments position, 
million U.S. dollars 
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
Import misinvoicing [U.S. exports (Cost, Insurance 
and Freight; Free on Board 
adjusted) – MX imports] 
1975-1980: IMF 
Directions of Trade 
Statistics (DOTS) 
Historical; 1981-2004: 
IMF DOTS 
Export misinvoicing [U.S. imports – MX exports 
(Cost, Insurance and Freight; 
Free on Board adjusted)] 
1975-1980: IMF DOTS 
Historical, 1981-2004: 
IMF DOTS 
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Table D.2 Further Goodness-of-fit Statistics (Illegal Goods Smuggling Estimations) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics Specification 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
AGFI 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.97 0.90 0.97 0.89 
PGFI 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.47 
ECVI 0.19 0.29 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 
ECVI independence 
model 
0.43 0.38 0.38 0.19 0.18 0.23 0.23 
ECVI saturated model 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.19 
AIC  41.57 50.27 45.20 33.42 45.02 33.02 46.08 
AIC independence model 120.12 144.94 84.36 67.20 66.14 69.95 68.11 
AIC saturated model 72.00 72.00 72.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 
 
 
 
 
Table D.3 Further Goodness-of-fit Statistics (Legal Goods Smuggling Estimations) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics Specification 
 8 9 10 11 
AGFI 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 
PGFI 0.42 0.53 0.53 0.40 
ECVI 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.05 
ECVI independence model 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.09 
ECVI saturated model 0.19 0.10 0.13 0.07 
AIC  29.38 15.74 15.85 12.91 
AIC independence model 32.61 30.26 25.73 26.38 
AIC saturated model 42.00 30.00 30.00 20.00 
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Table D.4 Estimates for Illegal and Legal Goods Smuggling 
Year Illegal goods smuggling 
(billions U.S. dollars) 
Export misinvoicing 
(billions U.S. dollars) 1) 
Import misinvoicing 
(billions U.S. dollars) 1) 
1976 75.52   
1977 84.68   
1978 84.16   
1979 78.81   
1980 69.45 -0.03 0.19 
1981 71.99 -0.18 0.00 
1982 74.24 -0.51 0.73 
1983 113.11 -0.69 1.66 
1984 115.99 -0.59 0.91 
1985 114.36 -0.66 1.03 
1986 116.36 -0.36 -0.59 
1987 81.69 -0.47 -0.31 
1988 86.58 -0.36 -0.71 
1989 68.11 -0.19 -0.93 
1990 76.20 -0.23 -0.18 
1991 77.28 -0.29 0.52 
1992 79.42 0.00 -1.17 
1993 73.16 0.22 -3.30 
1994 62.32 0.06 -3.50 
1995 87.23 -0.51 -0.83 
1996 79.77 -0.61 -0.32 
1997 62.12 -0.36 -1.66 
1998 50.07 -0.18 -2.59 
1999 39.92 -0.02 -3.36 
2000 40.10 -0.08 -3.03 
2001 29.61 0.04 -3.77 
2002 22.86 0.03 -3.83 
2003 23.43 -0.06 -3.47 
2004 27.36 -0.30 -2.28 
1) Positive values indicate underinvoicing; negative values indicate overinvoicing. 
Note: The indices for illegal goods smuggling, export misinvoicing, and import misinvoicing are 
calculated using specifications 4, 9, and 11 respectively. 
